Making Resource Futures:

Petroleum and Performance

by the Norwegian Barents Sea

Ragnhild Freng Dale

Hughes Hall

November 2018

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Scott Polar Research Institute

University of Cambridge

'Will I appear in your thesis?', T asked, as we were chatting on Facebook an evening in August, a few months before my thesis was due.

I told him I have anonymised everyone, though he was still there, somewhere, which I hoped was ok.

So to T, and everyone I have met during my fieldwork:
I hope that you can recognise the perspectives I describe and that they reflect some of the home region you know and live in.

I also hope I might surprise you; that on these pages, if you come to read them, you might find new or unfamiliar perspectives, and see some of the overlapping worlds that are woven together with your own.

And I hope we meet again soon, outside of my fieldwork notes.

Declaration

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the Degree Committee of Earth Sciences and Geography.

Abstract

This thesis is an ethnographic study of life with oil and gas in Hammerfest, the first petroleum town in Finnmark, and of what role this town plays and is cast as in narratives of petroleum as a driver for development in the larger region. It examines how oil in the Barents region is both disputed and celebrated, and how this resource, which has been central to the Norwegian economy and society for the last 50 years, is understood from northern perspectives. In particular, it explores what forms consent and conflict take, and how different actors engage in showing, masking and performing these.

Throughout the thesis, I employ performance as a trope to understand the creation and circulation of narratives about petroleum in the north, and how they are put in motion by industry players, local and national politicians, environmentalists and other actors. Working in a region that is simultaneously Sápmi and Northern Norway, the thesis also asks how assimilation policies and coloniality continue to have an impact today, and how this partakes in the making of pasts, presents and futures in the region.

The first part of the thesis seeks to ground the making of narratives and lives in Hammerfest, to understand how the stakes and impacts of resource development are understood locally, and how futures are made and broken by the materialisation of the petroleum projects on- and offshore.

The second part of the thesis is concerned with how the industry, the state and environmentalists creatively engage with conference settings, state rituals and the legal system, to strengthen their own narrative or contest that of others.

From platform openings to announcement of licensing rounds, industry celebrations to Norway's first climate lawsuit, the thesis argues that an explicit focus on performance and rituals of state and industry is critical for our understanding of industrial development and resource futures.

Sammendrag

Denne avhandlingen er en etnografisk studie av Hammerfest, den første og så langt eneste petroleumsbyen i Finnmark. Studien undersøker byens samliv med olje og gass-industrien, samt rollen Hammerfest spiller og blir tildelt i fortellingene om petroleum som en driver for utvikling og framtid i regionen rundt. Den utforsker hvordan oljen i Barentsregionen er både omstridt og bejublet, og hvordan en ressurs som har vært sentral for den norske økonomien og samfunnsutviklingen de siste femti årene blir forstått fra nordlige perspektiv. Særlig undersøkes spørsmål rundt konfliktlinjer og samfunnsaksept, og hvordan ulike aktører arbeider for å synliggjøre, skjule eller iscenesette disse.

I avhandlingen brukes 'performance'-begrepet (eller iscenesettelse på norsk) som en gjennomgående metafor for å forstå hvordan narrativene om olje i nord skapes, hvordan de sirkulerer og settes i bevegelse av industriaktører, lokale og nasjonale politikere, miljøvernere og andre. Studien er situert i en region som er både Sápmi og Nord-Norge, og avhandlingen drøfter hvordan fornorskingspolitikk og kolonialitet fortsatt påvirker samfunnet i dag og former både fortid, nåtid og fremtid i regionen.

Den første delen av avhandlingen undersøker hvordan ressursutviklingen rundt Hammerfest forstås i et lokalt perspektiv, og hvilke lokale narrativ som skapes og sirkulerer. Den spør også hva som står på spill i folks liv når byen formes og omformes, og hvordan ulike framtider blir muliggjort eller forhindret når petroleumsprosjekter materialiseres offshore og på land.

Den andre delen av avhandlingen søker å belyse hvordan industriaktører, staten og miljøvernere tar i bruk arenaer som konferanser, statlige ritualer og rettssystemet på ulike måter, enten det er for å styrke sitt eget narrativ eller for å utfordre andres.

Avhandlingen viser at et eksplisitt fokus på 'performance'/iscenesettelse, særlig statlige og industrielle ritualer, åpner for nye måter å forstå industriutvikling og ressursfremtider på, blant annet gjennom åpninger av oljeplattformer, annonseringen av nye lisensrunder i Barentshavet, feiring av industriutvikling og Norges første klimasøksmål.

(Abstract translated to Norwegian by the author)

Oktiigeassu

Dát nákkosgirji lea Hámmárfeastta etnográfalaš dutkkus. Hámmárfeasta lea vuosttamuš, ja dán rádjái áidna, petroleumgávpot Finnmárkkus. Dutkkus guorahallá gávpoga ovttaseallima olju- ja gássaindustriijain, ja válddáhallá Hámmárfeastta rolla - sihke dan maid váldá ja dan maid oažžu - muitalusas mas petroleum oidno birastahtti regiovnna ovdánahttima ja boahtteáiggi vuodjeleaddjin. Dutkkus suokkarda mo Barentsregiovnna olju lea sihke riidovuloš ja ávvuduvvon, ja mo resursa mii maŋimuš 50 jagi lea leamaš norgga ekonomiija ja servodatovdánahttima vuođđun áddejuvvo davveguovllu čalmmiiguin. Erenoamážit guorahallojuvvojit riiddut ja servodatdohkkeheapmi, ja man láhkai iešguđetge aktevrrat barget dáid čalmmustuhttit, čiegadit dahje čájehallat.

Nákkosgirjjis geavahuvvo “performance”-doaba (sámás “láhttedeapmi”) obbalaš metaforan ádden dihte mo narratiivvat davveguovllu oljju birra hábmejuvvojit, mo dat johtet ja mo industriijaaktevrrat, báikkálaš ja našuvnnalaš politihkkárat, birasgáhttejeaddjit ja earát váldet oasi dáid jođihit. Dutkkus lea dahkkon regiovnnas mii lea sihke Sápmi ja davvi-Norga, ja nákkosgirji suokkardallá mo dáruiduhttinpolitihkka ja koloniálateahtta ain báidná otná servodaga, ja mo dat hábme regiovnna vássán áiggi, dálá áigge ja boahtteáiggi .

Nákkosgirjji vuosttaš oassi guorahallá mo Hámmárfeastta guovllu resursaovdánahttin áddejuvvo báikkálaš perspektiivvas, ja mat báikkálaš narratiivvat ráhkaduvvojit ja jođášit. Jearrá maiddái mii buollá olbmuid eallimiin go gávpot hábmejuvvo ja rievdaduvvo, ja mo iešguđetge boahtteáiggit šaddet vejolažžan dahje hehttejuvvojit go petroleumprošeavttat bohtet áigái sihke mearas ja gáttis.

Nákkosgirjji nubbi oassi iská čuvgehit mo industriijaaktevrrat, stáhta ja birasgáhttejeaddjit iešguđetge láhkai váldet atnui arenaid nu mo konferánssaid, stáhtalaš rituálaid ja riektavuogádaga, jogo iežas narratiivva nannet dahje earáid narratiivvaid hástalit.

Nákkosgirji čájeha ahte láhttedeami eksplisihtta guovdilastin, áinnas stáhtalaš ja industriála rituálaid guovdilastin, rahpá ođđa vejolaš áddejumiid industriijaovdánahttimiidda ja resurssaboahtteáiggiide. Earrát eará guoská dát oljolávddiid rahpandilálašvuođaide, Barentsábi ođđa liseansaohcanalmmuhemiide, industriijaovdánahttima ávvudemiide ja Norgga vuosttaš dálkkádatášševuolggaheapmái.

(Abstract translated to Northern Sámi by Siri Broch Johansen)

Table of contents

List of figures

Acknowledgements

An academic piece of work is never one person's solo endeavour, and social anthropology perhaps least so of any academic discipline. For the insight and inspiration that led me to write this ethnography, I am indebted to interlocutors, community members and friends for their time, thoughts and knowledge, interviewees for their willingness to indulge my many questions and thoughts, and fellow academics for companionship and inspiration.

I am grateful to everyone who made Hammerfest feel like a home to me, who welcomed me into their houses, workplaces and mountains, and accepted me as the curious ethnographer I have been. In particular, I need to thank everyone I know at Seiland/Sievju: your mountains, your food and your sense of humour was a home away from home which I couldn't have been without – and I hope for many more return visits in future.

Friends, acquaintances and interlocutors in other parts of Finnmark, Sápmi and Northern Norway showed me parts of their lives and landscapes, professionally and personally, which have shaped how I came to know these lands. My language class and teachers at the Sámi Allaskuvla helped me learn so much more than a language, opening doors into their lives, experiences and stories across colonial borders and histories. The Riddu Riđđu family, which Karoline Trollvik first made me part of, gave me power and inspiration as I grew into the team across the years. Tromsø has grown to be my second home, thanks to the warm community of theatre-makers and artists who have become such great friends and collaborators during fieldwork breaks, theatre events and writing retreats.

To my formal and informal sources in the petroleum industry, I am grateful for insights and understandings gleaned by our many conversations and discussions. Whatever you make of my conclusions, I hope you will find yourselves and your perspectives treated with respect.

The preparations and writing of this PhD took place in Cambridge, on the top floor of the Scott Polar Research Institute. Friends and colleagues at SPRI have been important companions with whom I have shared discussions, frustrations and laughter along the way – particularly Morgan Seag, Victoria Herrman, Natalia Magnani, Peter Martin, Henry Anderson-Elliot, Michael Bravo and Ian Willis. In Social Anthropology,

Jonathan Wooley, Farhan Samani, Christina Woolner, Julia Modern, Corinna Howland, Chris Kaplonski, Barbara Bodenhorn and Richard Irvine have all been invaluable discussion partners, readers and friends during different stages of my work. I have also found friendships and support in the community of Gates scholars, who helped me keep afloat and supported me even when I returned after two years of absence.

When I embarked on my studies at the start of 2014, it was not quite part of the plan that I would graduate after my initial supervisor's retirement. I owe Piers Vitebsky thanks for engaging supervisions and pre-fieldwork discussions, for connecting me to Árran, and for the time to find my own way when opportunities that could not be turned down arose.

In my final year and a half I was supervised by Richard Powell, without whom this thesis would not have been written. Guiding my writing process from early drafts through to the end, and steadily dealing with administrative issues that arose along the way, he provided me with the support and encouragement I needed to get the work done.

Thanks extend to Árran Lule Sami Centre and Sven-Roald Nystø for folding my research into their project, *Indigenous Peoples and Resource Extraction in the Arctic: Evaluating Ethical Guidelines.* Participating in fieldwork with Emma Wilson, Roman Sidortsov, Natalya Novikova and Áike Niillas Peder Selfors gave me much deeper insight into the interaction between the extractive industries and indigenous institutions in Sápmi and other parts of the Arctic than I would have been able to discover on my own. It was also Lars Magne Andreassen at Árran who suggested the excellent and rather life-changing idea that I should learn a bit of Northern Sámi at the Sámi Allaskuvla.

The Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Bergen generously provided me with an office space for more than a year as I worked to put my notes, theory and thoughts (if perhaps not my desk) in order. Ståle Knudsen and the members of the Energethics project – especially Oda Eiken, Ingrid Birce Müftüoglu and Siri Lange – were the source of inspiring conversations and seminars which provided important insights and ample opportunities for fieldwork meetings with Statoil and other industry representatives, both from their CSR department and those who work in the Norwegian North. The department's PhD candidates have been excellent company during many writing sessions and general bantering.

The entire team behind *Trial of the Century,* particularly Morten Traavik and Guro Vrålstad at traavik.info, trusted me to be a full part of the development of a project that was nothing but a dream to work on. TOC has been a source of inspiration and new perspectives – including my favourite quotation in this PhD.

My work has also benefited from opportunities to present parts of chapters and loose ideas at a number of conferences, in smaller discussion groups, and in one-on-one discussions. Ingrid Bay-Larsen, Brigt Dale, Berit Kristoffersen, Hugo Reinert, Abraham Heinemann, Helge Ryggvik, Kjerstin Uhre, Corine Wood-Donnelly, Anna Szolucha, Máret Ánne Sara, Joar Nango, Siri Broch Johansen, Beaska Niillas, Jenni Laiti and many others helped me improve my thinking and deepen my insights along the way. An extra thanks to Siri Broch Johansen, for translating the abstract of the thesis to Northern Sámi.

My fieldwork was supported and made possible by funding from the Department of Geography and the Scandinavian Studies Fund at the University of Cambridge, Árran Lule Sami Centre, and the Energethics project at the University of Bergen. The Gates Cambridge Trust funded my tuition fees and living costs in Cambridge.

Many many friends and helpers along the way have supported me non-financially in ways which are too innumerable to recount.

Giitu. Takk. Thank you.

A final thanks goes to my brother and my parents for unfailing support throughout, and to my wider family for bearing with my research into the industry in which they live their professional lives.

To friends, allies, and discussion partners – I hope this work honours your commitment to make our shared worlds breathe a little longer.

And to all: I hope this thesis marks not an end, but a continuation of our conversations. There is so much work still to be done.

Acronyms (English-Norwegian/Northern Sámi)

BAT – Best Available Technology

BSSE – Barents Sea South-East

DNT - The Norwegian Trekking Association (Den norske turistforening)

FIVH - Future in our hands (Fremtiden i våre hender)

FrP – the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet)

ILO 169 – Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No. 169)

IPCC – The International Panel on Climate Change

IWGIA – International Work Group for Indigenous

KrF – The Christian Democrats (Kristelig Folkeparti)

LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas

NCS – Norwegian Continental Shelf

NNV – Friends of the Earth Norway (Naturvernforbundet)

NOFO – Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies

NOROG – The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association (Norsk olje og gass)

NPD – The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (Oljedirektoratet)

NPK – Network of Petroleum Municipalities (Nettverk av Petroleumskommuner)

NSR – Norwegian Sámi Association (Norske Samers Riksforbund / Norgga Sámiid Riikkasearvi)

NU – Nature and Youth (Natur og ungdom)

OED – The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Olje- og energidepartmentet)

PDO – Plan for Development and Operation (PUD – Plan for utbygging og drift)

SAR – Search and Rescue

Sp – Centre Party (Senterpartiet)

SV – The Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti)

UN – The United Nations

WWF – World Wildlife Foundation

Tuning in: a rough guide to the Norwegian North

Whichever way you first arrive in Hammerfest – whether you come by air, flying in over the mountainous islands of Kvaløya, Seiland and Sørøya, or if you come the long road over Sennalandet – you will inevitably see two things: First, a compact, modern town with buildings of glass and steel, small wooden houses and a polished wooden walkway along the pier, guarded by a polar bear on top of the hill. Second, the island of Melkøya, where Statoil's LNG plant (Liquefied Natural Gas) is in operation night and day, transforming gas from the subsea field to LNG, which can be loaded on tanker ships and transported to ports across the world. Some days, you might see the gas flame flare up towards the sky, signifying some problem being fixed. Other days, it will be quiet and silent as there is no need for this safety valve to regulate the operational pressure. The town and the gas plant dominate the landscape, the often snow-clad mountains and the vast, open sea when the town is in view. Hammerfest is also on land that is part of Sápmi, the land of the indigenous Sámi[1] who are divided by the borders of four nation-states; Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia – though there are few, if any, visual markers that tell you so, save for the reindeer that used to roam the streets in summer, but are now kept outside the town by a long fence.

Oil has been part of the Norwegian economy since the 1970s, but in Finnmark, Norway's northernmost county, Snøhvit (Snow White) became the first field in the Barents Sea when it started production in 2007. Since then, Hammerfest has been the petroleum capital of Finnmark. The significance of this development must be seen in relation to the history of the region and the town, which was burnt to the ground after World War II and experienced an industrial boom and then decline of industrial fishing and processing in the post-war period. Oil, I suggest, is locally a continuation as

[1] In Norwegian, the spelling of 'Sami' and 'Saminess' is with only one 'a' and no apostrophe (*same* or *samisk)*, whereas the English spelling varies in different texts; some write Saami, which is closer to the Finnish spelling, others write Sámi or Sami. In this thesis, I write 'á', but where I quote other literature I have kept their spelling.

much as a break. It must also be seen against the backdrop of the oil industry's rise in Norway since the first discoveries on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) in the 1960s, where a growing oil economy was built on top of the post-war welfare state and its structures. After the discovery of the giant Ekofisk field in 1962, legislation was put in place to ensure the resources stayed under Norwegian control, and the state mobilised to ensure Norwegian industry would take part in what promised to be a highly profitable venture (Ryggvik 2010; Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken 1997). Statoil[2] was created as a state-owned company as part of this process. Since the 1970s, the petroleum sector has become dominant in Norwegian society, employing 239 000 people before oil prices collapsed in 2014 (Prestmo, Strøm, and Midsem 2015).

Oil further north has been more controversial. This controversy has centred around the potentially vulnerable environment in the northern areas, leading to cycles of attention and delay from the 1980s onwards. Hammerfest was made a petroleum base in 1980 by the government, with equipment to respond in case of an oil spill during the exploratory phase. Fields that would become Snøhvit were discovered in 1984, but northern petroleum developments were put on hold and mostly remained off the table for the next 20 years due to long distances, high costs and environmental concerns. This changed in the late 1990s, and in 2002 Snøhvit was approved by the Norwegian Storting (Parliament). The Barents Sea was open to business – finally, for some, and to the dismay of others. The sector has since come to dominate the town of Hammerfest (Holm et al. 2013), thus far the only petroleum town in Finnmark. Elsewhere, notably the Lofoten islands, sustained resistance is closely linked with a local identity rooted in the fishing communities as both a past and future way of life (B. Dale 2011; Kristoffersen and B. Dale 2014; Kristoffersen and Langhelle 2017).

[2] In May 2018, Statoil ASA changed its name to Equinor. As the material in this thesis refers to the period before the name-change, I refer to the company by its former name.



Figure 1. Map of fieldwork area and key locations. Petroleum fields Snøhvit (Statoil) and Goliat (Eni Norge) top left. (Credit: Tom Chudley)

Figure 2. Hammerfest and the gas flame from Melkøya LNG. (Photo: Ragnhild Freng Dale)

What does such an influx of a multibillion extractive industry do to a small town? Is Hammerfest to be reduced only to oil and gas? How do historical experiences influence contemporary structures? The flare at Melkøya has fuelled people's optimism for the future, and transformed the town from a fish-based economy to an architecturally modern city of glass, steel and supply ships (Holm et al. 2013). Though now a 'petroleum capital', Hammerfest's identity is rooted in the northern and Arctic: the municipal coat-of-arms remains a polar bear, not a fish or trading vessel, and certainly not an oil drop – even if this was suggested by a performance artist twice in recent years, both times to mixed amusement.[3] A seafront of new offices and apartment blocks completes the impression of a thoroughly modern town, whilst the remainder of the seafront bears testament to the previous and less affluent construction cycle in the post-war era. The small, often make-shift architecture from the 1960s has an important historical role in the perception of the place. Some, particularly in the older generation, are strongly connected to what it represents. Others are glad to see it change: they want to be part of modern times like the rest of the country.

What precisely this modernity is means different things to different people. Behind the immediate face of the town and the new facades, are stories and experiences silenced in a flurry of activity around the new industrial project. Silence in life stories that existed before the arrival of the gas-fired dreams, which entangle with them and which inevitably are impacted by and impact on this development. These are the relationalities that abound and are present here, knots that stretch across Finnmark and Norway and internationally to other Sámi and Norwegians, environmentalists and indigenous peoples, across species and mountains and water and seasons, a web of relations that intervened in my fieldwork and my life.

Some of them are stories of success and positive growth. Others are stories of neglect, denial, and silencing. Many occupy a space in between or outside of the official

[3] Amund Sjølie Sveen's *Nordting* was performed twice in Hammerfest, once at the high school (2015) and once at the Arctic Cultural Centre (2017).

narrative, excluded from the reckoning of ripple effects in official reports, or the research that tracks industrial spin-offs in and around Hammerfest and Finnmark from industrial activities.[4] They fail to fit the parameters, but are part of the 'friction' (Tsing 2005) that occurs when a global and national industry meets local, often contradictory worlds.

The first theme of this thesis is about these entanglements, and how performances and narratives work to strengthen or resist ideas of what Hammerfest and Finnmark is and should be. It delves into what kind of futures are planned, dreamed of, and anticipated in and around Hammerfest, and how they shape the structures of the present, the past and the everyday. It is about aspects of life in a town where the everyday interweaves with industry, and explores what the materialities of gas and oil mean for local experience and regional economy. It explores how the town is used as stage to give weight to, and contest, narratives about the relationship between the oil and the Norwegian welfare state, local development and regional drivers, and of what and who can co-exist in the new High North. In short, it discusses what is at stake in the development of large-scale resources, and how these stakes are understood, narrated and performed.

The second theme of this thesis is about what role performance plays in shifting discourses, perceptions, and attention to what other anthropologists have called the partial connections (de la Cadena 2015, Strathern 2004, Haraway 1999) between indigeneity, governance, environmental activism, state-making, art and the colonial processes which have shaped both this region and Norway's national identity. I draw on anthropology and critical geography on petroleum and the Polar regions, using performance as a trope through which certain events highlight and emphasize wider

[4] The notion of ripple effects is a common-sense model for Norwegians, used to describe how the effects or industry spread out from a concrete image of an object landing in water and 'rippling' out to affect other industries and the larger society, a type of model which is both descriptive and normative at the same time (Reinert 2018:5–6).

tendencies of development, and become narratives which travel and create authoritative accounts.

In **Chapter 1,** I discuss my relation to the field and my research, past and present colonialism in Norway and Sápmi, and my methods and engagement within scholarly, artistic, corporate and activist contexts.

In **Chapter 2,** I situate Norway within the literature of oil and resource extraction in anthropology and geography, and outline Norway's history as the 'exception' to the resource curse. This lays a foundation for understanding how the promises of petroleum-fuelled futures in the north rest on a discourse of similar benefits as in the south. I briefly discuss what role the environmental movement is considered to play by social theorists, before I develop the theoretical framework I will employ throughout the thesis to consider state rituals, petroleum conferences and activist actions alike as performances of different kinds, analysing their intended audiences and effects.

In **Chapter 3,** I discuss Hammerfest's relation to the industry, seen through a celebratory event of Snøhvit and people's memory of the earlier days of the fishing industry and the first years of petroleum. I also discuss how the experiences of ripple effects from onshore development causes a demand for the 'onshore' in Finnmark, as a way to guarantee benefits stay within the community and aren't extracted to 'the south', leaving the region as a resource colony.

In **Chapter 4,** I discuss the presence, absence, and different forms dissent and protest takes, paying attention to how environmentalists are framed as outsiders, the collaboration between the fishing association, Statoil, Eni and the emergency oil spill preparedness, and how Sámi interests are conflictually tied up in colonial legacies and current conflicts.

In **Chapter 5,** I turn to a performative analysis of Eni Norge's Goliat project, and how they use petroleum conferences to present themselves and their disputed project as a success. I also discuss the role of local media, as national media start unravelling a story that portrays Eni as irresponsible and threatening the Norwegian model of trust.

In **Chapter 6,** I analyse the launch of the 23rd licensing round as a stately ritual strategically moved to Hammerfest to create legitimacy for the oil industry's future in the north as a success story with great potential, and how the dynamics of the town's positive attitude towards oil is used to create an image of regional consensus. I then discuss how environmentalists disrupt this by scaling up their protest to a legal challenge in a lawsuit which claims Norway breaches the constitution, and how this highlights the limits and gaps of considerations for the climate within the Petroleum Act.

The **interludes** spread between chapters are presented as fragments of other perspectives and deepening of stories, pointing to currents and undercurrents which are essential parts of the context in which the other scenes play out. They should be read for what they are: disruptions, tensions, disagreements, and sometimes support of a line of argument proposed by other angles on the themes of this thesis – reminders that no matter the neatness of a performed narrative, it inevitably leaves other experiences and worlds out of the frame. I have left them hanging between the chapters to perform an analogous move; to remind both myself and the reader of the untidiness of the worlds we present in ethnographic writing.

In conclusion, I draw the chapters together, asking whether narratives of growth and development as dependent on exploitation of petroleum resources really can be understood as made through performances, stagings and disputes, in the same way those of artists and activists are. Different worlds and discourses borrow, steal and reduce elements of and from each other, and though not equal in form, intention or

power to define what counts as 'real', they share strategies and similarities when placed in a comparative relation. As the future of the Arctic is increasingly at the centre of attention both in Norway and globally, this focus on strategies and performances is critical. It shows the inherently performative nature of resource extraction, where ritual performances occur at all levels of social and political worlds.

Chapter 1

On learning to listen and daring to write

We work from soiled grounds, in an atmosphere thick with the byproducts of fossil-fuel-intensive political and economic systems. Our anthropologies to come must work to dislodge the future these systems so forcefully anteriorize.

(Fortun 2014:324)

There is no postcolonial

(Pile o'Sápmi 2017)

This is an ethnography of how futures are made, unmade, performed and negotiated in the north of Norway, a region often cast as the periphery of a periphery of the world, but that is central to several ongoing struggles, from climate change and the future role of fossil fuel producers, to the aftermaths of assimilation policies and attempts to wipe out indigeneity in a Scandinavian welfare state. In this sense, it is also an ethnography of how futures and pasts are interwoven in the current moment, and how narratives are performed by the players most interested in building petroleum-fuelled projects in a newly opened area on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). It is an ethnography of how locals understand these developments, and the conflictual interests that have everything to do with the historical experiences still living inside people's bodies and minds in Finnmark and elsewhere in what is termed the Barents Region, the High North, the Norwegian Arctic or other varieties of geopolitical terms which come to shape the conditions of their futures, presents and pasts. I seek to

ground the making of narratives recurring in geopolitics and high-level strategies, to understand how the stakes and impacts of resource development are understood differently by different players, and how futures are made and broken by their materialisation.

Two questions made their presence known when I started my research on petroleum in Northern Norway. First, where does research on extractive industries really begin, when the context it takes place in is a colonial context that is not readily thought of as one in public or political discourse? Second, what language can narrate and analyse across and between positions, when any narrative, academic or otherwise, will inevitably bring some voices to the front, privilege some, and silence others? How does one write from within complicity? One answer is that we have to construct our own archives, working both in and outside the official record, another that our historical imagination should not be limited by ideas of 'traditional' and 'modern' and other such fixating categories (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). 'If texts are to be more than literary topoi, shards from which we presume worlds,' write Comaroff and Comaroff, 'they have to be anchored in the processes of their production, in the orbits of connection and influence that give them life and force' (1992:34). Writing a contemporary ethnography that starts in West Finnmark, I have found it necessary to acknowledge that coloniality still shoots through both the articulations and the silences of people and landscapes in the region.

The quotations that form the epigraph of this chapter both concern language; how we use it, how it transmits power and healing, who speaks and how they do so. *Pile o'Sápmi* is a piece of art and an art movement curated by the artist Máret Anne Sara, whose family have summer pastures for their reindeer on Kvaløya, the island where Hammerfest lies and which has seen a rapid and increasing industrialisation in parallel with the development of petroleum fields, whilst the Ministry of Agriculture wants to reduce the number of reindeer for reasons of ecological sustainability. The science

behind the rationale has been heavily criticised by political ecologists, economists and social scientists, as has the lack of consideration of the cumulative impacts of industrial expansion (Bjørklund 2016b; Johnsen, Benjaminsen, and Eira 2015), but the arguments against the state's experts and the state's practices are not easily overturned. Sara's artwork, alongside other contemporary Sámi artists, search for other avenues to talk of ongoing struggles over Sámi rights, both on the Norwegian side of Sápmi, in Sweden and in Finland – speaking through the arts at the same time as others might fight in the court or through politics (Dale 2018b; Junka-Aikio 2018; Sandström 2017; Stephansen 2017).

Simultaneously, not everyone in majority society or among the Sámi will agree with this statement, or with the art movement which so forcefully has centred contemporary struggles over rights and livelihoods, culture and futures, springing out of a court case over reindeer numbers and carrying capacities on Kvaløya. Most certainly, not everyone in my fieldsite agreed or felt comfortable with the often graphic artworks and the explicit labelling of colonialism and state oppression that these works of art express. With the Sámi well integrated in the Norwegian welfare state, unlike indigenous populations in other parts of the world (Bjerkli and Selle 2015), what language can be found to talk about the ways in which the state still acts in a colonial mindset? *Pile o'Sápmi* is an uncomfortable presence, or as curator and artist Hilde Schanke Pedersen puts it: 'This type of art does not seem to appear as assumedly politically correct, but springs from a deeply felt necessity, a care for the survival of the individual and the culture.' (2017:14). It is a reminder that before Norway can be post- or decolonial, it must come to terms with its past and present coloniality. The question about what kind of future is made in these regions, whether they are called the Arctic, the High North, or the Barents Region, must be dealt with in a way which acknowledges how this reality is felt, contested and questioned by people who live here.

This is where Fortun's quotation ties in with the place, people, landscape and temporalities. How can writing and working as an anthropologist dislodge some of the logic that seems to propel itself so relentlessly forwards, with such a narrow understanding of what a viable future is and should be? What other stories are there, those that strategies and conference talks put in the background, or the structures of political representation render powerless to decide the conditions of their own futures? Who speaks for the non-human actors whose futures are inextricably bound with ours? And what strategies for influence and social change are quietly at work through everyday practices? I leave these questions hanging for now, but they are what this chapter – and in many ways this thesis – is all about.

Initial research questions

My project initially started from an interest in understanding the dynamics of petroleum development and the values at stake as prospects and futures were made and unmade in Arctic landscapes, as well as a life-long interest and periodical work in the arts sector. I wanted to study how artists and activists dealt with these issues, and how performance as a tactic was employed in Arctic regions. I hoped to bring performance and performativity – a theoretical lens from my previous research on theatre practitioners (Dale 2013) – to bear not only on the performance of activism, but on the performance of resource extraction itself. My involvement in activism prior to starting my PhD, including divestment work for 350.org, had turned my interest towards energy, environment and narratives of futurity. Organising student activism for divestment and against petroleum research sponsored by Statoil in Norway in 2013-2014, sparked an interest in ethics and future imaginaries. This interest was only furthered by fact that the National Committee on Research Ethics (NENT) in Norway reviewed the ethics of petroleum research following these debates, stating that *'it is indefensible from a research ethics perspective if the framework conditions for petroleum*

research and research activities hinder transition processes and thus prevent the achievement of UN climate goals which Norway has pledged to uphold.' (NENT 2014).

In my PhD, I wanted to extricate myself from clear-cut activism and employ a more analytical-theoretical lens, to consider what kind of worlds are made possible through research, politics, arts and activism. Intrigued by the power and potentials of ethics, morals and what can only be described as a persistent *habitus* (Bourdieu 1977) of petroleum as a bringer of wealth and work, I started turning my focus from art and social change to that of energy, resources and society. The arts would return to frame my understanding of reality later, but at the time when I started fieldwork, I had no idea as to what form it would take.

Via Greenland to Hammerfest

In my first proposal for a PhD project, I planned on working with indigenous activists resisting resource extraction, both current and proposed projects. I made plans for fieldwork in Kaalalit Nunaat/Greenland, where struggles over minerals and energy were manifest as Greenland was trying to establish itself as a resource nation and harness the income for future independence from Denmark. Debates of Greenland's future were everywhere, from politics to activism and the arts, both in Copenhagen and in Nuuk, the capitals of Denmark and Greenland. During a preliminary trip to Nuuk during the snap elections in December 2014, it was clear that resource futures were on people's mind, though minerals took up more space than oil in people's conversations and public debate. The report *To the benefit of Greenland?* (2014) proved a definite influence and reference point, and the prospects of a uranium mine near Narsaq in the south had caused the government to lift the ban on uranium mining – a topic of fierce debate, disagreement and activism (Nuttall 2013).

Statoil was one of many companies holding licences off the West-Greenlandic coast, whilst NunaOil, the state-owned oil company, had a carried interest in all licences. The petroleum companies exploring for oil and gas would foot the bill, whilst Greenland retained a 6.25-12.5% stake in all prospects to keep some degree of control over the development. This approach was in many respects inspired by how Norway handled their petroleum wealth when it was discovered in the 1970s, the director of NunaOil told me in an interview in December 2014.

Neither I nor the rest of the world could expect that the resource boom predicted when oil prices rocketed in the 2000s, would decline so steeply in 2014. The drop in oil prices, combined with lack of actual petroleum discoveries (only Cairn Energy had drilled wells at the time, and their wells had been dry) would postpone the petroleum dreams of Greenland for the foreseeable future. Companies insisted they saw Greenland as a promising area for development, but information was scarce about any concrete plans. Not only was it difficult to find *any information at all* on oil company websites, there was no information to be gained from the companies when contacted directly. Emails and phone calls with requests for information from Statoil only ever guided me to their webpage, where information was superficial and next to non-existent.

The silence was likely a quiet exit strategy. With oil prices remaining low, and licences set to expire in 2015, oil companies abandoned their prospects, despite the Greenlandic government offering them an extension of the licencing period. Waiting for oil in Greenland increasingly felt like a variation of *Waiting for Godot*. My plan to consider arts and activism around the 'pipeline dreams' along the Arctic energy frontier (Nuttall 2010) seemed to have dissolved into thin air, as one of many 'Arctic imaginaries' (Steinberg et al. 2015) that would not be realised in the foreseeable future. The retreat of the petroleum companies was the exit of my planned research topic, and as far as Greenland's mineral future was concerned, there were already anthropologists working

on case studies of the uranium mine (e.g Bjørst 2016; Nuttall 2012, 2013). This, as well as the highly politicized relationship between Greenland and Denmark, made me feel I should turn my focus elsewhere.

If Greenland was not to become my fieldsite, the trip opened my admittedly naïve eyes to the colonial present in the Nordic countries, and to contemporary resource frontiers as continuations of these structures. The discomfort I felt was complicated by my Scandinavian appearance and Norwegian language, which made me a sort of half-Danish person and thereby part-coloniser myself – not least as Norway played a significant role in the colonisation of Greenland whilst under Danish administration (Neumann 2014). As a Cambridge PhD candidate, I belonged to an elite university, adding to what was already a complicated identity to navigate in between languages and post- or neo-colonial disputes that are still ongoing.

Meanwhile, oil was back on the table in other parts of the Arctic. The US saw a lot of activity and growth in climate-related disobedience at the time (Burkett 2016), and a striking contrast caught my attention: whilst the rest of the world cast their gaze to the campaigns directed at Shell's plan to drill for oil in the US Arctic, Norway's Arctic petroleum was temporarily out of sight. When Shell's oil rig came to the harbour in Seattle, 'kayaktivists' lined up to protest and stop it, and indigenous Coast Salish communities played active and leading roles in the protests (Norman 2017). It was a powerful David-and-Goliath moment for the environmental movement, with environmental organisations united in their call for an Arctic refuge that would keep these areas off limits forever. The protest did not stop the rig, but Shell ended their plans to drill in the Chukchi Sea not long after, and climate journalist Eric Holthaus (2015) called the kayaktivists 'the perfect symbol of climate change activism'.

Another Goliath seemed to have fallen off the radar entirely. In February the same year, the Goliat platform, owned by the Italian oil company Eni Norge,[5] started its journey from South Korea to Hammerfest, where it was set to start production in the Barents Sea before the summer. Goliat is the Norwegian spelling for Goliath, and Eni's giant was in the open, but out of sight; even Greenpeace looked like they would stay away this time. The battle had been lost in the Norwegian Storting in 2009, when the Plan for Development and Operation (PDO) was approved, and Eni got the permission to develop the field for production. They had since been delayed by more than a year with huge cost overrun, but there was little doubt: Goliat was going to start production. Yet in the eye of the world's public, it might as well have not existed. Goliat later received attention as a scandal and controversy and has been subject of extended public and parliamentary debate in Norway, but in 2015 there was resounding silence. Whilst Shell's test drilling was in the environmental movement's eye, Goliat moved slowly, but steadily towards its goal, with no David in sight.

Why was it so? What are the dynamics around the Goliat project that made this giant and its controversies fade from view? The immediate indigenous activism seemed to happen *elsewhere.* In Giron. In Oslo. In Tromsø. In Trondheim. And internationally: In Paris. In London. In Seattle. In Standing Rock. Looking to Sweden, one might say the new mining boom and mining strategy of Sweden has spurred a new movement in the fight for Sámi rights (Liliequist and Cocq 2014). In contrast, the gestures of protest against Goliat were hardly reported in the press. Why did the local protestors not receive more attention, why were they so few in number – and where was the rest of the environmental movement?

Some of the absence can be explained by the heightened attention towards the Lofoten areas, where local opposition has played an almost unprecedented role in political leveraging and national debate (Kristoffersen and B. Dale 2014), but there is more to

[5] Eni Norge has since changed its name to Vår Energi AS, after a merger with Point Resources in July 2018.

this context which raises interesting questions for anthropology. How does Finnmark's history of assimilation of the Sámi affect what can and cannot be said and done in public space and future planning? What are the felt gains and losses, risks and benefits, for the local communities in the north, and how does the oil economy partake in shaping their material and imagined realities? Protests against a mining project nearby were highly visible and articulated, but almost none spoke out against the oil field locally. Why was this so? *Why* was there so little protest here, when oil in Arctic waters is such a contested issue?

I had not planned to do my research 'at home', but the advice to dig where you stand, often ascribed to the Norwegian anthropologist Marianne Gullestad, suddenly made perfect sense. Within the space of three months, everything in my thesis plan had shifted, and I was on my way to Hammerfest. The questions raised by Goliat's arrival were simply too interesting to not investigate further.

Fieldwork

The majority of my fieldwork took place between April 2015 and September 2016, primarily in Hammerfest but also other locations near and further away from the coast of West Finnmark. I spent the autumn of 2015 in Kautokeino, where I learnt Northern Sámi at Sámi Allaskuvvla/Sámi University of Applied Sciences, and participated in some of the fieldwork for Árran Lule Sami Centre's project on extractive industries and indigenous peoples. This split my time in Hammerfest into two periods, which shaped and informed my understanding of ethnopolitics and petropolitics in the north. Whilst my first chapters focus on the local level in and around Hammerfest, the increasingly controversial issues concerning the development of Statoil's Castberg field outside Nordkapp and the 23rd licencing round in the Barents Sea South East, made their way into my fieldsite, my chapters and conclusion. My fieldwork was therefore supplemented by return visits in 2017. I also followed the climate lawsuit

(Greenpeace/Nature and Youth vs the Norwegian government), which tried to stop the new licences in the Barents Sea.

That my fieldwork started in the midst of an international and national oil crisis heightened my attention to how projects can be both/and, and how their meanings are performed and understood differently by different actors and audiences. It gave me an understanding of how fluid such understandings are, as the role of the industry in the north is contingent on local, national and international events and actors. By attending to a period which was simultaneously boom and decline, I hope to reframe some of the questions that might be asked about how futures are built – and for whom they come to matter.

What's in a name?

Naming and anonymity is a complex matter in anthropology, no less so in an era of proliferating social media, which leaves traces and crossing trails across the places the researcher moves. Where public figures such as mayors, ministers and leaders of NGOs appear in this thesis as part of public events and performances of different kinds, I have kept their names, as their actions are already in the public domain and it is in the interest of verifiable research practice to have them known as the offices or roles they represent. The names of artists whose work I discuss in this thesis have also been kept, as they operate in the public domain and anonymisation would be detrimental both to them, the thesis and the credit which their work is due.

I have conducted numerous interviews in Hammerfest and other locations, with individuals and groups ranging from NGOs to non-organised environmentalists, petroleum companies, industry associations, municipal employees, politicians, public servants, fishers, and local townspeople of different occupations. These have been semi-structured and open-ended, sometimes taking the form of longer discussions and

deliberations, depending on what the interviewee wanted to talk about. Where interviews have been granted, whether or not these are public figures, I have kept them anonymous so as to allow representatives and individuals to speak more freely.

Occasionally, I have named individuals who publish opinions in the newspaper or write books about the themes of this thesis, as these are already in the public domain. Beyond this, I have made every effort to anonymise individuals 'whose interest seemed better served at this stage by the use of pseudonyms' (Herzfeld 1991:xv) – that is, people who might not want to be front figures or serve as ethnographic characters in an academic thesis, which might be read by their townswomen- and men, by an academic community, or by others.

Fully aware that anthropological studies can be obstrusive (or to say it with one of my interlocutors: it's 'hard to know when we are at work and when we are not') – and the standing joke of a family consisting of mother, father, children and a social anthropologist (Nergård 1994:23) – I have approached my research contexts with caution, especially when touching on sensitive issues where people's intimate lives can potentially be exposed. I have, I hope, erred on the side of caution rather than exposure, ethnographic refusal (Ortner 1995; Simpson 2014) rather than a sense that 'everything' should be exposed. Anthropology is a discipline built on trust: and that bond of trust is the stuff our knowledge depends on. Where data is gathered from social media, it is explicitly from official channels of media outlets, local or national government pages and profiles, and NGOs public channels.

Finding a position 'at home'

Shifting my research area to that of my own country inevitably changed the methodological challenges I would encounter in the field – though I agree with Halvard Vike that doing anthropology 'at home' is a 'bad metaphor' and that

problematic familiarity is not directly relatable to the borders of one's own home country or language (Vike 2018). The form of the scholarly argument is always affected by the anthropologists' own definition of her relation to the fieldwork context (Gatt 2018), and this section sets out to describe the grounds on which I define my proximity and distance to the locations of my fieldwork. I do so in acknowledgement that all knowledge is situated; that anthropological knowledge is made through the relations and partial connections that we ourselves make in the field (Strathern 1991).

In terms of geographical distance, 'home' in Bergen is nearer Cambridge than Hammerfest, which is located in Finnmark, the northern-most county in Norway. Finnmark is also part of Sápmi, the Sámi homelands stretching across the northern parts of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Russia. Because my fieldsite is in a part of Finnmark which is both Norwegian and Sámi, where majority and minority exists in a complex, overlapping and often silenced relationship to each other, I have not had the luxury of choosing an either/or, but rather a both/and – seeking to understand how these identities overlap, contest each other, and shape the wider social processes that they are shaped by.

Much of what I wanted to research concerns the state as much as it concerns the local level, and as Bourdieu usefully reminds us, thinking about the state is to risk adopting the state's categories and way of thinking (Bourdieu 1996:48). It is a long time since anthropology was only interested in minority populations, and majority populations are equally important to study – both because they set important parameters for minority groups, and because they are interesting in their own right, if we are seeking to understand the process of modernisation and social change (Gullestad 1992). Because the researcher's presence in the world of the other is for a specific reason, and not as a random visitor, it requires extra reflection and caution on our part; our access to and understanding of their practices is always mediated by our own background (Nergård 1994:24–25). Figuring out how to address the relationships between state,

industry, Sámi and other local populations, remains an open and ongoing challenge throughout this thesis and in my wider work as writer, critic, and theatremaker.

Traditions of engaged anthropology are more common in the US than in the UK or Norway, as a position clearly taken by scholars across a range of sub-disciplines, from Nancy Scheper-Hughes on organ donation and a call for an engaged anthropology (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 1995), to the activist research of David Graeber on social movements (2004). Norwegian anthropologists are not unknown in the public sphere, but more often take a role as public intellectuals, commentators and translators between contexts rather than active, action-oriented researchers. For example, Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Sindre Bangstad have both regularly appeared in newspaper columns and published books aimed at non-academic audiences.

Anthropology has a history entangled in projects both of liberation and oppression, of colonialism and decolonisation, and for the many reckonings in the past decades, there is plenty of work left to do. Social anthropologists have acted as indigenous advocates and allies throughout the story of our discipline, from Franz Boas in the colonial Americas to Robert Paine in Sápmi. During the Alta struggle, anthropologists and ethnologists played important roles as allies in the fight for recognition of the Sámi in Norway as a people with rights as indigenous people. In the settlement of the Alta affair, Bjørklund and Brantenberg (1981) were commissioned write a report to provide a foundation for the Norwegian courts to understand the complexities of Sámi reindeer herding and the role of herding in Sámi culture past and present. Robert Paine was later commissioned to write a report, *Dam a River, Dam a People?* (1982) for the Supreme Court when they handled the Alta case. Bjørklund has continued to play an important role as an outspoken academic, for example in criticising the colonial thinking of the state in their treatment of a young reindeer herder's future as less important than Arctic business development (Bjørklund 2017a). He was recently entrusted a position in the Truth and Reconciliation commission created by the

Norwegian Storting in 2018, to look into the historical and present wrongs the Norwegian state has committed against the Sámi and Kven peoples in Norway.

The late Georg Henriksen, social anthropologist at the University of Bergen, worked with indigenous groups, especially the Innu, and was part of founding the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). He also undertook work for a Sámi group from Mid-Norway after they had seen the success with which other anthropologists had done so with regards to the Alta River (Henriksen 1985:125). Though he warned against the way in which anthropologists can make clients of the groups they work, he saw anthropology as a potential tool for social change and to 'address (…) urgent issues of domination, conflict and structural violence' (Henriksen 2003:122). Anthropology's role might be modest in the wider picture, but there is a place for anthropology that listens to and advocates for the people they are working with. Such an anthropology requires we have an idea of what a good society is, but even more important that we listen to what vision of a good society those we work with have. Importantly for the context in which this thesis is written, he remarked that 'the question of Sámi land rights in Norway appears to many Norwegians, including many Norwegian anthropologists, to be so difficult that they refrain from engaging themselves in the issue.' (*ibid.*:123). These words ring true to my experience of working in both Sápmi and majority Norwegian society, where there are still several situations where Sámi are ignored, discriminated against or disbelieved in processes of law-making or infrastructure projects, from border agreements to salmon management and windmill parks (Holmberg 2018; Joks and Law 2017; Otte, Rønningen, and Moe 2018).

When researching energy, colonial pasts and presents, it is neither possible nor desirable to maintain a 'neutral' stance, as our practice always serve to either preserve or challenge the hegemonic order (Mouffe 2013). I am not arguing that all anthropologists should take their placards to the street; but those who do so are continuing rather than compromising a strand within the anthropological tradition.

We are always already positioned and political actors, whose privileged positions do not absolve us of the responsibility we have for what we and our research does (or does not do).

In Berglund's reflection on her position doing research on the environmental movement in Germany, she found herself torn between maintaining an academic stance and putting forward her own view, noting that academics and activists in Western countries share a bias in their reliance on expertise (Berglund 1998:16). Initially, this was a condition I thought I shared, until I understood that my desire to interrogate and deeper understand the grounds for my perspective are what enabled and motivated my research in the first place. I follow Nader's call to 'study up' and not only 'down' or across to marginalised people here, but more importantly her assertion that anthropologists should study power because the powerful shape the lives of so many – and most encouraging for myself, that indignation and anger should be good motives for choosing what one studies (Nader 1972). I also found inspiration in Kim Fortun's work on activism in India and the US after the Bhopal disaster. Working within advocacy, whilst tracing transnational connections, she explains how '[o]scillation between different sources of data became an important research strategy' (Fortun 2001:6). Though centred on Hammerfest and the first petroleum projects in the Norwegian Barents Sea, this thesis also moves between and across locations, as it seeks to trace how they become significant locally *and* translocally, from the Storting in Oslo to the streets of Paris, from fly-in conferences to courtrooms and mountaintops, from local everyday lives to state and corporate strategies, and how it is in the friction between these worlds that they are all changed, remade and energised in different ways (Tsing 2005).[6]

[6] I write 'worlds' in plural not to make them all equal, but to note how these are also questions of competing ontologies; some seek to rule out others, to claim a privileged position to define what is 'real' and what counts as valid, whilst also overlapping as they seek to either affirm or close down parts of the other.

Some anthropologists warn against fieldwork in corporate offices as anthropologists tend to identify with our research subjects and thereby 'risk cooptation' (Benson and Kirsch 2010: 464). I think this is a risk we must take, not least because my background in activism tests both the limits of objectivity, and heightens a realisation made during fieldwork on Norwegian corporations; that the researcher *always* becomes part of the risk management of the company when we are invited into their offices (Müftüoglu et al. 2018). Rather than cooptation, then, 'our social and cultural frameworks simultaneously limit and make possible objective research', which should be met with both self-reflexiveness and 'intense ethnographic engagement' (Gullestad 1992). Marc Edelman argues that researchers tend to study movements they sympathise with (Edelman 2001:302) – a practice that might facilitate access, but also make analysis challenging (Edelman 2001; Knudsen 2014). Though the importance of movement tactics and non-violent direct action should not be underestimated when considering how social change is brought about (Burkett 2016), the broader social field in which it operates should be studied to understand the broader context of why people might be sympathetic but not join a social movement, or be put off by some of their tactics (Edelman 2001:311; Gledhill 2000).

I wanted, then, to build my project not on activism per se, but in a way that would let me understand what was at stake in the development of large-scale resource extraction from multiple perspectives. I wanted to learn how the industry thinks and presents itself to itself, and what this means in the only petroleum town in Finnmark. Rather than a preconceived idea of everything being either good or bad, I designed my research to expose me an equivocation between positions, working across locations and events to look for both overlaps and gaps between worlds that were made possible and impossible by extractive development.[7]

[7] The term equivocation' stems from the work of anthropologists Marisol de la Cadena and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, who build on the work of Marilyn Strathern (1991, 2011) and her discussions of partial connections and 'bifurcation' in the anthropological endeavour

Specific challenges

Studying industry in Norway as a Norwegian, there are a number of factors which make straightforward categorisations more complex. First, Norway is a fairly egalitarian society where 'studying up' does not fully capture the position of a researcher. The Nordic countries are characterised by transparency and shifting power relations between civil society, academia, politicians and business, which influences the power dynamics between the researcher and the company they research (Müftüoglu et al. 2018). Norwegians tend to actively de-emphasize the meaning of class or rank in everyday life (Gullestad 1989), which both gives a veneer of common interest between researcher and researched ('we all want what is best for society') and a perception that elite spaces are perhaps less elite than in other countries. This becomes particularly lucid during industry conferences; whilst the top positions of ministers and CEOs might be harder to reach directly, all other executives and participants are approachable during lunches and other breaks where mingling is natural and desired. In this sense, even if a PhD candidate does not hold a particularly powerful position, it can also be seen as a way of studying 'across', as a number of my informants and interlocutors work in positions which are in different fields than mine, rather than more or less powerful.

Secondly, the oil industry dominates the Norwegian economy, with an oil fund of 8304 billion NOK in market value. In theory this makes all Norwegians 'petro-millionaires' – though the fund is set up to save for future pensions and public services. I often encountered an assumed solidarity between interviewee and interviewer, a tacit agreement that we acknowledge what the oil has done for Norway even if we might hold different views on the future of the industry. One of my informants reminded me at the very start of an interview that I was a stakeholder for them – not only because anyone who researches them is a stakeholder for the company, but because I, as a Norwegian citizen who directly benefits from the taxes they pay to the government,

was a beneficiary of the wealth created by his company's activities. With a population of five million, it can often feel like everyone in Norway has a cousin working in Statoil (or elsewhere in the oil industry), to paraphrase a professor of geology at the University of Bergen. I am no exception here, as several of my cousins, my uncle, and several of my friends work for petroleum companies or in companies serving the industry. I also went to school next to a shipyard making supply ships for the oil industry. Researching an industry I am both critical of, benefiting from as a citizen in the country concerned, and inextricably tied to through my kinship relations, there is no objective position, whichever approach I or others take. My interlocutor's remark on being a stakeholder for his company reflects this, even when his rhetoric might have had a different aim. Following Sawyer (2009:70), I take this entwinement and complicity as an invitation to 'inspect the relationships we sustain with and through [oil]' rather than denounce them outright.

Thirdly, my positionality was influenced by my age, gender and ethnicity. As a young, white, and Norwegian woman, working in an elite research institution, I could gain access to some spaces where I would otherwise not be let in, but could also be deliberately shut out. It was not uncommon that people assumed I was on an MA programme rather than a PhD, since PhD candidates in Norway tend to be 5-10 years older than I was, and I appeared 'too young' to be so advanced, let alone be taken seriously when dealing with serious business such as the oil industry. I didn't 'fit' the category and it was easier to categorise me as either an environmentalist or 'just a student'. In such situations, it was only after proving my knowledge of the topics we were discussing, whether offshore safety, average and extreme wave heights in the Barents Sea compared to the North Sea, the content of impact assessments and follow-up research, or the complexities of the world market and oil supply and demand, that I would be 'granted' a position as a serious interlocutor and could ask questions or arrange an interview later.

Conversely, my relatively young age for a PhD student in Norway gave me access and trust in a number of spaces and situations where I would otherwise not be welcome – quite likely for the exact same reasons. Being female and fairly young induced trust from some of my interlocutors, or a perceived 'harmlessness' to my presence which could be an advantage as much as a drawback. More than once, an interlocutor stated that he would not 'pass the opportunity to talk with such a beautiful young lady', and was therefore more than happy to arrange an interview or informally explain things I wanted to know and understand. Negotiating these moments and what it means to be a gendered body in the field has inevitably shaped my perspectives, understandings and ethnography – and though this thesis is not explicitly framed around gender, it remains an ongoing issue for young women in 'the field', as our positions are sometimes more precarious than those of our male colleagues and most certainly give us access to our field and interlocutors in different ways.

Beyond my age and gender, my history of activism and written record of op-eds, chronicles, letters to the editor and appearances on debate panels on the future of petroleum production in Norway in the years immediately preceding my PhD, presented themselves as a potential methodological challenge when designing a research project to include close interaction and participant observation on industry arenas, or securing interviews with industry actors. Acutely aware this might limit my access, the Norwegian context was a chance to test how far openness stretched when changing my 'hat' to that of researcher – and to what extent the researcher position can be explicitly critical of her topics of inquiry. I made no effort to hide my background, but refrained from fronting it unless specifically invited. I always presented myself as a PhD student interested in social dynamics of industry development, or issues around conflict and consent over extractive industries in the Barents Sea. The name of Cambridge gave weight to that position when participating at industry conferences or other elite arenas.

It is hard to put a firm number or reckoning to whether this background closed more doors than it opened or vice versa, but deploying this research method I found that my background opened a different engagement with my interlocutors. Some of my key informants inside energy corporations and their interest organisations were contacts with whom I discussed extensively both as climate advocate and as a researcher on northern petroleum activities in a regional perspective. The insight gained through these discussions and conversations form key parts of the background for this thesis, as it is precisely these moments of role management which foreground the performativity of the encounter and of resource management writ large. My background also gave me credibility when speaking with environmentalists from different parts of the region or nationally, as some of them already knew my name and by referring to my background I could build trust with others. In other cases, my position created caution; was I an ally, or a researcher, or was I really aligned with the oil company interests by not speaking out against them?

Equivocation, then, comes at a price, as trust takes longer to build, but proved crucial for my understanding during fieldwork. When I was later offered and took up a role as researcher and assistant director for Morten Traavik in *Trial of the Century* in the autumn of 2016, my ability to speak across differences in positions made it possible for me to both know which persons to contact to represent the 'yes' or 'no' to oil in the Barents Sea, and how best to approach them to invite them as participants in the performance. The process informed my understanding of the boundaries between performance and politics in the Norwegian North, and though not explicitly part of this thesis, informs my understanding of how performance and performativity is constitutive of extractive projects.

Anthropology in a (still) colonial context

I opened this chapter with asking what it means to do anthropology in a colonial context not acknowledged as one – and I now turn to explain what I mean by this. In the introduction to *Maps and Dreams,* Hugh Brody (1986:xiii–xiv) reminds us that we cannot understand demands in the present if we refuse to acknowledge the past and the nature of suffering which has been and still is taking place. I would add that we also cannot understand the form these demands take, as they will be shaped by the same experiences and the ways they are passed down through generations.

The nation-state of Norway was founded on the territory of both Norwegians and Sámi.[8] Sápmi, the Sámi homelands, was split between four countries as nation-states were formed and borders drawn, most markedly after nation-building efforts intensified after the 1850s, and continued well into the 20th Century. During the Norwegian struggle for sovereignty and nation-building, and particularly after Norway's independence from Sweden in 1905, Sámi lost territorial sovereignty and status to the government. An emphasis on Norwegianness was important to justify the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden (Beach 1994:176), and in this ethnically uniform nation-state there was no room for either Sámi or other ethnicities, such as the Kven minority. The period of assimilation, or *fornorsking* (literally 'Norwegianisation') of the Sámi in Norway started by official decree in 1851 by the establishment of *Lappefondet* (the Lapp fund), to change the language and culture both of the Sámi and the Kven people (Minde 2003a).

[8] There is no official registry of who is Sámi today, but estimates vary between 50 000 and 80 000 across Sápmi and in southern Norway, Sweden and Finland. Membership to vote in elections of the Norwegian Sámediggi is based on two criteria: one subjective (to feel oneself as a Sámi), and one objective (to have used Sámi language at home or have at least one parent or grandparent who did). The criteria have caused some controversy over the years and continue to do so (Bjørklund 2016a).

In the last 50 years the Sámi revitalisation movement has turned much of this upside down.[9] In the 1970s, a generation of educated, young Sámi spearheaded the Alta affair, which 'changed the status of the Norwegian Sámi, past, present and future' (Minde 2003b:75). Governmental approval of a hydropower dam between Alta and Kautokeino sparked the biggest protests in Norwegian environmental history, with strong alliances between the indigenous Sámi and Norwegian environmentalists. The dam was built despite the protests, but in the aftermath the rights and recognition of Sámi changed: The first Sámi Rights Committee (Samerettsutvalget I) was instituted in 1980, to assess the rights of the Sámi with regards to land, water and resources in Finnmark, as well as their political and cultural rights. The work of the Committee has been central in the development of Sámi rights in Norway, influencing White Papers, the inclusion of Sámi rights in the Norwegian Constitution, and the creation of the Finnmark Estate in 2006, a temporary ownership body whilst the Finnmark Commission works to identify and recognise existing rights and ownership on land previously thought to be state-owned (Ravna 2011). Norway was the first country to ratify the ILO Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1990, and have amended the Constitution to include a duty to provide the Sámi with the possibility to develop their language, culture and social life. In 1989, the Sámediggi (Sámi Parliament) was instituted, and the King in his speech acknowledged that the nation was created on territory where the Sámi people were already established. Much of this work was driven by events both 'from above' and at grassroots level (Pedersen & Høgmo 2012: 19).

In the aftermath of the Alta affair a new generation found pride in their identity, cultural traditions, and relation to the land, a revitalisation which took place in different parts of Sápmi (Hovland 2000; Pedersen and Høgmo 2012). Arts and cultural traditions, from theatre to traditional joik, played leading roles here. Political

[9] Important periods of political organisation and recognition of rights precede the 1970s. In 1917, pioneers such as Elsa Laula Renberg and her collaborators organised what is often recognised as the first Sámi political meeting in Tråante. There was also a strong Sámi political movement in the north during the same period, which focused less on reindeer herding and more on the fight against Norwegianisation (Bjørklund 2017b).

mobilisation during the 1970s and 1980s also included alliances with other indigenous peoples, and over the next decades significant shifts occurred in terms of rights to land and water, self-determination, and a flourishing cultural life. New generations of Sámi refuse a traditional/modern binary, and understand Sámi identity as something made and manifested in practice (Pedersen and Høgmo 2012:47).

This does not mean that there is always a conflict-free relationship with the majority society, nor even amongst the different Sámi groups; Along the coast where the Sámi, Norwegians, Kven and other ethnicities lived alongside each other and practiced the same kinds of flexible livelihoods of subsistence fishing and farming, their culture was less distinct than that of the reindeer herders and more exposed to the Norwegianisation policies, and suffered heavily under assimilation policies. Previous generations were caught in a Batesonian 'double bind' (Bateson 1973) of either abandoning their Sámi identity to be Norwegian, or choosing the inferior Sámi identity – both associated with shame in different ways (Pedersen and Høgmo 2012:44). Ethnographic studies of the coastal regions of Northern Norway conducted both post-war and more recently (Eidheim 1969, 1971; Gullestad 1996; Kramvig 2005b, 2005a, Paine 1957, 1965), detail how coastal Sámi masked their identity so as not to be different from Norwegians. Acting as if Sáminess was not part of their past or present identity, and raising their children without any knowledge that their parents or grandparents were Sámi, means that both awareness and identity disappeared in many families. Some individuals have rediscovered their Sáminess as adults and taken back elements of the language and culture, but many find it hard to come to terms with and to ever feel properly Sámi (Gullestad 1996:63–106).

To write about Finnmark, then, is to write about landscapes where colonial histories and wounds are still made, ripped open, pieced together, and constantly shift in and out of view; where identities are contested, weakened, strengthened, negotiated, hidden and displayed in different ways across contexts. Identities here are situated

somewhere in between constructionism and essentialism (Bjørklund 2016a), contested and affirmed, debated and hidden. Not attending to these issues is as impossible as it is difficult to do with tact and respect. Many of those most aggressive towards 'the Sámi' (particularly the reindeer herding Sámi and what they call the 'super Sámi' and cultural elite at the Sámediggi) might be of Sámi heritage themselves, but had that connection severed during the years when assimilation policies reigned. People would tell me that more or less everyone had 'some Sáminess' in their family line, sometimes joking that 'we are all *fjellfinna*'. The term is used both jokingly and as an offensive way to describe the reindeer herding Sámi as 'Mountain Finns', who migrate their reindeer and only come to the coast in the summer as part of their yearly migration cycle. Other times, it is used as a more general description, of someone who voluntarily spends a lot of time outdoors and in the mountains. In conversation, you can often tell if the person is offensive in their intention, but just as often you cannot, even with people whom you think you know well. The racism or prejudice is not always conscious, but engrained through the decades and centuries of state assimilation, hostility, suspicion and misunderstanding. These are delicate issues for many, today as much as in the past.

In the regions around Hammerfest, coastal Sámi lived in fjords on the neighbouring islands and on the mainland, and oral histories from generations who are still alive today show that many of them were assimilated into a Norwegian identity as recently as the 1960s (Lund et al. 2009). The region is still home to many coastal Sámi, but their Sáminess is not always immediately available or visible. This became a topic of public debate after Hammerfest and the neighbouring municipality Kvalsund, which is more explicitly considered a coastal Sámi municipality, decided to merge after municipal referendums in 2016. Hammerfest, the biggest and richest of the two, will become the new name, but should the municipality have a Sámi name, and if so what should it be?

Questions of identity, belonging and landscape use – and how this will change with the new extractive industries – is still an open question. Nevertheless, a slow process of

revitalizing is underway many places in West Finnmark, including in and near Hammerfest, where more people are making their first *gákti*/*kofte*, the traditional Sámi dress which carries specific characteristics depending on which part of Sápmi you are from. In the area around Sørøya, Seiland and Hammerfest, the local variant of the *gákti* disappeared, but has been reconstructed from old photographs. Others are collecting historical material, starting to ask their parents about their past, or learning about it from other sources. Some are starting to use the Sámi language again, others learning it for the first time. Some in the older generation never stopped, but are more open about it, as children or grandchildren discover that they also wish to speak it. On the island of Seiland/Sievju, coastal Sáminess has an established presence both amongst its inhabitants, in their everyday practices, and in the National Park exhibition at the local shop, where the local *gákti* is displayed in both male and female version, alongside a mini documentary which interviews several of the inhabitants of the local community.

Some Sámi manifest their identity in daily activities, but those who are employed in other occupations do so more in their leisure time (Svensson 1976:16). As Jens-Ivar Nergård (2006) writes, to be Sámi is a living experience that is made and shaped in practice. On the coast, as elsewhere, the way landscape is used is key to who they are and how they identify themselves (Ween and Lien 2012). When practices with land, water and sea are maintained even in the absence of Sámi language, some of those who still consider themselves coastal Sámi remain Sámi without talking about whether or not they are. It is enough, sometimes, simply to *be*.

Yet the under-communication of Sáminess is important, in relation both to corporate and municipal obligations towards them, and more local reflections on the possibilities of staying in and using the landscape. At the same time as the industry is changing work and settlement patterns, it is also enabling people to stay in an area they would otherwise have left for work purposes. This ambivalence – of the extractive industries both enabling and potentially threatening the nature and landscape which is so

important for identities and a good life – is worth exploring further when considering how values are enacted through performance, from local, indigenous, national and corporate perspectives.

Is there a postcolonial?

It is against this backdrop, then, that we move into some of the questions framing the work of my PhD. What makes the perception of the oil industry in the north different from the south? Why is activism performed differently here than in Lofoten, Oslo, or Seattle? How does the industrial-economic elite create, perform and consolidate their own position? How is the High North constructed, enacted, contested and deliberated – and by whom? What voices are amplified in the media, and what voices are silenced, or ignored? What are the arenas where advocacy becomes efficacious? Who speaks, and what do they advocate for? Who sets the tone, and pace, on which deliberations of development should take place?

The scholarly discussions of settler colonialism in the US and Canada are, of course, not identical to how Sápmi experienced colonisation and partition between the emerging nation-states of Norway, Sweden and Finland on the Nordic side, and Russia to the east. The experiences within each of what are currently four nation-states are highly different. There is no fixed date when colonisation of the Sámi started, so standard understandings of colonisation might not 'fit' to describe the Sámi situation (Dankertsen 2016:26). The Sámi live within a welfare state where they are highly integrated, and the material conditions do not immediately give the impression that the Sámi are or have been colonised. This integration might come at the cost of limiting the political repertoire as they are normalised into voluntary organisations and political bodies, a model common in the majority Norwegian society (Bjerkli and Selle 2015:297). As most of the organisation of the welfare system, education and elected bodies are not based on Sámi culture, but rather majority society, some

scholars see this as mental colonization where the colonial process has been successful in 'cloaking its own violence.' (Bastien et al. 2003:28). The epistemic violence (Spivak 1990) which the Sámi have been subjected to in the past is not over, keeps reappearing and morphs into different forms.

Recent research also suggests that the Sámediggi have a limited legitimacy within the wider Sámi population (Bjerkli and Selle 2015). Though their position as indigenous people is better than many other places in the world, Sámi languages and livelihoods are under pressure from the majority society. This became evident in the political process around Snøhvit, where demands made by some members of the Sámediggi that Sámi should have rights to a part of the profits from petroleum developed offshore of the Finnmark coast directly to them, was dismissed outright by Norwegian politicians. There are many who don't see Hammerfest as a Sámi area, or claim that the only Sámi who are in Hammerfest are the migrating reindeer herders who come in the summer and hold no special rights as they are not 'really' indigenous and who regularly make such claims in newspapers (or self-financed books, e.g. Hellesvik 2016). Conversely, there are several Sámi living in Hammerfest who will only reveal their Sáminess to trusted others (cf. Eidheim 1969).

The artist Máret Ánne Sara's work, *Pile o'Sápmi,* explicitly discusses what she calls the 'sophisticated colonisation practices' of the Norwegian state, which she describes as happening with silk gloves, so gently only those who are directly affected will see it. Contemporary coloniality works through laws and regulations, making it hard to point out where it breaches Sámi rights, even when expropriating land through consultation or passing laws that gradually erode Sámi self-determination to replace it with structures and governance models which the state can recognize (Benjaminsen et al. 2015; Johnsen et al. 2015; Scott 1998). There is talk about co-existence, but often this co-existence will force the other party out through a gradual erasure of the relations

which uphold their ecological, cultural, material, and spiritual relations with specific places, landscapes, and beings.

Decolonisation, though an active and growing discourse in Sámi society, through the arts, in the Sámediggi, and amongst scholars across Sápmi, is not a uniform process across all regions or groups. In my fieldwork area on the coast of West Finnmark, its absence was more noted than its presence – though again, it is a question of whose voices are listened to, and what form the speaking takes. This is a region where people might rally against the fishing quotas being 'stolen' or a mine destroying the river, both issues affecting Sámi use of land and sea, but are more likely be frame resistance in terms of nature or the general rights of people in the region rather than Sámi rights in particular. In the time I was in the field, people in Hammerfest did not rally for the recognition of Sámi rights per se, but the presence of activism and its entanglements with different forms of Sáminess plays a mutually shaping role with how people and places are imagined in the region.[10] As a result, and in recognising the troubled history and present of a region where colonialism still resides, this thesis attempts to write against colonialism by not silencing it. The question is not whether there is a colonial history in Northern Norway, but how it manifests itself today.

Listen before you speak

It matters, then, to listen – not only in my mother tongue of Norwegian, where my dialect clearly marks me as a southerner, but also that of Northern Sámi, the Sámi language spoken in the part of Sápmi I spent the most time in. During the summer of 2015, I signed up for a course at the Sámi allaskuvla (Sámi University of Applied Sciences) which was to be taught that same autumn. My motivation was as much to understand as it was to signal that I was not here only to extract information, get my PhD and go away again to build my career elsewhere. Knowing there is a history of

[10] Where revitalisation is still a subtle process, it is not surprising that organisation happens through Norwegian organisations rather than through explicitly Sámi organisations, as I discuss in Chapter 4.

anthropological research and past experiences of knowledge 'extracted' without return, I wanted to ensure that I was able to give something back whilst working in Sápmi, and stay explicit and reflexive about the positions I take and why.

Language learning opened doors both directly and indirectly; I could understand and partake in conversations, read newspapers and follow debates that would otherwise be inaccessible to me. Though I only learnt the language partially, the learning process granted me a level of understanding for which I am hugely grateful, including a (partial) access to spaces and discussions, collaborations and friendships. During the language course I first came in direct contact with the far-reaching consequences of assimilation policies across Sápmi. Every person in my class had their own history of why the language had not been theirs from birth, often entangled in familial pain. Learning a language that was taken from you can involve intense emotions and experiences (Nordström 2017:36), and to learn alongside such experiences was an exercise in humility. I owe them my deepest gratitude for allowing me a part in their journey, and for teaching me the importance of language in revitalising Sámi identities across generations.

Beyond a sign of trustworthiness or way of gaining access, however, my language acquisition also created a conflictual position. For some, it was certainly painful that I, a southerner, would come to Finnmark and learn the language which was taken away from them and never taught them in childhood; that I would understand conversations they would not, and gained access to parts of their culture which was hidden from them. Sometimes, I realised that my eagerness to practice Sámi painfully reminded others that they did not master the language, or that they did not have the same ease of learning – a sense that was as much somatic as it was psychological. Other times, I failed to understand a dialect or a different Sámi language or fell out of a conversation because I failed to understand some of the words, and felt that I was more pretending to understand and speak than really understanding. Time and time

again, I have spoken where I should have stayed silent or stayed silent where I should not. For all my attempts to be respectful, I am sure I have fallen short numerous times.

Staying in the field over time, anthropologists become part of communities for shorter and longer periods and acquire positions unlike other researchers. We *intend* to get to know people, and we intend to do so on a level which is intimate enough to build long (sometimes lifelong) friendships which let us in on parts of people's lives, identities and worlds. Whilst not all I have done in the years during which I have worked on my PhD, whether in Hammerfest, Tromsø or Oslo, was part of my fieldwork, it is difficult to draw a clear line between me as a researcher 'in-the-field' and me as a volunteer, a professional critic, a friend, an ally, a fellow activist, or just a festival participant. This is the premise, the challenge and the constant ethical dilemma of anthropology. Where does fieldwork end and begin, when, returning to the Riddu Riđđu festival consecutive years, an indigenous festival in Manndalen/Olmáivaggi, I recognized several faces from Hammerfest, and had positive conversations about the festival with them? Our co-presence for reasons other than fieldwork let me in on just how much the festival means to them and their identity as coastal Sámi, which they wanted their youngsters to experience as well.

Participating at these explicitly Sámi arenas also created complications with some potential informants and interlocutors. Early on in my fieldwork I had a conversation with a man nearly twice my age about my PhD topic, and said I would not be in Hammerfest for parts of July because I was going to Riddu Riđđu. Appalled, he responded that I would be 'coloured' by going there, meaning (I can only presume, because he did not want to elaborate further) that I would be biased towards the 'super-Sámi' who were laying claim to everything and stopping development in the whole of Finnmark only so they could have the whole land to themselves. I did not know whether he considered himself a Sámi or not, but in our conversation up to that point, he had been anything but positive about the reindeer herders. Amongst people

of my own age, I normally found more respectful attitudes, even if they shared the same idea of the reindeer Sámi 'halting development' or otherwise being difficult. This episode taught me that being 'anti-Sámi' might be a pronounced position in Hammerfest, whereas *being Sámi* was much less pronounced.

Not a protest ethnography

To conclude, this thesis is not an ethnography of a protest movement, or of indigenous resistance towards industrial expansion. It is not 'activist scholarship' (Hale 2001) in the sense of embedding myself within the politics, ideology or world of a particular group whose outlook I as researcher agree with. On the contrary; my ambition is to write in a way that sits within anthropology's 'ability to tell a story that both acknowledges imperial power and leaves room for possibility' (Tsing 2005:267). I explicitly look at neo-colonial aspects of the Norwegian and global aspirations for wealth extraction as they work to cover up their impacts as externalities, but also local and regional manoeuvres to bring activities 'on shore' to create ripple effects in local communities. I have thus sought not to 'expose the lie', but find 'other ways of telling the truth' (Visweswaran 2011:78), to speak what needs to be said whilst investigating how what counts as truth, lie, fact and reality are constructed by different social actors. Stakes and futures are enacted and understood through local experience, political decisions, a global oil price in flux, and changing concentrations of carbon in the atmosphere which alter the geophysical world we are all part of (Chakrabarty 2009; Irvine and Gorji 2013). All of these enfold in and meet though local narratives of success and co-dependence which has changed a northern town into what some expected to become the next 'growth pole' (Eikeland 2014), and others fear might cost the future of the region and the earth.

In the framework of a singular person's research work, I cannot pretend this as a portrayal of all locals in Hammerfest and its nearby region, or of all Sámi, whether

there or elsewhere, but I hope to demonstrate the respect and tact these issues deserve, both for Norwegians, those who explicitly identify as Sámi, and those for whom these labels are more fluid (Kramvig 2005a, 2005b). My constant use of plurals point to what Comaroff and Comaroff call 'an anthropological cliché, albeit an important one: that most of the signs and practices with which we concern ourselves are either contested, or if not, are the object of a polyphony of perceptions, valuations, means and ends' (2003:166). I have allowed those contestations and polyphonies to dwell on these pages, such that my own argument can be interrogated alongside those I interrogate myself.

What my fieldwork and involvement in northern life-worlds taught me, is that the questions and power struggles I grapple with require an un-learning on the part of scholars and others who wish to study their effects, an acknowledgement of the ongoing realities of past and present colonialism in its many forms, and of the ways in which climate change and the Anthropocene are concepts which may do *more* violence and in which also research can have negative effects on the people with whom scholars are concerned.[11] Traces by researchers before me, and people's experiences of them, have been both helpful and disadvantageous in this respect.

In orienting myself in Finnmark, in Sápmi and in Hammerfest, I have sought different ways of giving back to people I have worked with. Outside of this thesis, as a theatre practitioner, arts critic, writer, festival volunteer, ally and public anthropologist, I have strived to uphold this ethos, and I hope to continue to do so in future. This has included volunteering time and energy to support indigenous fight for rights and recognition in Sápmi, using my platforms as tools to amplify work of artists and

[11] As Alf Hornborg (2017) writes in a call to action, scathing of the theoretically aloof writings of anthropologists within and around the 'ontological turn', academic discourses inspired by the predicament of the Anthropocene should not abandon rigour and clarity for prosaic language and speculation.

activists, and support in what ways I have been able to, whether as co-writer or editor of texts, listening, learning, and trying to understand when it is my turn to speak – and when to be silent. Not all this has been for the purpose of my PhD research, but it has arisen out of the situations I have found myself in and oriented myself towards as a consequence of my being in the north and in Sápmi, making a demand on me as researcher and person present in a particular place and time.

I offer the following chapters as attempts to rethink, bring together and hold different perspectives in tension, honing in on the friction they incur to – possibly – allow for a greater understanding of what is at stake in these vastly different, but tightly linked lifeworlds. Beyond the neutralising language of stakeholders, impacts, and documents, I aim to show ways in which categories are blurred and opened, how stagings both affirm understandings and create new ones, and how ethnography in the 21st Century might deal with its complicity in the here and now in ways which not only speak to, but help shift, our shared condition in a more sustainable direction. If it was an idea of what a 'good society' is that led me to both anthropology and environmental advocacy, it is through fieldwork I have come to understand what such a good society might be for people otherwise positioned than myself (Henriksen 2003). I turn to performance as a trope through which power struggles can be understood, and particularly how Hammerfest becomes at once stage, backdrop, prized and hated; indeed how the very contestation of what the town is in itself is key to understand what is at stake in the dreams of petroleum in the Barents Sea.

Chapter 2

Performing the frontier: framing and theory

By their performances shall ye know them

- Victor Turner

We don't do theatre, we do reality,' Geir Seljeseth from the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association (NOROG) told the public broadcaster NRK, to explain why they had declined to participate in a theatrical mock trial of an upcoming climate lawsuit in Norway in 2017 (Trellevik 2016).[12] The environmental NGOs Greenpeace Norway and Natur og Ungdom (NU/Nature and Youth) had collectively sued the Norwegian government for unconstitutionally awarding new petroleum licences in the Norwegian Barents Sea. With the artist Morten Traavik, I was part of an artistic team staging a mock trial in Kirkenes (East Finnmark), where we wanted NOROG to serve as witness for the defence of the state. The production was framed as a 'general rehearsal' or people's tribunal before the court case in Oslo would take place, and a deliberate moving of the event to the north where people are directly impacted – whatever the outcome in the Oslo District Court. None of the participants were actors, but climate scientists, environmentalists, politicians, indigenous and non-indigenous, a union representative, northerners and southerners, all serving as witnesses in their respective capacities rather than being represented by anyone else. But NOROG, the lobby organisation of the Norwegian petroleum industry, did not want to take part.

[12] NOROG is an organisation for petroleum companies operating in Norway, organised under the national Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise.

The reason behind their refusal gets to the heart of what this thesis is about: how we understand public performances of different social actors, and who gets to define what counts as valid claims to the real, whether it concerns industrial impacts, regionality, indigeneity or narratives of futures; of the relationships between cause and effect of climate emissions or industrial expansion; Arctic landscapes in between home and frontier; and how narratives of futures are made, lived and experienced across timescales. Through a focus on different performative and ritual events, I investigate what an explicit focus on performance might bring to our understanding of extractive industrial development, in this case in the Norwegian Arctic and Sápmi. NOROG's response shows the political potential held in performance and theatre also in Northern Europe in the 21st Century, and its power to frame, intervene in, and act in our social worlds, rather than simply portray it. Its relationship with resource extraction deserves anthropological attention.

But before we get ahead of ourselves, let us take a step back. This chapter provides an outline of theoretical background, situating my argument within anthropological literature. First, I draw on recent literature on oil and resources, including mining, and what anthropological lenses have brought to how we understand these processes. I then deal with a brief history of Norwegian oil, and the imaginaries underpinning continued Norwegian petroleum production as seen through governmental strategies and public debate, contrasting the fight over the Lofoten isles with the relative silence in Finnmark, which will be dealt with more fully in chapters 3 and 4. I also draw on work from critical geography, as the combination of close-up ethnography with more conceptual or space-focused contributions to the literature have helped me develop a sense of how petroleum development can be understood both geopolitically and in contexts closer to production communities, and how the multiple level of governance impacting Arctic regions can be traced across registers and localities.

Finally, I lay out my proposition for a contemporary anthropology of performance as encompassing the practices of public and semi-public events staged by the petroleum industry and the state, alongside activism and cultural events designed to intervene in or cast the more powerful actors' claims in a different light. I take my cue from both the anthropology of performance and ritual and its relevant intersections with performance theory, which provides a basis for understanding how staging, performance and narrative become powerful lenses to throw new light on extractive industries and northern futures. This is further developed and demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6, where industry and state rituals are analysed as performances that aim at creating certain narratives of petroleum as a driver of future development and positive ripple effects in local economies.

Four tools will guide my analysis: narrative, performance, structure and audience. Each chapter seeks to make a contribution to understand who tells particular narratives and how they work from either within or external to a place, its features, people, and beings. I will employ them as heuristic markers rather than all-encompassing theoretical frames, tools through which we can examine their dynamics at work in making and remaking the future of the north and the Arctic. In this sense, this thesis is also an intervention; it invites the reader to see the ecosystem of resource management and petroleum as a nexus of performative events – not one where all the world is a stage, but where performance nevertheless is ubiquitous – though certainly not everywhere. It aims to examine and uncover processes which are, in their design, performative – that is, designed to make something happen in the world. I argue that a focus on performance and performativity is fruitful for understanding not only how different actors stage interventions, but how they think about these stagings as more or less legitimate than those of others, how and when they 'do reality' as opposed to 'doing theatre', how they are 'serious' as opposed to 'symbolic' actions. I am, in short, interested in *what kinds of realities* are performed into being, and how our assumed understandings might not – actually – be as similar as we first think.

On political geography and the anthropology of oil

As a topic of anthropological interest, oil has been a periodical rather than sustained theme in anthropology, in periods during the 1940s and 1970s, and again in the 21st Century (Rogers 2015:366). Mining has been a far more sustained subject of anthropological and ethnographic interest – perhaps due to mining's territoriality more immediately and obtrusively interfering in the lifeworlds of anthropologists' interlocutors (Gilberthorpe and Rajak 2017:186). This does not mean oil and gas do *not* have such impacts. The destruction wrought by oil production in the Niger Delta (Watts 2001, 2004) or on indigenous land in the rainforest of Ecuador or the tarsands in Canada where indigenous lawsuits are challenging production (Davidov 2016), are just a few examples of what consequences petroleum might bring to communities, or what impacts energy might have (Szolucha 2018). The topic has also gained increasing anthropological interest in recent years, with sustained inquiries into the many forms and temporalities created by large-scale, onshore and offshore petroleum extraction (Behrends, Reyna, and Schlee 2011; Rogers 2015; Sawyer 2009).

Within the anthropology of extractive industries, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us* (Nash 1993 [1979]) and *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America* (Taussig 1980) both stand as seminal, if very different, engagements with how mining, modernity, indigeneity and local lives become intimately connected at South American mining sites, and how the materialities are, quite literally, incorporated into bodies working in or living nearby the sites, and into understandings of altered life-worlds. The promises and failings of mining to bring modernity and prosperity to locals is a recurring pattern in anthropological studies, whether in Zambia, Papua New Guinea or Indonesia (Ferguson 1999; Kirsch 2002; Tsing 2000). Such themes also recur within the anthropology of oil, with a growing literature of how oil, gas and the multi-national companies which extract it transform not only materialities, but also regions, nations and temporalities. Whether a temporal dimension where the anticipation of a resource

or the disaster it will bring might transform the nation (Weszkalnys 2008, 2014); or the way in which they become embedded in struggles for power and control and can fuel inter-ethnic conflicts (Betti 2018).

If we follow Rogers' division of periods, the past two cycles of anthropological interest in oil and gas mirror the fluctuating market prices and perceived scarcity of the resource, particularly a concern that it will run out, whether in the near or the far future (Rogers 2015; White 1943). The energy experts studied by Nader in the 1970s certainly operated under such assumptions (Nader 1981), as do experts today – though the trouble with petroleum in our time is a paradox of both scarcity *and* plenty. In terms of energy *demand,* the world is predicted to be running out, but in terms of *supply*, there is too much of it if the world is to avoid global warming at levels which will destabilise weather systems and alter the conditions for all beings on the planet. Whilst the large oil and gas fields are depleting worldwide and new discoveries need to be made to keep production at its current level, there is also a 'boom' in so-called unconventional resources, from shale oil and gas to the Arctic resources becoming available as the sea ice retreats – made available precisely due to the warming caused by burning oil, coal and gas in the past.

Norway as resource nation

As political theorist and historian Timothy Mitchell highlights in *Carbon Democracy* (Mitchell 2011), paying attention to the connections between democracy and fossil fuels, and in a wider sense energy resources and the development of nation-states, provides an important context for understanding contemporary developments in politics and democracies. Understanding the expectations, imaginaries and narratives of what Arctic petroleum futures might mean for the Norwegian north (and the nation as a whole), requires not only an understanding of the regional history and colonial legacy discussed in Chapter 1, but also situating the particular history of petroleum in

Norway since its discovery fifty years ago. Understanding something of the background of oil on the NCS and what it has come to mean for Norway as a nation, provides ground for discussing the ambitions, hopes and controversies tied to further expansion today. In this section, I draw heavily on the work of historian Helge Ryggvik and colleagues, as his focus on the historical-material developments in Norway *before* petroleum was discovered is exemplary in demonstrating how democracy, materiality of resources and infrastructure, and history are connected (Ryggvik 2010; Ryggvik and Kristoffersen 2015; Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken 1997).

In contrast to the 'resource curse' associated with petroleum-exporting nations, Norway's experience of oil and gas is often dubbed 'the petroleum fairytale' or the 'Norwegian model' (McNeish and Logan 2012; Ryggvik 2010). Since the petroleum resources on the NCS were first discovered in the 1960s, they were harnessed to create income that would become a provider of wealth and jobs regionally and nationally for the Norwegian people (see Appendix A for a brief timeline of this period). Legislative frameworks have ensured the financial gain is protected for the good of the nation and its inhabitants. Taxes on petroleum are as high as 78%, and the revenue is invested in the Government Pension Fund, a fund set up to ensure the wealth is safeguarded for future generations. Targeted planning to develop national know-how and expertise, a national company (Statoil), and a strong supply industry, have also been key factors in developing high safety standards and good working conditions for offshore workers, earning the Norwegian oil industry a good reputation internationally (Ryggvik 2010). The Norwegian state is characterised by a strong corporatist system where labour unions, business and government set terms for industry development through negotiations on pay, labour conditions, safety and environment.

Rather than see this as a benign ability of foresight or stroke of pure luck, it is instructive to co-examine how the historical experience of Norway and its energy resources was shaped at key moments in the formation of the Scandinavian nation-

states. Norway's landscape and geology is rich not only in petroleum resources, but also in waterfalls which have been converted to sources of hydropower.[13] The early period of hydropower utilisation on an industrial scale coincided with Norway's independence as a nation-state in 1905. With Norwegian nationalism a peak, politicians were concerned with self-governance and anxious about giving resource rights to foreign investors. Before awarding concessions to foreign companies, a condition was implemented to ensure that at end of the concession period of 60 years, concessions would fall back to the Norwegian state without any payment or remuneration (Ryggvik 2010).

When the first large oil field, Ekofisk, was discovered on the NCS in 1969, Norway had no experience with oil, no industrial know-how of offshore petroleum operations, and the next decade would prove crucial for the development of Norwegian society as a whole. The past experience with hydropower, and of securing natural resources in Norwegian hands, informed the thinking behind this new resource, too. The petroleum discoveries coincided with fierce battles over whether or not Norway should join the EEC (today the European Union), which strengthened the sentiments of Norway as a small nation whose population wanted to control themselves, rather than be part of a common market or ruled by foreign companies.

In 1971, the standing committee on industry in the Storting produced what has since been known as the '10 oil commandments'. These included the goal of national supervision and control for all operations on the NCS. In the years to follow, Statoil was created with the explicit aim of keeping resource control in Norwegian hands. Bureaucrats and public servants would play leading roles in shaping policy in the following years, and the 1974 Report to the Norwegian Storting on 'The role of petroleum activities in Norwegian society' stated that the wealth created from oil should be used to develop a 'qualitatively better society'; that Norway should take a

[13] Hydropower currently provides >95 % of the electricity in Norway (SSB 2017a).

'moderate pace' in the extraction of petroleum resources (St.meld. nr 25 (1973-1974)), and that there should be a cap on production, which the Storting set to a maximum of 90 million tonnes of oil equivalents per year (Ryggvik 2011).

None of these were explicitly for climate reasons, but a concern with the external environment in the sea and not 'overheating' the Norwegian economy. The goal to keep a cap on production would be gradually abandoned as more discoveries were made, and much more oil was found on the NCS than expected. Despite the initial idea of regulating the tempo on the NCS, gradual privatisation and neoliberalisation of the global economy in the 1980s and 1990s, combined with an increasing revenue from production, led to a change in this policy and a growth beyond the initial production cap. The largest investment boom started in the 2000s, when the oil prices were particularly high, and an aggressive expansion of the sector took place. Statoil was partially privatised and became a public limited company in 2001, listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange. The state is the main stakeholder with 67% of the company shares. Today, the petroleum sector is by far the largest income generator for the Norwegian state. The sector employed 239 000 people at its peak in the early 2010s (Prestmo et al. 2015), though almost 50 000 of these jobs disappeared after the oil price collapsed in 2014 (Hungnes et al. 2016).

Geographical distribution

With the exception of a few refineries, all of Norwegian petroleum production is based offshore. Unlike experiences in other countries, where offshore production may be a means to avoid onshore commitments (Appel 2012), or where the money generated benefits a small elite, the offshore/onshore dynamic in Norway functions in a different way, attributable to geological as well as social, economic and political factors. Norway's offshore has not created the formation 'enclaves' of extraction where the oil almost completely circumvents the economy, as Ferguson writes about the offshore

sector in Angola (Ferguson 2005:378). Rather, it is organised in 'clusters' of expertise onshore in coastal Western Norway. The main offices are centred around Stavanger and Bergen which are both close to the fields in the North Sea, as well as in Oslo and satellite offices in strategic locations outside of these bases. Industry clusters are spread along a large stretch of the coastline, and the petroleum sector employs people in nearly every single municipality in Norway (Hungnes et al. 2016).

Despite the recent changes following the drop in oil prices, the 'petroleum fairytale' has a strong hold on the Norwegian society and imagination (Dale and Andersen 2018; Kristoffersen and Langhelle 2017; Sæther 2017). In public debate, new petroleum fields are linked to keeping the country's largest sector going, with the Norwegian government and oil industry sharing an ambition for more oil and gas to be developed in an 'environmentally responsible' way. After the Paris agreement, the idea that Norway can help 'solve' the need for secure, cleanly produced fossil fuel energy dominates intense political and public debates in Norway (Lahn 2017; Oil change International 2017). The image of Norway as a responsible player in the north formed key arguments for the opening of new fields in the Barents Sea in the 2010s (Jensen 2011). The resources are also thought of as a contribution to the world's energy needs, as shown in the current Prime Minister's comment to the 2014 Arctic strategy, published by the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs, where she highlights the large oil and gas deposits believed to be in the Barents Sea (Solberg 2014:3).

That the drive for *offshore* oil and gas as coincides with the 'opening' of the Arctic (Powell 2008:829), is then not perceived as a threat for Norway, as the deep sea and far offshore is what the Norwegian petroleum industry has spent five decades specialising in. Even if some of the offshore modularity affects Norway through outsourcing of the platform construction to foreign wharfs, such as Spain and increasingly South Korea, the *production* mostly remains under Norwegian conditions and demands in terms of health and safety, working conditions and union-state-company collaboration.

For Finnmark and the north, on the other hand, there is a strong fear of *internal* colonisation not only by the companies, but by the state, which might allow production to go ahead without benefiting the local region. The 'late start' in the Barents Sea means there are very few companies and workers based in the north who can cater for a growing industrial expansion in the region. The Snøhvit and Goliat projects mark the first fields north of Harstad. The development of these projects suggest differences between north and south, and even north and north, which should be explored and is best explored through anthropological fieldwork, where attention to details can delve beyond 'the resource curse' and its exceptions (Rogers 2015).

That oil meets different regions differently should nevertheless be no surprise, as oil does not enter and rupture a region that has no previous history of its own. As noted by Watts in his work on the Niger Delta, the entry of oil is 'inserted into an already existing political landscape of forces, identities, and forms of power' as a new idiom of doing politics (Watts 2004:76). Moving north, the petroleum sector meets regions that widely differ in terms of population, employment, topography and mentality; from Lofoten where fishers are deeply concerned with the future post-petroleum (Kristoffersen and B. Dale 2014, B. Dale 2011), to Finnmark where municipalities are often portrayed as 'screaming' for jobs, or 'thirsting' for investments, as indeed Statoil's former industry coordinator described Hammerfest before Snøhvit. Local and regional differentiations are recurring topics and backdrops throughout this thesis, as they are key to understanding the ecology of which Statoil and Eni Norge have become part.

Norwegian nature, Norwegian environmentalism

To better understand the role, presence and absence of environmental protest against oil in the Barents Sea, it is worth delving quickly into what role environmental organising plays in Norway. Curiously, it is only in recent years that Norway has seen a rise of a Green party in Norwegian politics. Historically, and currently, these

arguments are also upheld in other political parties, from the Socialist Left (SV) to the Liberal Party (Venstre), the Christian Democrats (KrF), the Centre Party (Senterpartiet) and Rødt (the Red Party) who all have different shades of green within their policies.

Norway has a large degree of highly different organisations concerned with environmental interests, some of which focus exclusively on energy and climate, whilst others take a wider view of nature, consumption or markets. Naturvernforbundet (NNV/Friends of the Earth) is the oldest one, founded in 1914 with 24 000 current members across 100 local branches. Den norske turistforening (DNT/the Norwegian Trekking Association) is older (founded in 1868), but is a trekking association which only occasionally gets involved in environmental issues. Fremtiden i våre hender (FIVH/Future in our hands) focus on overconsumption and social justice across the world, and were country partners with 350.org's international Fossil Free investments campaign. Natur og ungdom (NU/Nature and Youth) organise youth on climate change and nature conservation, with more than 8000 members across 70 local branches. Affiliated with Young Friends of the Earth globally, they have a history of engagement in local environmental issues as well as the larger, global issues of climate change and resistance against the petroleum industry, sometimes through civil disobedience and other actions. Former members have founded both the action-oriented environmental watchdog Bellona (1986), and the more policy-oriented ZERO Foundation (2002). Like the international NGOs Greenpeace and World Wildlife Foundation (WWF), they are not member-run organisations, but still consider themselves part of civil society and participate in public hearing rounds for policy-making, lobby politicians. Greenpeace and Bellona also participate in or initiate direct action to protest petroleum expansion and/or protect the Arctic, Antarctic and other areas they deem vulnerable.

In general, Norwegian civil society is highly organized and institutionalised. Organisations including environmental NGOs receive financial support to carry out their activities, and often have a close consultative relationship with the state (Dryzek et al. 2003:23) . There is a broad political consensus for such support, as shown in governmental White Papers and reports to the Storting (NOU 1988: 17; St.meld. nr. 27 (1996-97)). Social movements are described as concerned with the 'common good' in one form or another, and also crucial for people's participation in civil society and formation of a Norwegian public sphere in the 19th and 20th Century.

This has led some theorists to analyse the environmental movement as more or less coopted by the government (Dryzek et al. 2003). They see the participation by organisations on official committees which feed reports and white papers to government as inclusion only in quotation marks, where disagreement is folded into the planning process within the state structures, without a guarantee that they will sway the larger group or change the outcome of the process. Environmental representatives are enrolled sometimes on explicitly environmental issues, but also on implementing 'green' taxes or taxes on carbon, regulation of fisheries and other issues where the environmental groups hold opinions or stakes that might influence policy (ibid.).

The critique of this type of analysis highlights that Norwegian environmentalism is rather different from environmentalism in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, since it is 'moderate from the start even if the movement has proven to be more radical in some periods than others' (Grendstad et al. 2006:13). This applies to individuals as well as to groups; state inclusion does not mean state interference, but reflects how Norwegian civil society is characterised by 'high levels of centralisation with a high level of citizen control' (ibid:15), which explains the generally higher level of public trust in political processes and governance.

This does not mean there are never heated conflicts between environmental NGOs and the state, but rather that these are rarer and happen only when all other avenues are exhausted, as part of the way Norwegian society functions. The first large-scale civil disobedience act in Norway for environmental reasons was against hydropower in Mardøla in 1970, when nature protectors created a group which stopped construction for several days and received both national and international attention. It was also hydropower plans which initiated the Alta/Kautokeino-events in 1979/80, with reports of up to 20 000 people participating at various times. These actions both changed and shaped Norway's politics and the Norwegian environmental movement, as well as the position of the indigenous Sámi discussed in Chapter 1 (Minde 2003b).

NU did not officially participate in any of these actions. Their first civil disobedience act was against mining waste in the Jøssing Fjord in 1983, in collaboration with Danish Greenpeace, before the international organisation was established in Norway (Kielland 2017). In the 1990s, NU had their most action-oriented period, with several disruptive events, civil disobedience, banner drops and demonstrations to directly stop construction work on projects they saw as bad for nature, or threatening to do so to win political ground. A group broke out of NU to form Bellona, a more action-oriented NGO which unlike Friends of the Earth and NU is not a member organisation. Less involved in direct action today, they still serve as a watchdog for toxic chemicals and other industry waste, monitoring the Goliat project and the developments in the Barents Sea.

Sustainable development and petroleum expansion

The public perception is that Norway is a leader in environmental issues (Sverdrup 1997:74), particularly since Gro Harlem Brundtland was the head of the Brundtland commission and the Brundtland Report, *Our Common Future,* whilst she was Prime Minister in Norway. The Brundtland commission introduced the term 'sustainable

development', defined as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (United Nations 1987). Good policies on climate change were deemed as those which were effective; climate change was cast as a *global* rather than local problem, and Norway as a small producer and emitter did not have a particularly large role to play (Andersen 2017; Dale and Andersen 2018).

Norway has since spearheaded flexible mechanisms including carbon trading, which work on trading emissions quotas such that, in theory, emissions one place within the quota system will be paid for and ensure emissions do not happen somewhere else. In 1997, the Kyoto protocol committed signatory countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases through specific emission targets and 'flexible mechanisms' including carbon trading schemes. For Norway, the Kyoto protocol allowed emissions to increase by 1% until 2012, which then has to drop by 16% by 2020.[14] With its reliance on energy-intense industries such as aluminium production with hydropower, and the petroleum industry, Norway has used this separation as a way to uphold an increase in petroleum whilst retaining its status as a sustainability champion. It was deemed better if Norway invested in programmes abroad that would cut emissions, or, as is currently argued by the oil and gas industry, that Norwegian gas replaces coal in Europe, and thereby is part of the solution, rather than part of the problem. Noticeably, the environment and energy are separate ministries in Norway, which, unlike other Nordic countries, gives the political networks in the energy sector more power to resist certain regulative processes (Midttun and Kamfjord 1999).

These arguments are at heart of the battle over the future Norwegian petroleum production, particularly as we move into the 21st Century. Though a signatory to the Paris agreement, Norway is still not a player in any transition away from fossil fuels. The *tone* of the debate has changed over recent years, but the strategy remains the

[14] Currently, Norway is at 2,4% increase compared to the benchmark year of 1990 (SSB 2017b).

same: new fields and tax regimes designed to stimulate further exploration on the NCS, and an increasing focus on flexible mechanisms, as well as gas as a low-carbon alternative to coal – a process one commentator has called 'tip-toing away from the climate goals' (Sæther 2017), allowing Norway to increase its emissions through quotas bought and sold to prevent emissions elsewhere. Just like it was economic arguments that led to the approval of the Alta dam in 1978 and the upholding of the decision two years later, economy is a key driver in the equation that gets presented to the Storting and eventually passed to make resource development possible. As the production volumes on the NCS will start declining within the next five years unless new discoveries are made and phased in, new fields must be discovered for the industry to keep production at current levels. Enter the north.

Oil north of 62 degrees

Recent work on the political economy of oil has paid increasing attention to the historically contingent relations that produce particular outcomes in countries across the world, from the role of labour unions to environmental NGOs and their lobbying and political protests to prevent spills and toxic chemicals from entering the ocean systems. These works are not only in anthropology, but also in geography, political science, international relations, development studies and a range of other disciplines. The same attention should be paid to how differences occur within a country, and the way oil in the Norwegian north has shifted on and off the agenda at different points since the 1970s speaks well to this point.

The first wells in the Barents Sea were drilled in the early 1980s, but it took more than 35 years from discovery to first production. From the mid-1980s, concern for a vulnerable northern environment caused political conflicts which were not as prevalent concerning fields in the North Sea. This delay was partly deliberate, to limit the revenue so as not to overheat the Norwegian economy, and partly related to

environmental concerns for oil in these regions (Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken 1997). Whilst environmental concerns were integrated into the petroleum politics in the 1990s, the north was seen as an environmentally vulnerable area and mostly stayed off the agenda for more than a decade (Thesen and Leknes 2010). The environmental concerns in the late 90s and into the early 2010s were not about carbon emissions, as the debate dissolved in arguments for increased emissions from Norwegian oil as a way of bringing oil to a petro-dependent world population. Instead, the focus was on potential damage to marine ecosystems and marine life such as the cod (Andersen 2017:453–54). The opening of the Arctic regions for extraction was also linked to security concerns, both in terms of setting safety standards for other imagined exploration by other Arctic nations, and by maintaining activity in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea (Jensen 2007; Jensen and Hønneland 2011). When Statoil's Snøhvit was approved in 2002, global markets had changed, and Statoil had spent years of research, academic collaboration and investments to master the technology that would make the gas transportable even without a pipeline to bring it to the European continent.

The decision was not without controversy: the previous government had dissolved over a bitter fight between the ruling parties over a gas power plant at Kårstø, which would increase Norway's climate emissions significantly. Put in an impossible situation, KrF left parliament, in what is the first and only time a Norwegian party has left office over an environmental issue. When Snøhvit was approved by the new government so soon after, this sparked controversy, but the decision held, whilst all further petroleum development in the region was put on hold in anticipation of an Integrated management plan for the Barents Sea and Lofoten areas. This plan was presented as a White Paper in 2006 (St.meld. nr. 8 (2005-2006)). It was during this period the campaign to protect the Lofoten isles as the heart of Norway's fishing industry propelled itself into public debate. A sustained, persistent campaign from a coalition of locals, fishermen, environmental activists and others, calling themselves a

'people's action for an oil free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja' (*Folkeaksjonen oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja)* has succeeded in protecting the area with temporary moratoriums through the last three national elections in Norway. Meanwhile, the oil industry has spent significant amounts of money on opening the northern regions for oil exploration. Whilst the alliance between the environmental movement and fishermen in Lovese may have succeeded in protecting those areas, the oil industry has succeeded in making new areas available further north (Ihlen 2007:20).

Strategy: Making the High North

The story of oil in the north of Norway, then, has gone through various cycles of hype, hope, delays and disappointments since the 1980s. In the 2000s, it acquired another, more explicitly geopolitical dimension, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs placed the region at 'the heart' of its strategy with its High North Strategy led by the Red-Green government.[15] The 'Blue-Blue' government[16] which came into office in 2013 built on this, using the term 'Arctic policy' and honing in on how to utilize resources and enhance growth and value creation north of the Arctic circle. The Arctic Policy, and most policy documents following it, is shot through with such developmental language, on how to 'take advantage of the opportunities in the High North' (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014:5); an apt illustration of the 'opportunistic adaptation' of the Norwegian government towards climate change as an economic opportunity (Kristoffersen 2015). After new areas were made available in the 23rd licensing round in 2016, Statoil's Exploration Manager told the media they would be making a 'treasure map' of the Barents Sea (Løvås 2017). Just as oil came to be seen abstractly as money in Venezuela (though in a completely different political climate than Norway) during its construction as a nation-state (Coronil 1997:390), the

[15] A coalition (2005-2013) between the Labour Party (Ap), the Socialist Left (SV) and the Centre Party (Sp).
[16] A minority coalition between Høyre (the Conservative Party) and FrP (The Progress Party), supported by Venstre (the Liberal Party) and KrF (Christian Democrats).

potential deposits below the Barents Sea are envisioned as future revenue to run the Norwegian welfare state and an affluent society. Whilst international oil companies apply for fewer exploration blocks than the Norwegian companies, seeing the focus on the Barents Sea as artificial, they follow the 'anticipatory' logics of the Norwegian government, where forecasting of energy realities and the projected future demand for oil and gas gains prominence over environment, and where Norway as a politically stable country makes it attractive from a security perspective (Kristoffersen 2014:142–43).

Examining Norwegian Arctic policy and its visual representation (see figure 3), we can see both what is highlighted, and what is left out of consideration. The people who live in the Arctic are present, but their future is narrated as contingent on the global networks of capital. Mining, oil and gas, fish farming, tourism and the opening of the northern sea route are seen to be the drivers of the future. To be a part of it, small coastal municipalities are expected to participate in the opportunities that arise from this global-Arctic focus. Even if fossil fuels are a non-renewable resource, the rhetoric of 'drilling for the environment' (Jensen 2011) keeps reappearing. Discourse is currently drifting towards a focus on 'meeting energy demands' and, as this thesis is concerned with, the development of the northern periphery into a centre with the associated anticipation of ripple effects the proposed activity creates. The language is also curiously close to that of the industry, for example in their claim that 'Norway's short-distance oil and gas deliveries are important for European security of energy supply, and have a low carbon footprint compared with petroleum from alternative suppliers.' (KonKraft 2016b:7).

The model is making the world it purports to describe, directing the attention towards what is included and measured in reports of what this model brings into reality. As such, it is not only the model which is performative, but also the processes which prop it up and amplify it. The landscapes in which such development intervenes are always

contested (Bender 1993:3), and the narratives of plans and strategies weave past and futures together in the present in particular ways to make their futurities possible. Petroleum in the Barents Sea, like so many petroleum projects elsewhere, are stories of anticipation and what this anticipation does to culture, history, identity and spirituality in a region – and it is a story of how a planning regime makes some risks tolerable and interventions in landscape legal, how they silence and make invisible all that is classed as externalities.

Oil in northern Norway has recently been theorised within a security perspective; both in terms of framing the state space, and local as well as regional perspectives of oil and its ontological status as either securing or putting a long-term future at risk (B. Dale 2011; Jensen and Kristoffersen 2013; Kristoffersen and B. Dale 2014). Such an approach is particularly salient near the Lofoten islands; where oil becomes a direct threat to the most productive region for fish and spawning ground for the cod stock in Norwegian waters and the identity of coastal dwellers. Not only might an oil spill mean severe and potentially irreparable damage; a narrow continental shelf would mean competition between the oil industry and the fisheries, and the effects on the fish and other marine species from seismic shooting is contentious. In the absence of conclusive scientific evidence on how damaging the practice of seismic shooting is, the fisheries associations regularly complain and try to alter the government's allowance of seismic surveying during periods when it might disturb the fish in the Barents Sea (Fiskarlaget 2017a). The power to define the political reality that is relevant for and in Northern Norway is an ongoing discursive battle, with both political and geographical boundaries at stake (Jensen and Kristoffersen 2013:67).



Figure 3. Illustrated overview of Norway's Arctic Policy (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014:6–7).

This holds well in a state perspective, but the way gas is understood *in Hammerfest* is more as a means towards a longer-term future than a threat to fish economies. This suggests a perspective where the oil and gas in the north is not so much an 'opportunistic' adaptation (Kristoffersen 2015), but rather a *pragmatic* one – an adaptation of practices rooted in a mindset of developing what resources one can manage, trying to build a situation where one's children and grandchildren might have a future in the region, instead of being forced to move to the larger centres for work. In contrast to Lofoten, where oil becomes a threat, the gas in Hammerfest has provided a form of security, a foundation to modernise the city and (at least in theory) build a longer-term future, no matter how petroleum-dependent it makes the town in the present. Hammerfest adapted to a large-scale fish processing industry in the 20th Century, and though petroleum is markedly different, it is a continuation of industrialisation (Holm et al. 2013), rather than a fully new era. The local drive towards resource extraction is more about making life in Hammerfest viable after the loss of the previous cornerstone institution, adapting to petroleum as the new cornerstone economy for as long as it will last. It is this pragmatic-temporal dynamic which creates the dynamics of silence and speech in Hammerfest, and which also come to shape understandings of past and present.

The activities in the Barents Sea have, however, not rocketed sky-high as was predicted prior to the oil price crash in 2014. Expectations have been lowered, but the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate estimates that more than 60% of the undiscovered petroleum resources on the NCS are located in the Barents Sea (NPD 2018). With Lofoten outside of political reach, the state has kept expanding licences in the Barents Sea, and incentivising new companies to explore for oil through a taxation scheme where the state runs the main financial risk if no discoveries are made.[17] Locally, this has been

[17] The reimbursement system for exploration costs was introduced in 2015, and gives companies the possibility to have the tax value of their exploration costs immediately refunded instead of carrying them forward as losses. As petroleum is taxed at 78% in Norway, this means the government takes the majority of the exploration costs and a risk of loss if there is no commercial find and subsequent field development.

less controversial for a time, but if oil fails to materialise in local ripple effects, the oil companies risk that their local licence to operate will weaken (Dale 2018b).

A changing consensus? Norwegian oil at risk

Another threat to petroleum development is a changing national consensus that is related to global discourses on 'climate risk', and environmentalist as well as financial calls to keep fossil fuels in the ground. If the world now has more fossil fuels than it can burn, a different question that concerns Norway's national production emerges: if two thirds of resources should stay in the ground, which oil and gas can be developed without breaking the world's 'carbon budget'? This question was taken on in a *Nature* paper in 2015 (McGlade and Ekins 2015), which has been cited and re-cited in public debate and in financial forums ever since. The authors, McGlade and Ekins, created a model based on a cost-efficiency analysis of which carbon reserves must remain undeveloped in a world which stays within the carbon budget for limiting global warming to a maximum of 2 degrees, and found that just cutting coal was not enough: limits on petroleum are also necessary. Amongst the resources that has to fall to 'negligible' levels after 2020 were the Canadian tarsands, where Norwegian-owned Statoil still had resources at the time. More importantly for Norway, was their conclusion that no Arctic oil and gas could be developed without going beyond two degrees.[18]

This budget has become significantly tighter after the Paris Agreement. In 2016, professor Eystein Jansen authored a report which concluded the agreement leaves very little room for bringing new sources of fossil fuels to the market within this century (Jansen 2016). Another study from Oil Change International (2017) took a more explicitly policy-oriented stance, where its authors attempted to calculate how much

[18] The data in the models came from the oil analysts at Rystad Energi, a Norwegian analyst agency whose CEO, Jarand Rystad, is an avid proponent of oil and gas development in the north. Rystad, in contrast to McGlade and Ekins, believes there is a bright future for Arctic Norwegian oil and gas.

carbon can be extracted and used without surpassing 2 degrees and 1.5 degrees, respectively, to highlight Norway's responsibility to leave its oil in the ground. Without Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) on a large scale, the world's currently operating fields produce more than enough carbon to cause more than 2 degrees of warming. Not only coal, but also oil and gas fields, will have to close before fully exploited to stay within these temperature limits (ibid.).

Whilst there are critiques to be made of the methodology of these models, whether over their differentiation of what counts as 'Arctic' or the model's lack of geopolitical depth, the point that bears interest in this thesis is *the way in which* these documents have been propelled into the Norwegian debate, both by the environmental movement and by academics concerned with sustainability and path-dependency. Though their strategies and end goals might diverge, they share an interest in changing the tone and shape of the debate and bring the notion of 'climate risk' into the equation. The profitability of Arctic oil and gas was already disputed in 2015, when numbers were plotted into what had been theoretical debates; how much carbon needs to stay in the ground, as well as which fields may or may not be profitable if the world's markets succeed in staying below two degrees. They also work towards shifting the debate away from the dominance of the International Energy Agency and its models, which allow for greater margins of CCS for example in its 2016 World Energy Outlook (International Energy Agency 2016), but also run a much greater risk of surpassing the 2/1.5 degree target from Paris.

The notion of 'climate risk' is tied into the wider discourse internationally, where a pivot point was when Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, delivered a speech warning of the 'climate risk' involved in fossil fuel investments which might become 'unburnable' within a 2 degree target (Carney 2015). In Norway, the industry has for decades benefited from public support and a political consensus that the oil industry is wanted and important for the Norwegian economy. The overwhelming

consensus in the Storting is to let this continue, though it is worth noting several shifts and breaking points which have occurred over the past years. The same year Carney spoke of climate risks, *det grønne skiftet* ('the Green Shift') was declared the New Word of the Year by the Language Council of Norway (Språkrådet 2015). This reflects the increased public debate on petroleum and sustainability in Norway, exemplified by two recent books which debate the inconsistency of the Norwegian political system, where the petroleum sector is separated from climate politics and given priority at the expense of effective climate policies, whilst Norway purports to be a 'green champion' (Bjartnes 2015; Sæther 2017). Several social scientists have also discussed Norway's position as one of 'living in denial' (Norgaard 2011), being potentially at odds with the Paris agreement (Lahn 2017), or the need to 'cool down' production rates (Ryggvik and Kristoffersen 2015). Another argument from the social sciences is that the petroleum policies are not tailored to meet a future where climate change and an on-going transition to renewables is happening faster than the international Energy Agency and other analysts predict (B. Dale and Andersen 2018). Just as the Norwegian government opens new areas in the Barents Sea, the international and national discussion of 'stranded assets' and 'climate risk' is starting to change investment practices and policy-making across the world.

This has two important implications for my fieldsite in the north of Norway. Firstly, the future of the Norwegian petroleum industry in the Barents Sea became increasingly contested during the course of my fieldwork, after a decade in the shadow of the more charismatic Lofoten areas. Secondly, this attention has a marked regional dimension: regionally, the question is not about whether oil is good for the climate or not, but whether or not it will create local jobs and local prosperity, or if Finnmark will remain a 'resource colony' and take all the risk for none of the gains. Nationally, the debate is over costs and environmental risks in extra vulnerable areas (called SVOs in policy documents), and on Norway's responsibility as a wealthy country to address not only demand, but also the supply side of petroleum. The oil industry are also active,

with Statoil and the interest organisation NOROG as the most visible players. Companies currently face a challenge over cost-cutting in the wake of the oil crisis, whilst also needing to show that development in the north will mean jobs in the north. It is precisely here Hammerfest as location steps into view, or rather is made into a stage on which the oil industry can perform their message that petroleum in the north indeed leads to jobs, growth and local prosperity.

Reputational risk, growing pressure from investors, storytelling to counter opposition, reporting and performance standards that are applied to them as transnational actors (e.g. World Bank, Transparency International, indigenous people's policies), and the idea of 'transparency' are all factors that influence what and how Eni Norge and Statoil make public, the language in which it is written, but also the performances of the companies, the actions they carry out as part of their company practice, the lingo they incorporate and the behaviour they both showcase and instil in their workers. What is publicly available and part of archives is shifting and contested, making them 'full-fledged political actors in the present' (Barry 2015:3) which responds to a great variety of pressure from investors, civil society, government and growing numbers of transnational standard. Openness is no guarantee of either responsible behaviour or adequate action. Indeed, it is often the *absences* that speak the most – things left out, contradictions, and significant silences (Lynch 1999:79).

When the environmental movement in Norway engages with technicalities, expertise and public hearings, it is related to this wealth of information. Attempting to trap the companies or government in their own words is promising, but also difficult, as there is always a report to wait for, or a white paper to be finished which works in favour of existing plans. Efforts to bring concerns back into the fold abound, from production of counter-assessments like the Sámediggi did in the Nussir project in 2016 (Ibenholt, Rasmussen, and Skjelvik 2016), to protest and sometimes civil disobedience by different environmental groups, whether NU, Greenpeace, or ad-hoc organisations. I

now turn to discuss how we can understand these strategies, responses and interventions within the *same* framework without collapsing the categories to make one more serious than the other.

The case for anthropology and performance

How do we understand the emergence of the narratives that Norwegian oil and gas is cleaner than other oil, or that the future of the Norwegian north is to be made through the development of its resources? How do these narratives sit within the town that is at the centre of the largest industrial developments in Finnmark throughout history?

My argument is simple at its core: in order to understand how a narrative gains its power, we must study not only the documents, but also its social life. Events, personal histories, presentation of plans and writing of documents which propel these narratives forward – all of these are saturated with performative elements. From the staging of a petroleum future in a 'successful' town, to the resounding silence of any question of indigeneity as a matter of concern when discussing petroleum development in the north, and how all these entwine in defining what and whose interest are recognised in public discourse as well as in policy documents.

Following Turner in that '[a]lthough we take theories into the field with us, these become relevant only if and when they illuminate social reality' (Turner 1974:24), this review is not made to be exhaustive (nor is there space for this if the ethnography is to hold the centre space of this thesis), but rather find those 'scattered ideas' and theoretical connections which might illuminate aspects of my ethnography, to better account for performative events as making and breaking narratives of different actors within the dramas of social reality. This understanding helps move away from a fixation on theoretical framing, to focus on social reality as experienced by our interlocutors and the worlds we partake in with them.

The anthropology of performance was pioneered by the late anthropologist Victor Turner and his collaborators, notably in his cross-disciplinary engagements with performance scholar Richard Schechner (Schechner 1988, 2006; Schechner and Appel 1990; Turner 1974, 1982). As a subset on the anthropology of ritual and event, Turner's analysis is connected to the Manchester School and the functionalist analysis, but also pioneered novel approaches to understanding ritual and performance. Performance has also figured in the works of several other anthropologists in the 1970s and 1980s (Handelman 1974, 1977; Handelman and Kapferer 1972; Kapferer 1988; Schieffelin 1996), and also in the 'theatre-state' of Clifford Geertz (1973).

Turner firmly held there to be universals of performance and ritual, which captured something essential about the human condition and how societies deal with conflict and social dramas in a society. Seeing anthropology of performance as part of the anthropology of experience and ritual, he understood them as events which are demarcated from but also inextricably linked to the everyday. He developed a model for analysing what he called social dramas, those moments when a breach of the normal working order of society occurs and slides into crisis, which must be addressed by redressive action and ends either with reconciliation and reintegration or a permanent schism (Turner 1957, 1974, 1982). Though originally developed to theorise small-scale societies, he later developed another take on large-scale industrial societies, where the division between work, play and leisure made social dramas liminoid rather than liminal, marked by an optionality rather than the fully integrative ritual process of small-scale societies (Turner 1982). Industrial societal play, then is more in the domain of art and leisure, though – as Turner also acknowledged, it is not always separate and the anti-structure can come to inform or change the structure of society.

According to Schechner, who collaborated closely with Turner, everyone, from politicians to activists, use staging – techniques of theatre – to support social action, whether their aim is to change the social order and the spectators understanding of the world, or maintain it (2003:215). Crossing over between performance studies and anthropology, the two wanted to explore how performance is crucial to understand events as shaping what we might call reality – the world as experienced by the people that are our interlocutors. Within these processes, status is negotiated, affirmed and contested, both between actors and in relation to the larger structure. Play can be a commentary on the social order (Handelman 1977:189) and being 'essentially elusive' (Turner 1983:233-4), it is at once within a framework and in between them, often difficult to locate.

Early anthropological texts are also full of traces of performativity, from Malinowski's description of the kula as being performed rather than existing a priori, to Mauss' notion of 'hau' as both material and social (Abram and Lien 2011:4; Malinowski 1922; Mauss 1954). Because language is so deeply embedded in our culture, Malinowski writes, 'to study language outside the framework of its cultural realities – the beliefs of the people, their social organisation, their legal ideas and economic activities – must remain entirely futile' (Malinowski 1922:vii). The encompassing milieu, or what Malinowski calls cultural reality, is essential to understand the responses and use of language. This, I would hold, applies equally to performance, both in the wide sense that everything from language to platform openings can be considered as performance in the sense of someone performing, i.e. 'doing something', to the more narrow sense of performance as theatre, dance, music, and other events which are marked out as 'art' in the Western tradition (Gell 1988). To understand the reception and social, political or other effect of the latter, one must understand something of the context it operates in. This does not make these performances 'total social facts' of the kind described by Mauss, even if anthropologists have analysed theatre as all-encompassing and efficacious in certain societies (Geertz 1973; Hoëm 2009). Rather, it should attune

us to a 'greater attention between performance and its wider socio-political and economic context' (Bauman and Briggs 1990:61). Linking specific events with their wider contexts gives a deeper insight into the workings of culture and cultural change, and how they are contested by different social actors, who may partake signing up to the ideology underpinning them. Their presence and interpretation of what they are doing are also part of forming social and political realities.

Performativity and performance

An aside to performativity within the social sciences will clarify why performance is the key word within my framing, rather than the focus on performativity which is more common across other fields of social science. Words as performative utterances, as *doing* rather than just stating, have a history both within linguistic philosophy (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) and the development of such perspectives in gender studies (Butler 1997). Butler deliberates on the performative acts as constitutive of gender; it is something we do, not something we are, brought about through discourse *and* physical acts (Butler 1993, 1997).

Within anthropology and STS studies, a focus on the construction of scientific knowledge in the laboratory and beyond (Latour and Woolgar 1979) can also be said to share roots with performativity, and has sparked a plethora of theoretical and ethnographic studies from the domestication of scallops and fishermen (Callon 1984), salmon in Northern Norway and Sápmi (Joks and Law 2017; Lien and Law 2011), to the performativity of economics as a discipline (Callon 2006). Such takes extend to documents, impact assessments, maps and reports. Impact assessments create potential for transforming landscapes; they performatively constitute the reality in which transformations can take place, by changing what kind of activity is permissible within an area. To become this specific type of knowledge, they also perform what Scott calls a 'narrowing of vision' (Scott 1998:11), which excludes a wider perspective

and implications which would otherwise disrupt the possibility to estimate and quantify possible impacts. A document is both decided by its context and partakes in shaping it, 'together with the very issue at hand' (Asdal 2015:86–87). The mineral mappings of Sápmi and Fennoscandia are a case in point (Uhre 2015). Indeed, documents partake in making the issue in the first place, and I return to how they both order and make reality throughout this thesis.

But a document in and of itself makes no revolution. Performativity focuses on how words, documents and such-like *do* things, of the agency of the non-human, let us say, whereas I am more interested in who sets a performance in motion and how. A document must be presented, mobilised, talked about, circulated; it must be performed, framed and narrated. My concern in this thesis is not with how documents perform in and of themselves, but how they are made to matter and understood through their circulation and social lives. This also concerns what counts as facts, as several of the interludes reflect.

Anthropologically, there are also critiques to be made of the philosophical arguments on performativity. In examining planning practices, Abram and Wezkalnys claim they are 'elusive promises', of a kind that creates expectations in citizens and publics (2013:10) – and instil in people a belief that things might be better rather like magic at work (Abram 2011:21). Promises are not always made to be fulfilled; but they might still be something different than Austin's illicit utterances (1962). They might be made for rhetorical purposes or for stage effect, and a promise made by corporations or a political representative is different from those made by individuals without such positions, such that the materiality, procedures and tools of planning may lead to an infelicity which is better investigated anthropologically (Abram and Weszkalnys 2013; Hommels 2005). Plans might purport to know the future, or to help one prepare for it, but there is a built-in possibility they might be broken – and also, I would add, a responsibility placed on other social actors to partake in the fulfilment of the plans.

When the impact studies of a petroleum project suggests that it will provide a certain number of jobs, and there is a stated aim that these jobs be local, the local authorities have to decide whether or not they play their part to make this plan real; whether they provide education for young people to be able to fill the positions which the company promises will be there in future, build new kindergartens and schools for the children of future inhabitants, and improve roads to deal with the projected heavy traffic. In all these cases, *planning* emerges in all of these as a conjurer's way of making the future by envisioning it – but it is made material by choices and priorities; through performance.

In her research on planning, Abram remarks that it is often those who object or protest that seem to have the strongest belief in the ideal system (Abram 2011:22), but this does not to me seem to be fully the case in my case study; though objectors to the process *do* participate in the system of planning through hearing rounds and other processes governed by the Planning and Building Act, the Petroleum Act and other processes, they are also inherently sceptical towards these processes. In particular, they are sceptical about the kind of knowledge that is validated and produced through these processes, and the way in which local knowledge that does not 'fit' with desired conclusions tend to get ignored.

Plans can thus mask disagreement, as the planning process strictly regulates what counts as valid interferences and disagreements, as is and has been the case with civil society and voluntary organisations in Norway, including the environmental movement. When the Integrated management plan for Lofoten and the Barents Sea was approved, '*none* of the written or oral hearing statements were included in the final report – they were acknowledged as part of the process, but not as knowledge that would be included in the plan' (B. Dale 2016:15). The foundation for the political decisions, then, lacked critical knowledge about the marine ecosystem, knowledge which was actively excluded in the decision-making process.

What one has, then, is ontological closure; the world as described in the management plan is the reality the Norwegian government acknowledges, and other realities are defined as less valid – they are not part of what should be managed by the plan purporting to sustainably manage the marine eco-system. As we shall see throughout this thesis, however, this closure is not final; the excess spills back into the frame, interferences create friction that is as often set in motion by unruly waters as by unruly humans or by the human-animal relationship which refuses to have its own world erased by the arrival of a new management regime or industry.

Relating this back to the discussion of the status of Norwegian environmentalism, we can make some preliminary statements on the role of performance within resource and nature management. Without the popular protest against the Repparfjord mine (which appears in Chapter 4), it is likely the reindeer herders' interests would have been overruled a long time ago. With the Petroleum Act, it is commonly assumed that opening for an impact assessment is equivalent to opening for production – indeed, impact assessments are part of the opening process, and thus viewed with extreme suspicion by opponents of such development; they already know the current value and usage of a region, so the potential monetary profits or jobs to be made from extractive industries do not interest them as the risk to what is already there is too big. 'Everyone' knows this, but petroleum lobbyists repeatedly talk as if the impact assessments are about producing knowledge before a conclusion is made. Stopping that assessment from happening may then be the most effective way to stop a project before it is made possible at all.

Some utterances are performative, whereas others seek authority, and the extent to which they have effects on social reality is emergent and historically experienced (Schieffelin 1996:81) – that is, their social context matters beyond what social structures already exist, as they might also manipulate or alter those. Schieffelin also points to how a performance might be a success even if some actors' performance can

fail (1996:81). Transposing this to resource extraction, an oil company might succeed even when one of their employees fail, or a company might fail even when their employees perform correctly. A strategy from an environmental organization might fail and succeed at the same time, a work of art might succeed in changing a conversation or putting an issue on the international agenda.

Framing reality

Let us return, then, to performance and to what a notion of performance can do to our understanding of resource extraction. In recent years, the performance of activism, of documents, of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), indigenous identity, and social movements have been topics of several scholarly works. The work of Greenpeace is well known for its spectacular tactics of staging and visual narrative (Barry 2013:82–85; Tsoukas 1999), as is the work of social movements, from media strategies and the value placed on visibility, to the 'the importance of specific micro-level performances for communicating specific messages and expressing diverse political visions' (Juris 2015:93). Having worked on social movements such as Occupy, Jeffrey Juris calls for attention to how 'it is through [...] cultural performance that alternative meanings, values and identities are produced, embodied, and publicly communicated within social movements'' (ibid:82).

This can most certainly be turned also on how politicians and petroleum companies enact their messages and meanings to their peers, political opponents and the wider public in different registers. No less than protests, these conference speeches, strategic timings of releasing a report platform openings and announcements of licencing rounds, are also performances - pragmatic, mundane and highly ritualised. They are 'twice-behaved behaviour' (Schechner 2006:29); rehearsed, restored, performed after rehearsal or improvised from a script. They are ruled by conventions, but there is also room for improvisations and creative adaptations by those who carry them out or

direct them, for personal flare and strategic decisions which might serve a purpose outside the performative event itself.

The displays and performances of extractive industries have also been called 'theatres of virtue' (Rajak 2011), and their claims to sustainable mining 'corporate oxymorons' (Kirsch 2010), which implies there is something deliberately being obscured or hidden through their displays and performances of corporate virtue. Yet the use of the word 'performance' is different in these cases. The activism of Greenpeace is interpreted as 'theatre', as a staged event with specifically desired effects. Demonstrations are analysed as social scripts. Juris, for example, employs performance as analytic even if not emic category, recognising how his interlocutors can see both performative and non-performative elements in their own actions (Juris 2015). But the work of the world's financial elites and the effects of industrial activities tend to be seen as a different kind of performance, even if they have also been subject to study as groups on the financial markets with external impacts far from them (Zaloom 2004), or by activists who accuse them of beguiling the public by their displays and misinformation. The public perception that activists deal in affect or 'spectacular performances' (Igoe 2010), whilst industry deals in facts, nevertheless seem to hold strong, as indeed the statement by NOROG that introduced this chapter shows.

Ethnographically, I am interested in what the claim that they 'don't do theatre' means, amidst displays and performances of openness and concealment that take place in corporate events and sponsorship of public concerts, in radio debates and un-taped conversations. I am interested in what they believe the environmentalists are doing, and how they operate within the frameworks where they set the rules as well as how they react when those frameworks are broken. Neither Greenpeace not NU see themselves as performing theatre when they engage in actions to stop or protest drilling projects; on the contrary, the stakes and their strategies, even when involving deliberately staged protest actions such as boarding an oil rig or chanting outside the

Storting, are concrete actions in a larger process of achieving particular goals. Granted that they don't do *theatre*, how can performance still be employed as a trope? What does their performed convictions bring into the world, and how does it seek to legitimise or delegitimise other, partially overlapping, worlds?

Framing becomes important here, as what is considered performance is governed by other rules than those in everyday life (Goffman 1974). It is also understood differently and seen as serious or non-serious according to this framing. There is no full agreement amongst my interlocutors, collaborators, and discussion partners about where the boundaries should be drawn between theatre, performance and reality, what 'counts' as real, or how this reality should be accounted for (and why should there be?). Discussing their events as performance, carrying ritual and theatrical elements, is therefore an etic category, which I employ to highlight how their strategies, modes of (self-)representation and engagement with other actors in the industry, in the town and in politics, have much in common with the mode of operation of both activists and theatre performers. Local narratives are also entwined within all these worlds. Delving into the dichotomies and overlaps of what it means to 'see as an oil company' (Ferguson 2005), 'seeing like a state' (Scott 1998), 'seeing like a mayor' (Verdery 2002), and the conflicting ways of seeing of state and pastoralists (Johnsen et al. 2015), I place my work at the intersections between theory, performance, reality and narrative, which sees the stories told in conferences, in art and in everyday lives as different modes of presenting one's worlds and what is at stake in each of them.

My analytical frame of performance is not primarily concerned with the distinction between theatre and reality, but rather with performance as a mode of operating and navigating in the socio-natural worlds in which my interlocutors participate, the contexts in which they operate and the way they seek to influence these. As modern-day rituals, the consensus-creating, consensus-confirming and consensus-disrupting performances explored in this thesis aims to highlight precisely their *commonalities*

with explicitly performative events, and how it is through performance that their status and role is contested. When protestors intervene to disrupt celebratory events, they do so with an understanding that this is an event which should not be allowed to go ahead without question. When the industry is concerned with stopping such interventions, they also do so from an understanding that something is *at stake*; their narrative of success and celebration is made in the performance of a non-disrupted event.

From the gifting of a concert to the town by Statoil (Chapter 3), to the launch of the 23rd licencing round in Hammerfest (Chapter 6), these events show how a specific genre lends itself to intervention in social reality by the participants in the ritual – and how they, in turn, use this potential to make a specific point, strengthen a narrative or otherwise influence the course of events and thereby the future. Indeed, their awareness of the performative act – and the way in which they distance these acts from distinctly theatrical ones – shows that the interrelation of social drama to stage drama is a spiralling one rather than cyclical or repetitive (Turner 1990).

The point then, is not whether these events 'really are' performance, or what either NOROG, Greenpeace or artists think the category of performance to be (though this also warrants discussion throughout the chapters), but how performance *as a trope* shifts our perspective to 'the performative dimensions of the social construction of reality' (Schieffelin 1996:83), or how local enactments are articulated in the world. Used in this way, performance is a useful motif to consider how different actors seek to order and influence their world, and what this enactment highlights, conceals, enters into dialogue with and excludes. This approach also allows for the bifurcation between different stances; that of the ethnographer and those of her various informants. In this tacking back and forth, of showing different scenes of making and unmaking worlds through social practice, this is not only activist research, and not only cultural critique (cf. Hale 2006; Ortner 2016), but a motion between worlds made to be commensurable

and incommensurable at variable points of their political horizons. My aim is to show not only what is at stake, but *how the stakes are enacted* as being such in the events which form the ethnography of this thesis.

This brings us away from a sociological reduction where theatrics is something social movements use, or performance as business language of acting according to correct procedures, as performance and theatre is *both this and something much more.* Rather than claiming a Shakespearian 'all the world's a stage', I ask *how* stages are made and defined, performed upon and contested – and how some of them are explicitly talked of as not stages at all, constructing a reality in which some arguments are more valid than others, due to where they are performed and by whom. The world of social drama is made such by actors with greatly differing interests, and the way they perform publicly is part of affirming and disavowing other actors and their lived-in worlds, social realities and notions of what facts are and which facts should count. In a present infused with fossil fuels, discursively as well as in the air we breathe and the soil and water we depend on,[19] the way in which relations are made to count or ignored, makes and unmakes possibilities for the futures of human and non-human worlds.

Across different arenas from corporate meetings and conferences to the arts, the courtroom and everyday life, people are concerned with the efficacy of what they do, they have an awareness of who their audience is, and often attempt, through their performance, to either strengthen, question or directly challenge the leading narrative of particular events. If we consider performance not as a spectrum of theatre vs reality, but instead as sites of contestation, of boundary-making, of calling attention to particular realities which are threatened with erasure by the performance and enactment of others, and as performances reifying certain realities which are

[19] Anyone born after 1986, myself included, was born into an atmosphere containing more parts per million of CO_2 than at any point whilst Homo sapiens have existed on the planet. When I started my PhD in January 2014, CO_2 levels were just below 400 ppm. As I put my final touches to the thesis, they are at 406 ppm (October 2018). We have indeed inherited 'soiled grounds' (Fortun 2014); as this is wholly uncharted territory for us an many of our companion species.

constituted through the practice and repetition of discursive events, we might begin to glimpse what the concept of performance can bring to anthropological understandings of these issues. This thesis explores events such as industry conferences and media debates *as performances*, that is, as processes which matter for shaping the narratives of development of the north and of what the north is and should be, as a resource region yet to be fully exploited and simultaneously a homeland which can co-exist with this new driver of development. Throughout, my research asks what drives orientations towards resource extraction, and what contestations arise from what is unheard, unarticulated or made unimportant at different stages of an unfolding political process.

Interlude: Of Paris, the streets and global localities

> *'It's half past noon in Paris, December 10. A small group of indigenous peoples from Sápmi and the Pacific Islands, with supporters from across the world, are standing in a circle in front of Notre Dame. The Pacific Islanders bid everyone welcome and start a ceremony where they receive a stone from the Arctic Ocean, which has been carried from Sápmi to Paris by runners in the longest performance and relay race leading up to the negotiations. Song penetrates the silence hanging over Paris' protest ban, but the police make no move to interfere. They understand that this moment is far too significant to interrupt.'*

I wrote the above words in an online article in New Internationalist (Dale 2015), during the climate negotiations at COP21 in Paris in December 2015. The protest ban lay heavy over the city after the terrorist attacks only weeks before, but some actions were still going ahead, defying the French authorities and insisting that civil society had a right to gather and make their voices heard. Indigenous groups from around the world had come to the city, and I followed some of the activities of the Sápmi Grassroots group, which got together with other indigenous delegations to highlight the presence and visibility of indigenous peoples outside the official climate negotiations. Some of them deliberately stayed outside of official negotiations, whilst others of their colleagues, allies and other representatives partook in events and meetings inside the conference halls, bringing joik and indigenous presence to the negotiations. In alliance with other indigenous activists, they marked territory on the streets and rivers of Paris with ceremonies, canoes and other kinds of boats, and a clear, red line running through the events, marking the 1.5 degrees of global warming that cannot be crossed if they, particularly the Pacific islanders, are to have a future on their own terms.

The ceremony also marked the end of an ambitious theatre production by a Swedish art and activist collective, Troja Scenkonst, who had initiated a relay-race from Gíron on the Swedish side of Sápmi, through Europe and to Paris. A stone from the Arctic ocean was carried 4000 km by thousands of people in a live-streamed event. Each participant had a statement on 'why I run', a personal motivation that linked them to the wider movement, the planet and the environmental crisis we are all connected in. The struggles to be heard are also struggles to make others pay attention and join the fight, addressed to 'the movement' and for movement-building purposes as much as it is addressed to the powers-that-be.

Jenni Laiti, who calls herself an artivist rather than activist, started the relay race in Kiruna, and has been active in the Sámi art and struggles for self-determination for several years. She holds that she does this to make people think themselves – to wake up (Sandström 2017:105). Laiti was also present at the end of the relay in Paris, and on the frontlines during demonstrations and artistic interventions.

In my fieldnotes, I carry on the thought of what this type of protest means:

> *'Though protest is often rooted in the specificity of a here, protest actions labelled as such often transcend localities and speak to a globalized audience at the same time as they address what is happening where they are. It is a demand on the here and now, where Sápmi's melting tundra is indeed present in Paris, together with the sinking islands of the Pacific and the First Nation's landscapes wounded by tarsands operations. The frontlines merge to a land held together as indigenous by their shared ritual actions and protests, their artwork and traditional practices, their red lines and raised fists, and the power of circles gathered in prayer. It is a here and now that is both local and global at the same time, that relocates specific places from what is often thought of as periphery to the centre of political power, negotiations and policy-making. Outside the offices of the oil company Total, who*

are deep in the Canadian tar sands, outside the cathedral of Notre Dame, outside and inside the formal negotiations. Activism and diplomacy becomes two sides of the same strategy.'

Localising protest only by what gets coverage in the media or is recognised as protest by the environmental movement writ large, misses a significant part of the picture, namely these interconnections of resistance which emerge through time spent listening and participating; interlacing ceremony, ritual, diplomacy, protest and parliamentary politics, the everyday and the grand political events. As the President of the Sámediggi has put it at different debates and events: social media is a gift to indigenous peoples everywhere (see also Daes 2003). In an era of social media, activists are connected in ways that are not immediately visible unless you are part of their networks yourself. Small, local gestures of dissent are part of a worldwide network that is working systematically for recognition, self-determination and a future beyond the fossil fuel economy.

The older generations – and the younger – have their offline networks too, and make connections across vast distances from Sápmi to Standing Rock and other indigenous struggles against oil pipelines and other infrastructure impacting their land, sometimes without participating in the social media networks where their messages circulate. Sámi and Native American water protectors connect and meet, whether they travel to Standing Rock or the Standing Rock Sioux tribe or other allied tribes travel to Sápmi. They find each other. Sometimes they make the news, and get coverage for their shared struggle. More important are the meetings themselves: they give strength and security with a feeling that they are not alone, building instead on the connections which grow increasingly strong.

As Anna Tsing points out, '[t]here is no reason to assume that collaborators share common goals.' (Tsing 2005:13). Conversations and shared strategies do not necessarily

mean that one works towards the same goal, and these overlaps of motivations and interests are sometimes what allows seemingly unified action to move forward. Some of those who I shared the streets with during those days in Paris care for a just transition for indigenous peoples, others remain uncommitted to such questions – but the nature of alliances is that they all partook in dancing, shouting, and demanding a future beyond carbon and the fossil fuel industries, and for an agreement that would hold decision-makers accountable. Paris was not the end, nor the beginning, but a point on a trajectory, a translocal event which comes to influence the future of the Norwegian north and every other corner of the globe, as the climate agreement's highest goal is to influence the very contents of the atmosphere.

In Paris, because the whole world was at stake, everyone was local. At the same time, the voices of indigenous groups insist that the red lines are already crossed, their bodies and their artwork, their ceremonies, banners and ribbons testimonies to their experience of a world that is already changed by colonialism and climate change. They remind us that rising seas, melting tundra and changed seasons have already altered living conditions. Being in Paris, drawing red lines, and making sure their continued presence in known, the translocal here also points to other localities; the local and present in their home communities, where their futures come under threat through plans of mines, roads, power lines and recreational cabins.

Or as one of the Sámi activists, Sarakka, said to me: 'Those of us who aren't politicians can still show our discontent. (…) We can feel the changes in nature on our bodies, and how it affects our lives.' Her family have reindeer, they feel the change of the seasons, and in Paris, she acts as a representative of her people, taking to the frontlines to insist that their voice be heard.

Elsewhere in Paris, Naomi Klein, Bill McKibben and other prominent climate activists hosted a mock tribunal against ExxonMobil for their climate crimes – although, Klein

stressed in her introduction, 'there is nothing mock about this' (*Democracy Now!* 2015). The tribunal, held in a big room in Montreuil used by the People's Climate Summit, invited a scientist, Jason Box, and frontline witnesses from across the indigenous world. Jannie Staffanson, in Paris as a representative in the negotiations for the Saami Council, testified to how climate change is impacting her people and her family's practice of reindeer herding, where unstable weather made the seasonal migration difficult and reindeer struggle to reach their food when the ground gets covered in icy layers. Staffanson had an official role as political representative in the COP21 negotiations, but like many other indigenous representatives, she did not have a problem crossing over into the events organised by grassroots and civil society. Her message in both forums where the same: a concern with securing a future where climate change would not pose a threat to their ability to continue existing as indigenous people on their land.

In Paris, a short and powerful sentence with a history linked to Sámi activism and to the indigenous movement was repeated, again and again.

Mii leat ain dás. We are still here.

Chapter 3

Defining the stage: narratives and localities

Industria hominum naturam vincit – Man's industry conquers Nature

- Watchword of Hammerfest, 1889

For it is surely the case that control of a society's memory largely conditions the hierarchy of power

- Paul Connerton (1989:1)

What kind of a place is Hammerfest? A frontier, a periphery, the edge of the High North? An edge, or a centre? Or all these, at the same time?

If one were a travel writer, Hammerfest could be described as a phoenix: rising from flames and economic crises and always finding its feet again, even after the seemingly darkest or most hopeless of periods. Hammerfest and its inhabitants have seen war, famine, trade relations that rise and fall, fisheries that thrive and decline, political decisions that work in their favour and political decisions that prevents prosperity from resources right at their doorstep. The people who have made their homes here are used to getting by despite whatever is thrown at them by other forces, human and non-human.

The image of being at the end of everything is strengthened if you come by road, over the long plain of Sennalandet, passing along the edge of Repparfjorden through

Kvalsund, over the bridge and away from the mainland. Round the mountains and further along the road, you will first see the town over the top of a road, where Hammerfest's coat of arms and municipal icon, the polar bear, stands in the form of a sculpture or statue in white, looking out over the town. The region has no live polar bears to speak of, but the coat of arms is testament to the period when Hammerfest was a northern harbour which served the boats that went into the polar ice to hunt seals and other sea mammals. Hammerfest has been a harbour for different kinds of trade with different ethnic and national groups, from providing dried fish for the Hanseatic trade in the Middle Ages to the Pomor trade with Russian seafarers in the 18th and 19th Century. The latter half of the 20th Century was marked by fish exports and the fish processing industry, and now in the 21st Century, Hammerfest is home to producers and exporters of oil and gas resources from the Barents Sea.

Hammerfest's history as a town began at the end of the 18th Century, when Denmark made the northern counties a free trading zone. The Bergen office of the Hanseatic League had closed down in 1754, and in 1789 three towns with trading rights in Finnmark were established: Hammerfest, Vardø and Tromsø. By 1801, only 300 people lived in all these three together (Elenius et al. 2015:134). This history, of the first and the northernmost, remains part of the story told by people in Hammerfest today. The latest turn in this cycle started with Statoil's gas plant, which would start a transformation of the city's face. As the local narratives go, the pubs in Hammerfest were flooded with champagne on the day when the government approved the development of the Snøhvit field as an LNG plant in 2002, and the number of cakes consumed to celebrate petroleum milestones are larger than can be accounted for. Through petroleum, Hammerfest has refound an optimism for the future: people are 'painting their garden fences again', as I was frequently told during fieldwork. Locals feel it is worth staying and that there is a future for their children to return to as well. That Hammerfest is a place to be, rather than a place to leave.

This narrative is, indeed, already a travel narrative. It is retold in numerous articles by journalists who have visited the northernmost petroleum city in the world, and returned to tell a tale of a resilient, proud and industrious people at the tip of the land in Northern Norway.[20] On the local level of the town, their self-understanding is not as a region where ordinary people are 'joining distant corporations in creating uninhabitable landscapes' (Tsing 2005:2), with all value creation sucked out into a globalised economy, leaving only toxicity and a few demeaning jobs behind. Enough jobs and money is left behind such that people feel the development also benefits them. Hammerfest looks nothing like the ecological disaster wrecked by petroleum companies in Ogoniland in Nigeria (Watts 2001), the vast, open-pit mines for the tarsands areas or the roads and roads that cut through the boreal forest in Canada, where Statoil until recently was one of many operators (Wanvik and Caine 2017). Granted, there are impacts onshore and at sea, but seemingly within borders: the gas factory itself is confined to an island and the industrial area extends into the sea in a fjord just outside the city. From the top of the Tyven mountain just outside the city, it looks orderly and almost peaceful, as if people on the local level in Hammerfest understand petroleum as a way to make their world habitable in late modernity. Income from petroleum has made the city modern, and the region liveable, such that there is a future here for the current and next generation, whatever might come after them.

Just like it is 'the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny' (Anderson 1983:19), the patriotism in Hammerfest plots its petroleum wealth as the next adaptation to the shifting ways of cultivating or exploiting resources. The self-image of Hammerfestians is not of pristine nature, but a town which knows very well both the need to make a living and the sudden shifts which might change everything. In more than one sense, Hammerfest has always been an industry town – or a city of commerce adapting to new ways of using the rich natural resources at their doorstep.

[20] For telling examples, see *BBC*'s 'The Norwegian Town the world tried to erase' (MacEacheran 2017) and *Teknisk Ukeblad* for a Norwegian equivalent (Taraldsen 2016a).

Farsighted mayors and other pioneers play lead roles in this story: as early as 1972, when Statoil had just been founded as a one-man office in Oslo, Hammerfest's former mayor Aksel Olsen trooped up there with a map that showed Hammerfest as the centre of a petroleum industry in the north of Norway (Amundsen 2012:4). Arve Johnsen, Statoil's first CEO, is said to have replied that he was 'at least 25 years too early', but the ambition was clear: Hammerfest was to be the industrial node in the north. This ambition continued through him and subsequent mayors, whose work on steering committees and regional councils repeatedly insisted on the role of Hammerfest as a strategic centre for operations in the Barents Sea. It would be 30 years and a long-winded waiting game before the first developments materialised, but the self-consciousness with which Hammerfest views its history, is one of a self-made man whose industriousness conquers not only nature (as is the town's maxim from 129 years ago), but wins political battles through long, hard and determined work.

This chapter delves into this self-perception, employing a 'concern with representation, with how people make things known to themselves' (Strathern 2005:42). Geertz, in his analysis of the Balinese cockfight, writes that such events are interpretive, 'a story they tell themselves about themselves' (1972:26) – though as Ortner (1978) reminds us, it is more than 'just' a story; it is also a felt experience where participants' are drawn into its meaning- and consciousness-forming elements. Such events are sites of negotiation as much as reification, of different powers and displays of self-understanding at work. As identity is performative (Butler 1997), this chapter is concerned with *how* it is performed and brought about, and how the identity and the history of a town is told and retold alongside the development of infrastructures, shifting global markets and national politics.

The petroleum development in the region is not inscribed on empty territory, but reconfigures the material and social relations within the town through the

understanding of its inhabitants and their elected politicians. My starting point is to look at how the mayor self-narrates the story of petroleum development and the town's relationship to Snøhvit at a Statoil-sponsored concert celebrating 10 years of Snøhvit LNG in operation. The event, with gifts, exchange and speeches, draws out perspectives that show both how Statoil talks of their position in the region, and how the municipality see themselves as industrious collaborators rather than grateful clients of petroleum companies. Drawing on how this representation is performed also sets the stage for examining state and industry events as performance in later chapters. Finally, it links the abstract existence of narratives with the concrete events at which they are performed in public, for all to see and validate by their presence. These events, then, create a particular relationship between past, present and future. In this chapter, I seek to understand how Hammerfest, its people, politicians and journalists, place the arrival of Snøhvit within discourses of change and modernity, and how this narrative is reified and strengthened in research favouring socio-economic variables such as jobs, in-migration, infrastructural development and the coming of a modernity signified by architecture and a changing habitus in the town. Chapter 4 then delves into modes of dissent, its presence, absence, and silent forms in a region marked by a long history of epistemic violations (Spivak 1990), assimilation policies and post-war reconstruction.

Good times and mutual debts

August 2017 marked a historical event in Hammerfest. It was 10 years since Statoil started production from the gas field Snøhvit here in 2007, a milestone for the region's first definite step into the petroleum era. To thank the city for their hospitality and good cooperation over the years during construction and operation, Statoil was hosting a party for the locals, inviting the whole city to an outdoor concert that was advertised in local newspapers, social media and posters spread around the city centre. The concert was a day-time party on a stage rigged especially for the event, which took place along the architecturally modern pier on the seafront, right next to Hammerfest's

prominent cultural centre, which had opened just two years after Snøhvit first came into production.

For the event itself, Statoil had booked the Alta-based light and sound technicians VALY. They worked late into the night before the event to prepare the stage in the heavy and increasing rain, which rather unusually for this time of year had unleashed upon the town. Torrents of rain persisted throughout the night and only started letting go early afternoon the day after. This left the first part of the anniversary a rather wet affair, but the weather started clearing just in time for the concerts to start in the afternoon. Volunteers, many of them local youth, were out in great numbers to ensure things went smoothly, wearing rain jackets underneath light blue t-shirts provided by Statoil. They had the pink Statoil logo along with its partners printed on the back, and the words 'Hammerfest LNG celebrates ten years of production' printed in Norwegian on the front. From midday, they served cake inside a white festival tent, but the crowd was relatively sparse before the programme started at 3pm. Throughout the afternoon, local catering businesses also sold their food – local specialities based on fish and reindeer – from inside the white tent, which also functioned as a shelter for those who wanted to seek refuge from the weather. Statoil's local industry coordinator was in the audience, beaming and greeting people in the crowd, accepting congratulations and making small-talk during the breaks between concerts.

At 3pm, the show host entered the stage to set the mood, and introduced the production director of Melkøya, Unni Fjær. She started her speech by saying they had been planning this event for almost a year, seeing it as an opportunity to thank the whole town for great cooperation through the years. She emphasized this was not only the municipality, but also its inhabitants, and that this was mutually beneficial both for Statoil and for them. Half of the people who live here have either worked at Melkøya or have a family member who used to work there, she said, highlighting how important Statoil were for jobs in the region. Her final remark was directed to the

property tax, and how much Statoil contributed to the welfare of Hammerfest: nearly 2 billion NOK in property tax over the years. Someone in the crowd gasped, as if this number was totally new or unprecedented – the roughly 200 million a year amounts to quite a number over the years. Someone clapped, but the applause never went beyond modest; the crowd was not yet big enough to sustain a longer round of spontaneous applause. Statoil's representative continued by emphasizing that she is not a fan of property tax per se, but was 'impressed' with what the municipality does with the money, how they use it to create welfare and a town where people want to live. It was obvious, she said, that they had to invite the whole town when they were to celebrate Melkøya's tenth anniversary, and use it as a platform to showcase local talent.

The mayor, Alf E. Jacobsen, then took the stage, and spoke in his characteristically straight-forward and humorous manner; 'I can understand that she loves property tax', he started, jokingly stating the amount they get from the company and how it has made them 'Siamese twins' of sorts: when things go well for Hammerfest, they go well for Statoil, too. The municipality has been more than happy to accommodate Statoil here. 'And for the town', he continued, 'it is no secret that if you hadn't come, we would be in deep shit.' It had been a period with bad times in the fishing industry, and Hammerfest had been placed on the so-called ROBEK-list for municipalities, which requires the state to approve any loans local authority want to make because they are not deemed able to pay these loans back. 'And if there is one thing we don't like, it's the state muddling into the size of our loans'. Now, he continued, their loans are so large that property tax is probably needed forever. The joke carried a large degree of truth, as Hammerfest's investments in anticipation of Snøhvit's arrival have made them a heavily indebted municipality, fully dependent on the property tax income to keep their economy afloat. After those remarks, the mayor praised Statoil for throwing a party for the whole town, and recounted how the collaboration between Statoil and Hammerfest stretched all the way back to 1981, when the company first started looking for petroleum in the region. At the end of his speech, he presented a gift to Statoil's

production manager, a work of art called 'Vannpoesi' (water poetry). 'What this symbolizes to me', he says, 'is that when you have gas that will be produced until 2055, maybe longer, then it's good times also for Hammerfest.'

The event continued with mini-concerts and other performances, including a show by the local gymnastics club, performing a routine which, according to the evening's host, was inspired by the gas pipelines at Melkøya. Other acts included local youth bands, adult musicians and some invited stars, whose names mattered more for the young people in the audience than for the parental generations. About half-way through the programme, three LNG-powered boats from Østensjø rederi, a company based in the South-West of Norway, appeared in the harbour area, where they made some loops and were broadcast onto the big screen on stage. The light blue tug boats, the same colour as the T-shirts of the volunteers, had been baptised the same morning in the torrential rain, and would be serving the Snøhvit field as part of their contract with Statoil. On the side of each of them, the company had put the words 'LNG Clean Power', doubly signifying both the LNG processing plant they were serving, and the motor efficiency of the boats themselves.

After the end of the concerts, people quickly disappeared from the city centre, families went home, and the town remained relatively quiet for a Saturday night. Statoil had thrown a family-friendly party, and it remained a calm affair.

The gift that stays local

The words of Statoil's representative and Hammerfest's mayor, and their performed relation to each other during this event bring up two central aspects of the relationship between Statoil's local organization and Hammerfest, which bear importance for understanding how Hammerfest's political leadership perform their relationship with Statoil. The kind and form of gifting plays an important role here. Exchange between a

donor and a recipient is more than just an exchange of things, the action also is their respective perspective on each other (Cross 2014:123; Strathern 1999). If we start with the form, the informal and joking tone between the company and the mayor in front of a crowd signifies a level of trust that comes from many years of co-existence, but also a very particular emphasis on equality and egalitarianism that is particular for Norwegian society (Gullestad 1989). Other anthropologists have argued that the north is more characterised by gift economies than other parts of Norway (Kramvig 2005a; Lien 2001). The spirit that is evoked is one of collaboration rather than dependency, mutual benefit rather than patronage.

Whilst Statoil's gifting also occurs at other sports events and cultural events, where it is not uncommon to see Statoil's logo amongst the sponsors, this sponsorship is often alongside other businesses such as the fish industry, local energy suppliers and sports stores. This event was different; Statoil gifted a concert to the town, just like they have gifted jobs, development and property tax.[21] The mayor's speech, and return gift, marks a subtle difference in understanding: this is not a relationship of gratitude from a recipient community towards a company exercising their corporate social responsibility, but a relation between a host community and a company which benefits both parties – and where neither of them are at the mercy of the other. He thanks the company representative for putting on a concert, but the emphasis on the property tax is the real message. Statoil are not *giving* money to Hammerfest as charity or patronage, but paying their tax as all businesses are required to. Hammerfest is proud to be the first town in the northern petroleum adventure, but this is not charity. In the local narratives, whether from politicians or other locals, the property tax is a defining factor for the change of the town's exterior and interior.

[21] It also marks out a cultural event explicitly associated with Statoil, rather than with Eni Norge, whose operatorship and offices in Hammerfest has also led to the initiation of an 'Italian Week' at the Arctic Cultural Centre every September. The event was initiated 'over a glass of wine' by two figures who are both visible in town: the rector of *kulturskolen,* which provides music lessons and instruments for children and youth, and the industry coordinator of Eni Norge, as a way to develop good relations between industry and culture in Hammerfest.

Property tax as social licence

Hammerfest's main source of income from the petroleum sector, then, is not as a receiver of gifts, but as a legal unit regulated under Norwegian law: property tax from companies operating on their grounds. One of the town politicians put it in this way in an interview: 'I won't say it's meant everything, but it has certainly been very, very important'. Describing what it was like to grow up in the 1990s, with grey cardboard in front of shop windows, houses which no one bothered to maintain, and no future in the town except as a teacher, police, nurse or doctor, the contrast to the optimism after Snøhvit was made apparent in her narrative. She continued to explain how, after *gjenreisinga,* the post-war reconstruction,[22] Statoil's Snøhvit and the start of the petroleum era was almost like a second reconstruction of the town, allowing a reconstruction after the fisheries declined and Hammerfest was at risk of becoming a ghost town. After the gas came, new houses have been built, new schools and kindergartens in the place of old and worn buildings, a reconstructed city centre, new infrastructure, and – most importantly, I was told – optimism and belief in the future, and career opportunities, here, in Hammerfest. As long as Statoil is there, which is for the foreseeable future of at least 35-40 years, Hammerfest is guaranteed a yearly income which gives them possibilities smaller municipalities often do not have. Provided no changes to the property tax regime is made, this is a rare stability in a region otherwise dependent on the public sector and seasonal, often fluctuating, sectors, particularly fishing.

Just how much it means for the municipality was made clear in 2015, when the 'Blue-Blue' government suggested the removal of the property tax. Hammerfest's politicians were amongst the most vocal voices against the change nationally. In a public hearing

[22] The period of rebuilding the city after World War II is referred to as *gjenreisingstida,* or the 'reconstruction period', when people who had been evacuated in 1944 returned to their home region which had been burn to the ground by the retreating German troops, and rebuilt their homes and towns with extremely sparse materials – a period that lasted roughly until the mid-fifties.

letter to Department of Finance, Hammerfest's chief municipal executive wrote that the proposal to change the property tax legislation was 'dramatic' for the municipality, and a 'breach of the social contract that is the foundation of municipal consent' to the big infrastructural development and the impacts it has on nature to build the processing facility at Melkøya (Hammerfest kommune 2015, my translation).

The government's proposed policy was never implemented, but the response from Hammerfest shows how politicians and municipal employees portray the importance of the tax as absolutely essential to their economy and development: The letter explains how Hammerfest experienced economic decline and population decline until 2002, including the loss of 1200 jobs in the fisheries and fish processing industry. The marginal situation led to hardly any maintenance and upgrades to public buildings, and a great need for an economic upturn which came with Melkøya and the processing plant. Since the approval of the LNG plant was passed in the Storting in 2002, the municipality has been responsible for the investments and upgrades of infrastructure, including roads, traffic safety, avalanche safety, schools, kindergartens and much more. The finances for all this is attributed to the property tax. Hammerfest, which now has 2,3 billion NOK in debt from their investments in rebuilding the town to meet the petroleum era, need the continued income which is generated by the current tax arrangements. Without this, the letter said, 20% of their budget would disappear, leading to 260 job cuts and a significant reduction of services available to its inhabitants, instead of continuing its current trajectory of growth and population increase.

The response is not a particularly 'northern' structure, but a feature of the Norwegian tax system on factories onshore. The Network of Petroleum Municipalities (NPK/Nettverk av Petroleumskommuner), consisting of seven municipalities who are host municipalities for onshore processing facilities for petroleum (including Hammerfest), made the same points as Hammerfest in a more general manner. All of

them have instituted property tax in their municipalities. NPK's letter emphasises that it is a prerequisite for the municipalities accepting to be host communities for onshore petroleum facilities that they will receive a portion of the value creation, which the property tax has ensured (NPK 2015). The income is necessary for the municipalities to develop the infrastructure and services needed to serve the large infrastructural developments brought in by the petroleum sector – and there is at present no other way to generate this income. Beyond what is considered the responsibility of the company when it comes to onshore facilities, the local authorities consider it as part of the social contract that they can directly reap the benefits and income generated by the company they are hosting in their municipality.

Statoil, on the other hand, wrote a response in support of the removal of the taxation (Statoil 2015). Whilst Statoil wrote that they care about contributing to local ripple effects and growth, providing jobs and paying 'significant amounts' of property tax, a different taxation would improve their competitiveness on the international arena. Though the government remained in favour of the change after the hearing round, the smaller political parties which they relied on to make up the majority blocked the change. The consequences, said a spokesperson for the Liberal party to NRK, were simply too big (Klo and Trellevik 2015). Hammerfest, and other municipalities dependent on income through the taxation could breathe a sigh of relief.

Materiality and memories

To understand the relationship between Statoil and the town, then, it is necessary to understand some of the specificities of Snøhvit, and how the materiality of the resource and infrastructure are key to understand its social, political and economic dimensions (Barry 2013; Mitchell 2011; Weszkalnys 2014). Snøhvit operates as a subsea field, where installations on the seabed extracts the gas and feeds it to the facilities at Melkøya, an island right next to the town, through a 143 km long pipeline. Here, the

gas is transformed to liquefied natural gas (LNG) before it is loaded on tanker ships to be transported and sold to Europe and the rest of the world. The entire island of Melkøya is the base for this plant and its operation, and it is this onshore construction that gives the project the special significance and economic income for Hammerfest.

The LNG plant was a solution to a logistical problem: Statoil's operations in Hammerfest cannot connect to a pipeline like the North Sea gas: the 8800 kilometers of pipelines that connect Norwegian gas to the European market do not go as far north as the Barents Sea. To get the oil to the world market, constructing an LNG plant was the only way for Statoil and the other license holders would be able to develop the field. This was costly, initially set at approx. 49 billion NOK, but viable, unlike the cost of stretching a pipeline thus far north without guarantee there would be further projects. The proposals were disputed, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, but eventually made it through the Storting in 2002. The year before, Statoil had signed contracts for gas sales with a specific start date for deliveries, and any delay to the production start would be costly (Tveiterås 2010). Initially, the project was not viable for Statoil under the then-current taxation rules, but a change to the Petroleum Act Tax reduced the depreciation period for new, large scale LNG plants in Norway. The change was pushed through by the Finnmark-born Karl Eirik Schjøtt-Pedersen, who was the Labour Minister of Finance at the time.[23] Statoil was allowed to write off the costs for the project over a shorter time period than normal, whilst the whole LNG facility was classified as 'offshore', such that the tax payments would be bigger.

One of Statoil's representatives called this a 'win-win' for all parties when I interviewed him about Snøhvit. The environmental NGO Bellona disagreed, and filed a complaint about these changes to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), claiming this was an illegal state subsidy of a polluting project. The Department of Finance defended it in a letter to the EFTA Surveillance Authority, where they also wrote this was

[23] Schjøtt-Pedersen later became the Director General of NOROG, a role he held during the launch of the 23rd licensing round, discussed in Chapter 6.

necessary to make petroleum viable in Norway's 'extreme northern periphery' (2002). Eventually, the project – and the tax change – was allowed to go ahead. From then, it would take five years before the field was ready to produce, also costing the company much more than it initially expected. Delays in construction and delays in the start of the project (partially blamed on the environmental NGOs for meddling in the tax affairs), would cost Statoil both time and money.

Whenever I mentioned Snøhvit to Henrik, a Sámi man from inner Finnmark who had lived a large part of his life in Hammerfest, his eyes lit up in reminiscence of the construction years, when everything was insanely busy and everyone who wanted work would get it. Snøhvit's construction turned Hammerfest into a boom-town, or what is still called a 'klondyke' mood by locals, not without a certain nostalgia. They use 'Klondyke' as a positive term, to describe the surge of energy and activity when several thousand construction workers descended on the small town, giving young men and skilled workers all the work they could dream of. Henrik and many of his friends were employed in this period, but afterwards fewer of them were needed. They were left to find other kinds of jobs within the same or other kinds of spheres. Henrik, who had invested in a house in Hammerfest, had worked all sorts of jobs, from social work to construction work. The part of Melkøya's employment period where his skillset was attractive, was by now over, even as other friends of his worked on the island in different capacities.

Less nostalgia-inducing (but sometimes talked about with ironic distance), was the experience of local women, who did not enjoy the constant attention from strangers whenever they wanted to go out for a drink. A city formerly known for its lively nightlife, Hammerfestians changed their habits of going out on weekends, and still prefer a party at someone's house or a weekend at their cabin, although the construction phase is long since over. Though the city still has night clubs and pubs, where the relatively new microbrewery pub along the new pier is particularly attractive

for many of Hammerfest's old, new and returned inhabitants, the disappearance of the night clubs of the 'old times' were still lamented by some, as something which had changed with a changing composition of the town. Others would laugh away the matter and say there were 'many divorces' in the construction period, although this is more of a folk myth than something that is established in numbers or divorce statistics – in fact the opposite is indicated by some of Snøhvit's follow-on research (Eikeland et al. 2009:115–16).

Jobs, and net migration into the town are, on the other hand, numbers which *can* be accounted for, and are tied closely to the material infrastructure for processing gas. The island of Melkøya is connected to the town via an underground tunnel, and unlike offshore structures, where the workers can live anywhere and are flown into the city only to get a helicopter to the field, these jobs can stay in the region. At Melkøya, people can live in Hammerfest and go to work for Statoil each day, returning home after their shift, unlike offshore workers who might spend at most a night in a hotel on their way out to the platform. After the arrival of the gas plant, Hammerfest has gained jobs that in numbers replace those lost in the fishing industry, with the number of people employed locally rising with 1300 people in the years 2002-2007 (Eikeland et al. 2009). Of the newcomers or returned youth, many were in the age groups between 20-29 and 30-39 – those always highly desired in small municipalities like Hammerfest since they are likely to have children and might settle in the town. The gas industry, now followed by oil, seems to have turned a trend of population decline into an increase and stabilisation, even if the numbers are somewhat lower than predicted (Aure 2015), and would be even lower without the migrants and refugees that are settled in Hammerfest (IMDi 2018). The overall positive attitude towards the place has risen, reflected in the attitude of the older generations I interviewed, who see their children come back, even if they are coming to work in other industries than petroleum. Housing prices have soared, more shops are open on the high street,

politicians have prioritised investments in schools and kindergartens to demonstrate for local people that this activity benefits them.

The research on the impacts of Snøhvit also shows a renewed optimism amongst young people in Hammerfest and the nearby town of Alta in the years directly following the construction, who envisioned a future in the region and wanted to stay there to work (Eikeland et al. 2009). Through the local high school, Statoil helped both start and develop vocational training and apprenticeships, and in the first period most of them would be able to enter straight into well paid jobs at a young age. This collaboration is showcased in an industry report by KonKraft,[24] where the Melkøya development is used as an example of successful case study. Across a page of the report, the rector of the high school says the collaboration with Statoil and Melkøya has led to more motivated students and less absence from teaching in all subjects, as well as a good dialogue with Statoil on what both parties want from each other (KonKraft 2016a:81).

Simultaneously, youth in Hammerfest and Alta are not lining up to work in the industry – on the contrary, the popularity started falling at the end of Snøhvit's construction period (Eikeland et al. 2009:99–100). In the past few years, the number of applications to the high school education geared towards work in the industry has dropped dramatically; from long waiting list to fill two classes, the number of applicants dropped to four in 2016, and in 2018 just one applicant with chemistry and processing as their first priority. This is a development which both the deputy major and the industry worry about, or as they say to the media: there will be a need for more

[24] KonKraft describe themselves as 'a collaboration arena between NOROG, the Federation of Norwegian Industries, the Norwegian Shipowners Association and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), with LO members Fellesforbundet og (sic) Industri Energi. It serves as an agenda-setter for national strategies in the petroleum sector, and works to maintain the competitiveness of the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS), so that Norway remains an attractive area for investment by the Norwegian and international oil and gas industry – including suppliers and the maritime sector.' (KonKraft 2016b)

skilled petroleum workers when more of the Barents Sea developments come, and the more of these that are from Finnmark, the better, in their opinion (Reginiussen 2018).

Amongst the youth, on the other hand, the jobs are neither as many nor as attractive as they were five years ago. Though they might secure an apprenticeship with Statoil, there is no guarantee they will find a job – and even if NU have never been big in the town (as we will look at in Chapter 4) – neither is there uncritical love of the oil industry. Applications to study 'safer' choices, such as healthcare, are on the rise. This is illustrated rather well by the response from local high school students to the performance *Nordting*, performed for them by Amund Sjølie Sveen and his team in 2015. Playing on a satire over the development of the north from fish to petroleum, the performance contains an element of voting and decision-making, where he asked the teenagers whether Northern Norway should break out and become its own jurisdiction (overwhelming majority), whether mayor Alf E. should be mayor for life (also overwhelming majority), whether the high school should become Goliat Arctic Learning Centre, taking the sponsorship all the way (majority), and whether the fish-mogul Røkke should be charged with robbery of the coastal resources (majority). When it came to petroleum, opinions were a bit more divided; some thought that Snøhvit could be closed down and become a theme park straight away, but the majority wanted to keep production. And the municipal icon should remain a polar bear; not become an oil drop like Sveen suggested. Though town politicians and industry spokespeople might still be in Klondyke mood, the youth are more measured and – even if this was not a set of votes representative for the whole of the young population – points in the same direction as the drop in applications for petroleum-related education.

Black soot and berries

When the gas plant first started on August 21, 2007, the mood was rather different. Taking both the company and the town by surprise, a thin, fine layer of black soot suddenly covered people's cars, windows, and gardens. Ambulance drivers phoned up to complain, people were angry and worried, and Statoil's industry coordinator, who had just gone for a long over-due holiday after the project was safely up and running, had to interrupt his break to respond to the new issue at hand. Statoil had been worried about the *sound* of the gas burner, and wanted to avoid making it a point of disturbance for people living close to the island. No one had expected that a more silent burner which worked at a lower temperature would produce more soot. The result was a proper headache for Statoil not only in technical terms, but in terms of public trust in the city. It took several weeks to bring the situation under control.

During the same period, the instruments for measuring air quality and potentially toxic substances were not functioning for 14 days, leading to a deep distrust in the company's guarantee that the substances were not dangerous in such small quantities. A doctor in Hammerfest advised people not to pick the blueberries that year: though it was unlikely that the concentration of particles in the soot were cancer-inducing in these small amounts, it was better to take precautionary measures. The environmental NGO Bellona spoke to national media, calling Statoil's behaviour irresponsible and embarrassing for the company, and would later file charges against Statoil for an application to increase the amount of soot they were allowed to admit. The charges were dropped, but the reputational blow was significant for Statoil, who also received interview requests from international media who heard about the scandal. The company ordered an independent report from the University of Tromsø which confirmed that the particles were not dangerous in the small quantities. Over the course of a few weeks and a high number of public meetings, the problem gradually calmed down. After the first year of operation it mostly disappeared from people's

minds, as they felt reassured by the recommendations from health authorities and Statoil handling of the matter, which included paying for the cleaning of people's cars, homes and windows. For others, the insecurity lasted – some people still do not pick berries on the island.

The autumn the following year (2008), Statoil held their first concert for Hammerfest, as a token to thank the population for their patience and soften moods that might still not be fully happy with their presence in town. The real 'celebration of the opening' happened in 2010, when Statoil arranged another concert to celebrate Snøhvit's successful operation. Both of these concerts headlined more famous bands and hosts than in 2017, with an atmosphere of a 'people's' celebration aimed more at the population as a whole than the children which are Statoil's current campaign focus nationally.[25] The newspaper report was of a success event which had been welcomed by everyone, though some shorter 'text messages to the editor', which often appeared in local newspapers in Norway before social media replaced such forums, complained that 'some people had complained' about the concert and Statoil. They instead praised the company for both the concert, the free food and for creating a good atmosphere on a cold autumn day, with the flame of Melkøya shining in the background. 'Just think before you complain', one of these text messages said, 'where would Hammerfest be without Snøhvit? No cultural house and no newly refurbished schools, or the many jobs Snøhvit has given us.' (Finnmark Dagblad 2008, my translation). Not everyone was convinced, but the fairytale was beginning to settle as both real and material in people's minds.

[25] Whether this suggests that the downturn in the oil industry more generally has also reached the north or not, or whether it is part of Statoil's general spending policy change is hard to say, but the change of focus is notable. In both 2008 and 2010, the concerts were for the whole town and with names which the adult generations would appreciate, whereas in 2017, the 10-year celebration was explicitly aimed at the young and the local, a move which both saves money and roots them deeper within the local community – in many ways a strategy in line with the 'Heroes of Tomorrow' campaigns of Statoil, which are mostly directed at developing young talent in sports, science subjects and the arts.

The industry effect

Hammerfest's identity, through Snøhvit, has become that it has 'always' been an industry town, a line which goes through its former industries and now into the petroleum-driven future. The local author Alf R. Jacobsen, who has written the histories of both the Findus factory and of Snøhvit (Jacobsen 1996, 2010), captures this sentiment in a Statoil-commissioned book on Snøhvit's history. In the preface, Jacobsen writes that Hammerfest has been a pioneer in a northern Norwegian context; as host municipality first for Findus and the fish industry in the 1950s and now as a pioneer in LNG production – the very first such base in Europe (Jacobsen 2010:9). Throughout the book, he deals frequent punches to the 'backwards', doomsday-oriented and Arctic refuge-fixated environmentalists who would deny development and prosperity to Hammerfest and the north. In one of the book's final chapters, he sums up Snøhvit's development, from discovery to production. The following passage is a good example of this genre:

> *'For Hammerfest and its nearby areas, the petroleum industry's entry has been a revolution. The development has been phenomenal. From being the centre of a periphery marked by pessimism and stagnation, the city is now lit up with optimism and initiative – founded on the income and possibilities afforded by the gas age. Several hundred new and interesting jobs have been created, and the municipality of Hammerfest annually received 154 million Norwegian kroner in property tax from the facilities at Melkøya. Mayor Alf. E. Jacobsen and his staff have done the right thing: they have invested in the future and borrowed billions. All schools have been refurbished and modernised. Roads, public facilities and other infrastructure has been improved. The old Findus factory is torn down and has made way for a cultural centre with scenes and facilities, which were only dreams in earlier years. (...) It has taken time, but the fairytale is now a reality.'* (Jacobsen 2010:263, my translation)

This line of reasoning carries echoes of adaptation to industrial developments in the past: some people feared for what Findus and industrialization of fish processing would mean for the local fishing fleet (Holm et al. 2013), whilst others saw it as an opportune adaptation to the times. Findus led to economic development, population growth, the construction of a large and architecturally modern housing block, and shaped the identity of the town as an industrial centre on the Finnmark coast. Hammerfest had been rebuilt and modernized within a generation and a half – changing people's lives, dreams and hopes. There is a popular perception that Hammerfest is at the centre of things, in contrast to other places in the north where oil has not arrived. Hammerfest now participates in the development not only of the town, but the region and indeed the whole country: they are contributing to the future of the Norwegian oil industry, and working to make as much profit from it as possible.

To avoid the image of Hammerfestian exceptionalism, it is worth noting that the idea of Snøhvit as an adventure for the north with only southerners against the development was strong also in other parts of northern Norway, both when oil was first discovered in the 1980s, and again when the debate around Snøhvit was at its fiercest before it was passed in the Storting in 2002. *Nordlys,* the Tromsø-based newspaper, was significantly more positive than the business daily *Dagens Næringsliv,* with story-lines that were opposing to the extent that they reified a north vs south divide (Michaelsen 2007). Where *Nordlys'* editorials and reportage saw the project as an adventure that would bring growth and development to the north, *Dagens Næringsliv* commented on the economic subsidies that would be needed and the poor climate politics the project represented. In the period during the Snøhvit construction, *Dagens Næringsliv* shifted perspective, and started using the phrase 'Snøhviteffekten' (the Snøhvit effect), focusing on the many contracts, positive spin-offs and opportunities it created. Media started forming a consensus about the project as an

'adventure' which became the leading discourse through constant re-presentation (ibid.).

Modernising impulses

Within this ecology of symbols, gifts and semi-gifts, the Arctic Cultural Centre (AKS) comes to stand as the ultimate symbol of the new era; no longer powered by fish, but by petroleum, Hammerfest's bright red cultural house is built in the middle of town. Replacing the Findus factory, it symbolically as well as materially marks a new era in the history of Hammerfest. On its web page, AKS calls itself the 'cultural heart and meeting place of the municipality and the region,' (n.d.), a phrase which has also captured the analysis of other researchers writing about the gas-fuelled development of the town (see Holm et al 2013:361). Offering facilities that far outcompete other parts of Finnmark both in size and capacity, and a side panel which lights up with blue light in the evening, the building is meant to evoke the colours at play in the northern lights – a cultural house for an Arctic petroleum town.

As a building bridging the old and new, it is also a structure that embodies, manifests and holds both the community and the contradictions inherent in the meeting between the town and the large-scale petroleum industry (cf. Levi-Strauss in Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995:8). A materialisation of the petroleum money and the petroleum tax, it *is* the outcome of the petroleum visions that are projected from it as a stage. It incorporates the former fish industry in the architecture with a fish bone as part of the ornamentation and structure, and straddles different aspects of cultural work – though it is worth noting that the costs of playing in such a high-end venue is beyond the budget of many smaller companies and artists who are forced to either not tour Hammerfest or find other solutions to show their work. The venue is used for several petroleum-related events, including the Barents Sea Conference every year, whilst also being a space for artistic productions which might be either critical or ambivalent with

regards to oil. That the time of petroleum is now does not mean it will remain so in future, but the arts centre stands as a modernising impulse which also both highlights and conceals the changes brought about by petroleum development.

As work in the petroleum sector in Norway is high-paying, the general affluence and wealth in Hammerfest is growing, both for the municipality and people in general. This is a change from the 'older' modern times, when the Findus factory employed a great number of people, but the form of modernisation was rather different. When I interviewed Mia, a women in her late fifties in her kitchen in Rypefjord, she told me work at Findus was never associated with high status, except for the Christmas parties. But there were other benefits: Spare time after work, and families who worked at Findus had access to all of their products at a discount, including baby food and milk replacement for toddlers. Frozen meals for the first time became a staple of family diets and changed the organisation of the home. 'It was a gold mine', Mia said, 'they got it cheap since they worked there. And things switched, since the mother was no longer at home.'

Her mother had not worked for Findus, so her experience was different. With a housewife mother who picked berries, made fish cakes and didn't modernise as quickly as the town writ large, she had felt the differences between the modern and the traditional very strongly. Humbly illustrating her point, the kitchen table was filled with different kinds of homemade cookies, with more stacked in tins on the counter behind her. Mia put forward a domestic perspective on the changes brought by the industrialisation of the fisheries in Hammerfest – a story most often told from macroeconomic perspectives and with a focus on the number of and kind of jobs. Her story focused on a changed habitus of people in town, altering not just their 'skillset', but also their bodily techniques and dispositions, and with that their minds, thoughts and ways of being in their homes and other landscapes .

The jobs in the petroleum industry are considered 'skilled' jobs, as opposed to the jobs carried out by the workers for Findus, where women were in the majority and many were Finnish immigrants – or 'busloads of women from Finland', as many would describe them. But when Findus gradually disappeared, and the fisheries were restructured, the jobs, and the people who had worked them, disappeared as well. A key factor in people's tolerance towards the LNG plant was the jobs, she thought. *'I think people are willing to take the smoke, from Melkøya – and there has been a lot – because many families have seen their children return, because there is work (…) We have borrowed over our head, everybody knows that… and it's not that society has paid it for us.. we have paid too, with the tax arrangement.. (…)'* The property tax, which had provided income for the municipality, applied not just to businesses, but also to the properties of normal citizens. Nevertheless, as is rather typical of Norway, the compulsion to avoid difference and thereby de-emphasize hierarchies and inequality (Gullestad 1989), leads to a denial of such changes, and a perception that it did 'get better' once the aftermath of the Snøhvit construction period had settled.

Indeed, Hammerfest's experience parallel's Ringel's work in the rapidly shrinking town of Hoyerswerda, where he reminds us that 'times themselves might suddenly and most unexpectedly change.' (2016:391). Hammerfest has experienced such change numerous times, and the social memory of these disruptions is part of what constitutes their short-term focus on the future as finding a way from the now into the next few decades, without too much thought of what comes after. The change brought about by gas is one that was anticipated, but never certain, fading in and out as possibility for decades before it was made material. Marine resources and fish stocks are known to have fluctuated also in the past, but the structural changes in the 1990s after the collapse of the cod stocks, and the modernization of the fishing fleet with trawlers and larger boats, was a shock to the entire Finnmark coast. Whereas gas 'saved' Hammerfest, the stark comparison to other former fishing villages and towns as stuck in a spiral of decline, is notable. Simultaneously, Hammerfest's municipal plans note

concerns of the high debt levels incurred and the need to gain control and reduce this (Hammerfest kommune 2016). The uncertainty over the future of the property tax, put in jeopardy by the 'Blue-Blue' government, shows just how vulnerable this perspective is to changes brought by policy as much as by natural environments.

Dual vision

In the meantime, social relations within the city is woven into the gas economy, where people have children in the same class as those who work in the industry, or share quiz teams with them at the local pub. Whether or not they 'agree' with the environmental footprint of the industry, they live together in the same town, and the neighbourliness makes criticism more difficult. This again links to the attitude from the Findus days; on days when the fish factory filled the city centre with the odour of rotten fish, people had a special saying: Det lukter pæng - it smells like money. Melkøya, the biggest point emission in Norway and the sometimes burning gas flame is tolerated because it, also, is the smell of money and futures in the north.

Frustrations about this are rarely vented in public forums, and rather take the form of quiet discussions in small spaces, or at moments when it simply becomes too much. One day, whilst giving me a lift home from the city centre, a friend whose work was outside the oil industry burst out in frustration, as we walked over to her car parked quite a way from her workplace. Parking is sparse in the centre, and the new carpark is on the other side of town, a short walk but far enough for it to be a long journey to make with kids or if one had an appointment with the doctor. This particular day, she had experienced a combination of these, running around town with a sick child and needing her car elsewhere. She scoffed at the Eni offices as we drove past, visibly annoyed when she said that they have the most central parking, whereas most other people have to find other places to park their cars. They also get a discount at the local sports' store, which she discovered when she once overheard one of the Eni employees

paying at the store where she normally buys equipment. 'I can't understand', she said, after we had passed their offices and left the main street of the town, 'why they get the discounts, when they earn so much money. It's not fair.' This outrage over unfair benefits for the petroleum workers points to changes in Hammerfest's social fabric, where high-earning jobs are rewarded for living in the 'peripheral north', whereas public sector or other 'normal' jobs are left out of this equation.

On the Eni company website, the employee benefits are listed as part of the good conditions offered for potential employees in the Hammerfest organisation (Eni Norge n.d.). Other benefits include 'Competitive housing, car and consumer loans', and 'Tickets to selected concerts, theatres, museums and other cultural events'. Statoil in their time offered Snøhvit employees good conditions on loans to buy houses in Hammerfest and establish themselves with their families. One Statoil worker boasted to me how great the conditions on the loan for his house was, whilst another told a story of how someone had managed to get good conditions on a car loan for his wife's car. Oil workers, even when their wage is significantly higher than most people in Norway, know to make good use of the incentives and benefits available to them – including a significant pay raise as 'Northern Norway bonus' for Eni Norge, and also for Statoil's workers when Snøhvit first started.

When I discussed this with one of Eni's summer interns one of the summers I was there, she told me that the company places a lot of emphasis on recruiting local youth to these positions, but despite the increased opportunities, many of her friends who have finished their education didn't find work, whether with Eni or elsewhere in the industry. In Hammerfest, she felt that people accepted the industry, and those who came from the south made an effort to integrate, but she did not like the special arrangements of extra pay. Being from the region, she found this ludicrous: Hammerfest is not as remote as Svalbard, but a place that is well connected for transport and that has everything you need within the town. Hammerfest might be far

north with a lot of nature around it, but it is a modern town, not a remote Arctic location.

Other people knew, vaguely, of these arrangements, mostly because everyone knows 'someone' who works on Melkøya – but the differences in wage was not talked about, nor was class differences a common topic. Politicians remarked it 'might become a problem in the future', or that 'things were calming down after the construction period', but the way in which this was expressed made it clear it was not a topic for discussion. Oil workers have higher-earning jobs than fish plant workers, and the type of people who work in these jobs has inevitably changed the composition of the town – but the topics of conversation on 'what has changed' were more about the general affluence of the city and the improved architecture and infrastructure, about 'skilled jobs' rather than changing social compositions.

But there is a difference between fish and oil beyond wages and skillsets or smell and sound, renewable and non-renewable. That difference lies in the infrastructural effects at sea, and the acreage required on-shore for all the developments related to the industry itself. Findus may have claimed a large part of the centre of town, but petroleum's industrial ecology of 'clusters' lead to a completely different series of effects that do more than ripple smoothly across a surface. Industrial expansion, notably the industrial and docking area Polarbase in Rypefjord, 4 km from the city, has changed both the soil and the surface where the land and sea meet, expanding into what the base itself calls a 'one stop shop' for the activity in the Barents Sea, with storage, quays and offices and an ever-expanding activity. Both Statoil and Eni Norge have used their services, as have other companies carrying out exploration activities in the Barents Sea.

Onshore-ness

Most of Norway's oil industry is based offshore (see Chapter 2), but through legislation, the formation of a state-controlled oil company which today is Statoil, and the strong corporative state, this has not led to the formation of 'enclaves' (Ferguson 2005) or lack of onshore commitment and development (Appel 2012). The majority of activity is in South-West Norway, but is spread along a long coastline, with hubs of activity or 'clusters' in several cities and towns. Immediately, then, a demand for onshore processing does not seem obvious as a matter of importance to regional politicians, or other regional players in Finnmark. But the starting position is different: in the 1970s and 80s, Norway had no petroleum industry, and Western Norway sits on most of this expertise today. The industry is so new to northern Norway, and there is a fear that the offshore will bypass them – not *Norway,* as a country (though the unions also express concern with the amount of projects built abroad and the growing number of workers on temporary contracts), but Finnmark, as a region which might once again sit and watch activity outside their shores bypass them altogether. Snøhvit has meant tax income and jobs, and with much of this attributed to the onshore work, there is a fear in the region that if future projects become offshore projects with no onshore facilities, it will create value only for the south, whereas the north will yet again be a resource colony.

Bringing the processing of petroleum *onshore* can also be seen as a way of taming it into an ecology that is already known. Jobs at sea have been known to create jobs on shore in the fishing industry, until the modernisation of the fishing fleet when the capital concentrated on fewer hands. This is captured in the name 'Røkke', possibly the least popular person in Finnmark. In the 1990s, the investor Kjell-Inge Røkke and his company AkerSeafoods bought a large number of fishing quotas and fish processing plants in Finnmark, on the condition his boats would commit to deliver to the processing plants onshore. Instead, a number of the plants were closed down, and

processing outsourced to China. People in Hammerfest and elsewhere on the coast feel fooled and angered by Røkke and his false promises. In 2012, a number of mayors of coastal municipalities, including Hammerfest, demanded Røkke return the fishing quotas (Ytreberg 2012). In the northern understanding, it was politicians that allowed the fishing quotas to be sold and the production moved out of the county, by falling for Røkkes false promises instead of protecting the fishers who live by the sea and depend on it. The demands that offshore oil should create onshore ripple effects must also be seen in this light: it is seen a *political* responsibility to regulate the companies so they don't escape with the profit and none of the gain is left behind. The deep mistrust towards southern politicians who 'don't understand' the north, and politicians from the north who go to Oslo and 'forget' where they are from, are deep-rooted and commonly repeated.

An event during from July 2016, when the Conservative Prime Minister Erna Solberg visited Hammerfest and held a meeting with local businesses, illuminates this. During the meeting, Solberg said that people had to understand it is not profitable to have small-scale fisheries in each little village – because there was no economy in it, and it was necessary to make structural changes to the fishing quotas (Østvik 2016). Asked by the journalist about loss of jobs, she replied that the fishing industry mainly employed immigrant workers anyway, and was not important for the local community. 'And Hammerfest has gained so much other activity, like oil and gas, which has created growth,' she concluded (ibid, my translation).

This statement, that there were 'too many' places to deliver fish, had locals fuming for weeks, and was brought up in conversations and interviews months later. It was interpreted as an example of the arrogance of the government and the prime minister as only concerned with 'the south' and with 'Oslo', and negligent of the way big capital owners like Kjell-Inge Røkke had stolen from Finnmark and its population, by buying up fishing quotas and moving production not only out of the county, but to China,

removing the jobs, the activity and the profit from the region. When Solberg endorsed this in an unwitting comment, it was guaranteed to contribute to the resentment towards the distant and aloof government in the south, who threatened the existence of the fishing industry.

The historical experience of being used for the gain of others exists as both a recurring narrative and a fresh memory, whether it is the Hanseatic trade and people from Bergen 500 years ago, or today, 'Oslo' and 'Røkke' who are only tapping the resources from the region without giving anything back, or that the rest of Norway has either forgotten or denied the suffering of Finnmark during and after WWII. There is a deep, heart-felt distrust towards 'the power in Oslo' (*Oslo-makta*), and a correspondingly low tolerance for comments such as the Prime Minister's, which is interpreted as arrogant and ignorant of the value produced from northern resources.

Samfunnsansvar and Norwegian governance

In the literature on relations between multinational companies and local communities, the international CSR language – Corporate Social Responsibility – often plays a large part, whether in the form of praise or critique (Frynas 2009). As Welker has noted with regards to the mining sector, CSR is shaped by local actors and the relations they form with the company, not just from distant offices or calculations (Welker 2014:127–28). CSR in Norway looks different from many other countries, as much of what a company would do beyond legal requirements in the US or other countries, is already part of the Norwegian welfare state and public policies, with a corporate state, collective agreements, environmental regulations and in general smaller businesses than Anglo-American enterprises (Ihlen and von Weltzien Hoivik 2015). As Statoil is a former state-owned, now privatised company where the Norwegian government owns the majority of the shares, the entanglement of the state and the corporate is also more complicated and direct than the case for Eni Norge. The main route in which the

enactment of CSR is prescribed and directed is, however, not through voluntary initiatives by the company, but through the PDO which has been passed in the Storting both for Snøhvit and for Goliat. Here, the terms of operations and the expectations of ripple effects are not only written into their terms and conditions for development and operation of the field; they are also to be monitored by the follow-on research (*følgeforskning*) which is carried out by research institutes. This research which plays an important role in documenting and thereby making the ripples readable.

CSR has a Norwegian equivalent in the term *samfunnsansvar,* but neither of these are phrases which exists in local vocabulary in Hammerfest, even if people have a clear sense that companies should do certain things for the community (Loe and Kelman 2016). People are aware of what the companies do, such as providing local job opportunities, sponsoring festivals, art and music, and contributing to Hammerfest being an attractive place to live also for those who don't work in the industry, including spouses of oil workers. I also found this narrative reiterated through formal interviews, numerous informal conversations, and retellings in conferences on the future of petroleum in the north (whether held in Hammerfest itself or in Tromsø, Bodø or elsewhere) – but always with the notion that the company, municipality and government were all entangled in this development. When the municipality decided to borrow money to invest in infrastructure for a petroleum town, they did so on account of plans and promises by state and company, which predicted a growth in income, population and jobs that would follow from the income of the gas facility, reflected in impact assessments and plans (Asplan Viak/Barlindhaug Consult 2001; Hammerfest kommune 2001). Planning at the local level was necessary for the government's plans to be made material – areas had to be regulated for different purposes than they had been in recent years, and a growing need for new acreage meant re-regulating also areas outside of the municipality, such as in neighbouring Kvalsund, have been utilised for the industrial expansions that have followed Snøhvit's construction.

This is where the research reports from Norut Alta on local value creation become important actors. These reports are part of the conditions in the PDO, financed by the companies but carried out by independent research institutes as a way to monitor whether the promised ripple effects hit the shore. Framing determines what matters and not (Beck 1992; Callon 1998), and as such, reports become political by guiding the gaze towards positive, measurable effects of petroleum development, termed ripple effects in the legislative governance. Just like the discipline of economics makes the world it studies, such studies interplay with what they purport to study by defining the vision with which we see impacts and their effects (Mitchell 1998:297; Weszkalnys 2011). The follow-on research enacts the measuring of predictions made of the ripple effects from petroleum development in Finnmark. In the process of documentation, they are guiding which numbers should be looked at, and what experiences are discussed, which masks negative effects by defining them out of the frame.

In the case of both Statoil's Snøhvit and Eni's Goliat, it is the research institute Norut Alta which has carried out the research and the reports, both those released at different stages of the project developments, and the concluding report of Snøhvit after the end of the construction period (Eikeland et al. 2009). The Snøhvit report opens with a reference to a newspaper article, where a local teacher points to the new school she works in, and says 'This is Snøhvit' – the title used for the report (ibid.). The choice to use her statement as the opening narrative and title of the report strengthens this notion: Snøhvit is not only perceived to be this by the locals, but also verified as such by the research institution, thus amplifying and strengthening the performance of this particular narrative. Here is a clear example of 'emergent authority' (Schieffelin 1996:81) in the process of being performed – not least by how it is used by the companies, petroleum organisations and local politicians. Statoil's former industry coordinator flagged these reports as one of the first points in my interview with him,

asking if I had read them, because they gave a very good idea of what Snøhvit meant regionally.

Commissioned research, such as these reports, come to play an important part in the construction of knowledge about industrial developments and the narratives which both construct the knowledge and which knowledge is constructed by. Ripple effects include a growing population, new optimism, and youth returning home (Eikeland et al. 2009; Nilsen and Karlstad 2016). They are also used, by the companies, to affirm and display success, or – when such success is disputed, as we will get to in Chapter 5 – to perform a narrative where the positive is highlighted to outshine the more problematic effects. During the Barents Sea Industry conference in 2016, Eni capitalized on the report of their ripple effects to date, by illustrating the highlights in a display on the window with stickers of all the highlights, their collaboration, jobs created and money gone to culture, education and local business. (illustration below). To an extent, their offshore-ness required them even more than Statoil to prove their significance for the local and regional development, too. The report, which was released just a few days before the conference, was strategically put to this end.

Conclusion

As a city, Hammerfest is greatly shaped by political projects of the state directly choosing to prioritize certain economic developments, with a continuity of policy-driven industrial development from fish to petroleum, but also differences in how they fit into the city and the region: fish has always been a backbone of the coastal economy, culture and identity (Holm et al. 2013). Oil is, in the north, still something they must adapt to and which shapes the identity of the region in a new way. Amidst discussions of oil and climate change, there is a clear narrative told locally, which differs from other parts of the country: that the oil industry saved the town after the decline of the industrialized fisheries, thereby making Hammerfest's adaptation one



Figure 4. Eni Norge's display of their local and regional ripple effects, at the Barents Sea Conference in 2016. The numbers are drawn from Nilsen and Karlstad's study (2016), which was released the same week. (Photo: Ragnhild Freng Dale)

from fish to petroleum, from fluctuation to stability, in a manner that goes contrary to a lot of discussions about climate change transition, adaptation and long-term sustainability. In the south of Norway, 40-50 000 people have lost their jobs since the fall in oil prices in 2013 (Hungnes et al. 2016), but this is less acute in the north. The cuts at Melkøya came at the same time as the start of Eni Norge's Goliat project locally, which led to a balancing out rather than growth or decline. Petroleum is understood as securing the short-term future on which the long-term future depends.

The town's joint optimism at the economic upturn is persuasive even to those who feel it changes other parts of their lives or is bad for the climate writ large. The negative effects the industry brings in terms of increased traffic, the years during construction when thousands of men would fly in and out, the scares of the soot and pollution from the gas plant, the risk that now comes with oil spills as more oil and not only gas comes into production, are tolerated because people feel they get something back. Resistance, in Hammerfest, is repeatedly cast as coming from 'outsiders' (Loe and Kelman 2016; Michaelsen 2007), but the dynamics are complex than they might appear at first glance. I explore this in depth in the next chapter, where I also develop a perspective of environmental concerns in Hammerfest as channelled into other projects which pose a more immediate threat to local environment, livelihood and recreation; particularly against Nussir, a proposed mine with planned subsea deposit for tailings in nearby Repparfjord.

Interlude: trails off the map's view

The first time I looked at the hiking map of the Hammerfest region, I remember noticing that many of the names were given both in Norwegian and Sámi, but also that there are many parts of the island where the paths, finely printed in red dotted lines, do not. The names on the map are not Norwegian, but bear the characteristic letters of Northern Sámi which suggest these areas are more in use by Sámi-speakers than by Norwegians. Some places, a particular mountain top, river, water or bend will have a name in both Norwegian and Sámi, but often the names have different meanings. You don't have to move far out of the city to feel you are moving away from the trails walked by human, areas that are at best partially domesticated by the city, but which are too wild, rugged or removed to be fully marked by the trails and paths of the local trekking association's red markers. At the same time, the city feels strikingly Norwegian, where Sáminess is only ever a hidden part of people's lives and personalities.

I ask several of my friends about this about this. Of course, says Katrine who lives a bit outside the city, and starts telling me what all the names in their area mean. She points at the mountains outside of her living room window and explains to me for the first time what other parts of a geography I have come to know though walking, running, fishing and snow-mobile driving, actually mean and where they come from. Too fascinated and polite to write it down, I simply listen, and make a mental note that there is more to a landscape than meets not just the eye, but also the walker.

Mari has a different take when I ask her a month later. She says it's a shame, really, with the names, because they've only asked some people, and then the names might be different from what others would use. They are the names of those who use the land – and I'll learn how this works when we go hiking together at the end of the summer, a

trail on the mainland from the mountains to the sea, along the edge of a national park and where the reindeer are led when they move between the winter and summer pastures. During the two-day hike we stop several times as we move across the land. Every place we stop, all the rivers and the places we pick berries, all the places have a name, most of them different or additional to the names on the official map. Her map has these places written and marked in blue ink, but they remain invisibly inscribed on the land. It feels to me like this landscape, where the cloudberries grow in such quantities we cannot pick them all, is her home, just as much as her flat in the city. She does not own it, but she is both a guest and a dweller, someone who moves through it and knows certain places that are for berry-picking, bathing, sleeping, swimming, fishing, laughing, talking, being silent, moving through a trail of significant places which will only be reachable if you are with someone who holds that knowledge.

As we reach *Madra Jávre* – the Mother Lake – we stop to swim and have some coffee before we start our descent from the mountain. The clouds have been threatening us with rain all day, but just as we reach the water, the sun comes out and shines warm as the warmest summer's day. We jump in and have a swim as the coffee is boiling, and as the sun dries us afterwards, I can feel the pigments drawing strength and happiness through the skin. As we sit there, the little break between the clouds looks like it's about to end, so we pack up and start moving down the hill. The rain starts a bit during our descent, but we make it down to the camping site dry and in good spirits.

Half an hour later, it's raining. The next day solid rain pours for the first four hours of the day. We send our thanks to the spirits as leave the place, and visit the stalagmites in Trollholmsund on our way home. According to legend, they were trolls who arrived in the north with great riches, but in their greed lost the competition against the sun. Finding nowhere to bury their treasure in the unwelcoming landscape, they lost track of time and found nowhere to hide before the sun came and turned them to stone. Forever standing white and tall at the edge of the land, their riches good for nothing,

reminds the living, also the visiting tourists, of the powers in nature. Hoarding more riches than you can carry is a bad idea in these lands.

Mari's world uses trails already present in the landscape, but hidden, out of view, a connection which is both spiritual and grounded, on the map and not on the map. Her map is filled with stories in places which evokes a resemblance to the way the Apache landscape is profoundly social, a landscape where places contain stories which serve as moral lessons and guidance (Basso 1996). Mari might never have read Basso's work, but from the indigenous people she knows from other parts of the world, she knows there is a connection across time and space, grounded in concrete interactions with plants, trees, sun and water, humans and animals. When indigenous resistance to an oil pipeline across sacred territory in Standing Rock, North Dakota, kicked off in the autumn of 2016, she wrote a letter to them, and received both a reply and a visit later on. Defenders of Mother Earth must work together, she told me, the next time we talked.

Figure 5. Cloudberry fields along the trek with Mari. (Photo: Ragnhild Freng Dale)

Chapter 4

Who counts as local? On fleeting categories and (mis)recognition of dissent

Boares gáttit eai šat gávdno
Vierrásat leat gáibidan
Sin dárbbus ii leat geahčige

Old shores are no longer found
The strangers have claimed them
Their need has no end

- Paulus Utsi, *Giela Gielain*, 1980 (translated to the English by Kalle Brisland)

'It is so quiet here in Finnmark. No one speaks out against anything, they just accept it.'

– Cultural worker, Finnmark

During an early afternoon summer's day whilst I lived in Hammerfest, Mari took me on a walk out to Meland. We biked to the entrance to Statoil's facilities, where you have to pass through the security barriers and register as a guest to be allowed access to the underwater tunnel and the LNG plant on the island. But we were not going through the gate, even if a sudden burst of rain surprised us, and we had to seek refuge under the roofs of the entrance hall until it stopped. We were heading for a hiking trail which starts just beyond the fence, 100 meters from Statoil's gates. We locked our bikes next to the barracks, the living quarters for people who work short-term at Melkøya or don't live in the city, and made our way around the fence, up to the path that is still accessible to the public on the side of Statoil's area. I immediately noticed multiple

tracks up and down the moss-covered stones: we were outside the city's fence and in an area where the reindeer wander. The walk was stony, but pleasant, and a soothing green greeted us as we walked along, sometimes by the water's edge and sometimes further up in the hillside. We saw a few reindeer in the distance, and made stops so as to not disturb them needlessly, though none of them were mothers with reindeer calves. They don't come down to this part of the island anymore, Mari told me. Rain surprised us again: we made our lunch stop inside a little cave that seemed to open just for our purpose.

On our left, constantly, was the presence of the Melkøya island and the gas plant, and Mari's steady voice narrated a story of what this place used to be. The small strait between Melkøya and Kvaløya used to be the route when people took their boats out to sea, but now they have to go all the way around the island. When Mari was a child, her neighbourhood used to have bonfires along this shoreline and spend time in summer. Now, fire is prohibited, and people didn't come here much anymore. The paths are less used and gradually disappearing.

We trekked further, to the remnants of the archaeological stations which were the bases for the digs to preserve cultural heritage at Melkøya. Cultural heritage is protected by legislation in Norway, and as part of the impact assessment for Snøhvit, Finnmark County Council mapped cultural heritage on Melkøya, where they registered several remnants which were protected by the law. Statoil applied for dispensation to build anyway, which was granted on the condition that Statoil financed the archaeological dig carried out by Tromsø Museum. The archaeological remains, which might not have been found without Statoil's planned construction, were thoroughly documented before they were bulldozed to make way for the construction work.

Mari's activities left no material trace protected by the heritage law, nor was there any other way to document her loss, except through the stories she told to others,

including me – people who came to meet her because she is one of those who clearly are opposed to the petroleum development. She could still come here and go for walks on the land, but the ways it could be used was changed by the industrial expansion she opposed. Throughout our walk, she constantly shifted tone: the place as beautiful; the place as tainted by the presence of the gas plant. From time to time, she would remark that she could smell the gas from the burning flame in our proximity.

Her life, like the rest of Hammerfest, is entangled in the developments. These losses, subtle changes, and shifts are harder to document or discuss on a scale comparable to the 'real' material changes of improved schools and other positive ripple effects, or the increasingly acute loss of grazing land for reindeer herders. But the land's significance should not be underestimated; as with the planned tailings deposit of a hotly contested mining project nearby, the worry of pollution mobilises protest in familiar registers, but also generates strings of silent opposition which emerge into the larger protests and alliances. Environmentalists, reindeer herders and local fishermen form different and sometimes common fronts, reflecting how the landscape carries different meanings and practical engagements for the people who use it in their different ways (Ingold 2000). The proposed mining project requires a sacrifice zone which threatens several worlds, and sets in motion layers of materiality, imagination, models and languages which are engaged by different social actors (cf. Reinert 2018). Anthropogenic change is not unfamiliar for people in the region, even if climate change is not what immediately spring to people's mind. In a similar vein, when Mari continues to walk at Meland, she refuses to let the landscape be lost, and she also insists on not being reconfigured fully into a citizen of a petroleum town with new relationships to the landscape, but to keep up practices others might have stopped. By taking me there, she shows a fragment both of what is lost and of what remains, subtly demonstrating some of the externalities of the documents measuring the success and positive developments of Hammerfest – a practice of walking which brings forth how this is a town with several more stories to tell.

As categories of who counts as local and what the local community is are both flexible and extensible – to a much greater extent than 'state' or 'company' – the local is also changed and contingent upon the changing industry over the life of a project (Ballard and Banks 2003:297). Add to this the fluid identity and ethnic categories discussed in Chapter 1 (Bjørklund 1985, 2016a; Kramvig 2005b), and the question of who counts as local and what impacts are measured, ignored or conjured into being through the process of monitoring are destabilised as neutral or pre-given categories. This chapter ethnographically explores different ways of being local and non-local amongst town-dwellers, activists, reindeer herders, fishers, and coastal Sámi, categories that are made explicit, silenced or side-stepped for different reasons at different times in peoples' everyday lives and their engagement with resource extraction, whether current, past or potential developments.

Rewriting controversy

When the first dynamite sounded at Melkøya in July 2002, it was after a long and politically charged process, involving not only the Norwegian government and the hearing rounds of the PDO, but also the world markets, technological developments, research institutions and universities in Norway and abroad, environmental NGOs, the finance sector and a long and sometimes divergent framing by different media. Snøhvit is a 'mega-project' (Tveiterås 2010), but what does this mean for the locals in Hammerfest, beyond the infrastructural upgrade of the town and a changing industrial structure?

One of Statoil's key local employees during the period just after these episodes and was the public face of the company for many years, echoed the local narrative. He told me Statoil came to a city 'thirsting for investments, and that though there were a few who opposed Snøhvit, 'most people saw that this was what the city needed for a

revitalization [nytt løft].' Academic publications also attribute the absence of debate in Hammerfest as related to how much the city needed new activity after the fisheries decline. The petroleum findings led to optimism from the companies, other business organisations and society more generally (Tveiterås 2010:134–35). Former studies have noted the absence of environmental protest, and the idea that it was only 'outsiders' who were against the project (Klick 2009:41; Loe and Kelman 2016).

From journalist accounts to formal speeches and scholarly reckonings, there is a striking degree of agreement, a structured narrative gleaned from interviews with people whose lives are entwined with the town and through that the industry. Negativity towards the oil industry is commonly cast as coming from outsiders, often in the shape of southerners in Oslo sipping their lattes and not wanting Hammerfest to have the modernity and development they have, in a narrative retold so often that it becomes true.

But this is, in the language of an anthropological truisms, not all there is. Loe and Kelman's study of perceptions of the industry in Hammerfest identifies an 'undercurrent' of less positive experiences (2016:29), and speculate that this 'may mean that negative opinions are controversial, or that the respondents did not want to let the positive sides be overshadowed by less important side- effects.' This chapter turns its attention the spaces that are left unarticulated, by way of looking at what disagreements are actually performed, particularly in relation to mining projects and other activities seen as more directly affecting the fisheries.

Ignoring these silences, or how structural and historical experiences shape the conditions of public debate and dissent, not only overlooks the forms of dissent that might not immediately be recognized as protest with placards and demonstrations. It also leads to an underplaying of environmental concerns in Hammerfest, as if northerners are more backward or greedy than others, cheering on oil without

thinking of the consequences. Indeed it might look like this if one looks for the usual markers, as Northern Norway lacks a unified environmental movement, at least beyond the issue of the Lofoten isles which have become iconic for petroleum resistance in the north (Jentoft 2013). I hope to show that environmental concern and concern for the future is highly present, but the forms it takes must be understood within a local ecology where care for the environment might be expressed in different form or experienced and lived differently than what ticks the classic 'environmental NGO' boxes. This also calls for an ethnographic exploration of the town's relation to its Sáminess, and what gets articulated or not within the fenced-in city centre where the majority of the municipal population lives. I follow several narratives throughout the chapter, exploring how they are built and influence the registers of speech about the petroleum resources in West Finnmark.

The local and the non-local

As discussed in Chapter 2, the approval of Snøhvit in 2002 happened whilst the rest of the Barents Sea was put under a moratorium on development, pending an Integrated management plan for all the resources in the Barents Sea. Snøhvit was detached from this process, and approved before any impact assessment on the wider consequences of opening the Barents Sea for oil production had been completed. Environmental concern pivoted on the fear that oil and gas activities would be harmful for fish and marine species in the region, and also threaten the sea bird populations along the Finnmark coast, many of whom are threatened species with no other available habitat. Another important point of concern was the level of emissions: though Statoil planned to reinject a portion of the CO_2 emissions in Snøhvit into the ground again, the LNG plant would come to stand for 860.000 tonnes of CO_2 emissions per year, or a staggering 2% of Norway's total emissions (St.prp. nr. 35 (2001-2002)). The project would bind Norway to extensive climate emissions for decades to come – directly contradicting Norway's pledge in the Kyoto Protocol to cut emissions.

Environmental organisations were heavily opposed to this. A key player was the youth organisation NU, the biggest environmental organisation for young people (age 15-25) in Norway. They called it a 'sneaky opening' [snikåpning] of the region for production – once the gas field is approved, NU's leader told the media, it is only a question of time before the oil resources will also be produced (Andersson 2002). Their concern was not unfounded, as there were clear ambitions for further expansion of more fields in the Barents Sea in the PDO of Snøhvit, even if postponed until after the management plan would be finished (St.prp. nr. 35 (2001-2002)). In a book chronicling NU's 50-year long history, Snøhvit is portrayed as their most important fight in the early 2000s (Kielland 2017:175–221). From political lobbying, leafleting and report-writing, to visiting local fishing communities in Troms and Finnmark, an attempt to stop an oil rig from entering the Barents Sea and civil disobedience in Hammerfest and Oslo, the organisation employed a wide range of protest forms against Snøhvit.

NU's involvement highlights the 'Oslo'-regional-local-axis in environmental opposition in Norway. The organisation had a local branch in Hammerfest at the time of Snøhvit's approval, and the way these young activists were treated tells a great deal about the collective memory of Hammerfest's population. People remember the protests, but mostly they remember that it was people from 'outside' who came, sidelining the local youth who protested first; the geographical dimension of us vs. them is so strong that they almost cease to exist.

When construction started at Meland, a group of 33 people engaged in civil disobedience to obstruct the tunnel-building over to Melkøya. Kielland compares the action to a film set, where there is a lot of waiting and less action before things kick off; the group chained themselves to machines, and some of them were arrested and fined by the police (2017:211). At the time, Statoil were deeply concerned with the temperature of events: When locals threatened they might throw the youth into the

sea, Statoil employees intervened to tell them off and to leave the youth alone. 'It was a bit 'cowboy'', one of them relayed to me during an interview, 'and we tried to calm it down.' Statoil felt their public image was at stake in the press coverage – environmentalist actions and locals who wanted to beat them up didn't look good for the company. Statoil wanted to de-escalate the situation, as is in the company's instructions when antagonistic situations occur: they must show they respect the demonstrators and are willing to enter into dialogue with them, and prevent potential accidents if activists take action. Newspaper clippings show Statoil's industry coordinator offering hot drinks to the activist youth chained to the machines and trying to calm down events, but the action also reached a point where Statoil changed tactic: when the young activists refused to budge, Statoil moved to threats of legal action against them for the financial losses incurred on the company (ibid.).

Though nothing came of these threats, they show that the dialogue was only maintained to a certain point. Statoil performed courteously, and could do so because they leveraged a power the young activists did not yield. NU were engaging in civil disobedience by obstructing the construction work, and Statoil could get the police to stop them. But the company also had a public image to maintain, not wanting to look like they shut down a protest unreasonably, even when this came at a great financial cost for the company. Those days with youth chained to equipment that would dig out large areas at Meland and on Melkøya, left their mark in the saga of Snøhvit, though its significance varies depending on which perspective one sees it from. Statoil retells how there were 'only a few' locals, who were treated harshly by other locals. The local narrative, reiterated even by the mayor of the town, is that 'none of them' were 'from here' – but then, where had they gone?

When I started my fieldwork, I knew that some locals had been part of the protest, but most of them had left the town and often the region for studies or work, both within and outside the environmental sector. I was therefore pleased when I found one of

them at a gathering of family and friends of one of my interlocutors, an ardent opponent of oil and gas. Not long after I arrived, she told me she had an informant for me: Fredrik, who was one of the NU activists in Hammerfest who protested against Snøhvit 15 years ago.

'I was 19 at the time', he told me a few days later, as we met at a local café in Hammerfest. He was part of the small group of local youth who led the initial protests against Snøhvit, and showed me a newspaper clip from Finnmark Dagblad from the time. He remembered there was a lot of back and forth as to whether or not the gas plant would materialise, and by the time they knew for sure, it was too late. The actions to stop Snøhvit, when youth from across the country came to chain themselves to equipment were mainly symbolic, but the reasons for protesting were rooted in a long and controversial fight over the future of the Barents Sea.

For the locals, it was a longer – and different – fight. He was also active in a political youth party at the time, but kept a strict distinction during the protests: then, he always spoke as a member of NU. At the time, even the political youth parties, who tend to be more environmentally oriented than their mother parties, were positive towards Snøhvit. Fredrik and his friends, on the other hand, thought gas was just the beginning before oil would be allowed:

> *'When I think about it, the main reason we were against gas wasn't because it's gas – gas is better than oil – but I remember our main reason was that it was an opening of the Barents Sea. It was the oil we were afraid of.'*

Few would disagree with him today: Barents Sea gas was only the first step into a region believed to be rich also in oil. As many others, his concern is that an oil spill will harm fish and marine life, as it is still uncertain if an oil spill in the region can actually be cleaned up. Even today, Fredrik remained unconvinced the technology is sufficient

to deal with high waves and rough weather, fearing the consequences in such a vulnerable area.

Fredrik guesstimated 4-5 of the protestors were local youth. The rest of the 30-or-so youth were 'from the south' – a label he was happy to use as a generic description of people not 'from here'. From his perspective, the target was not so much to stop the project, but to perform opposition, and to make people think. Whilst others in NU might have had the intention to stop Snøhvit altogether, Fredrik protested to show that not everyone agreed. From his perspective, the target of the protest was not performative in the sense that he thought they could stop the project, but to create a material blockage and visible display; so that it was more than something they talked about in the privacy of their homes.

> *'We never thought that we could really stop Snøhvit,– at least not that I can remember. But it was important for us, and for me personally, to say something. It was like everyone was just celebrating that there would be money, and we just wanted people to stop and think for a second. To use their head, you know.'*

Performed opposition was repeated by a new generation 10 years later, when Goliat arrived in Hammerfest to fulfil the fears of the environmentalists who protested against Snøhvit. This time, NU were not as active in the city, but a small delegation of locals in NNV appeared in front of the city hall, and NU protested during a petroleum conference a few days later; episodes I analyse in the next chapter. I note them here to highlight the local/non-local dimension: when I discussed NU's protest with a representative from Eni, he insisted that the teenagers were not local. Though he was factually correct in the sense that they were not from Hammerfest, but had come from the neighbouring town Alta, the statement was nevertheless curious. In employment statistics, the zone within which ripple effects from the petroleum activities are considered, categorises all of West Finnmark as 'local', and Northern Norway as

'regional' (Nilsen and Karlstad 2016:8). A similar zoning is used in the report on Snøhvit's ripple effects (Eikeland et al. 2009). By these reports, then, half the teenagers from NU protesting Goliat would be 'local', and the others 'regional'. Yet in the media, in people's perceptions, and in industry discourse, the environmental groups and the smaller political parties who are against petroleum and the threat it poses to a sustainable future, are seen as a marginal part of the locals – if seen as local at all, as these categories are fleeting and depend on who tells the story.

Of mining and the sea

Elsewhere in Finnmark and other parts of Sápmi, resource extraction is often highly contested, whether mining or windmills, power lines or other infrastructure which will take away grazing land or damage recreational areas. Many people in Hammerfest were against mining plans in nearby Kvalsund, and would passionately voice their disapproval of the plans to dump mining waste in the fjord and ruin nature and their recreational areas. In Kvalsund, with its 1000 inhabitants, Nussir ASA wants to start mining a copper ore, and their CEO Rushfeldt has spent years applying for permits, talking with locals, and convincing politicians that his project is both needed, sustainable and beneficial for the local community.

Mining is a significant part of the government's High North Strategy, and Rushfeldt has high hopes that his mining project can set an example for the future industry. As the CEO and public face of the company, he has worked continuously to secure and retain a social license to operate in the municipality, particularly with its political leadership. It is a common statement that Rushfeldt has been 'drinking coffee with the whole of Kvalsund'; a joke not too far from the truth, as he is a figure known to 'everyone' in the local area and wider region, often appearing in the media and at conferences concerning future development in the north. He also recruited locals to a 'reference group' to have them provide advice to the company, though many of them –

according to one of the former members and a clear opponent of the project – immediately dissipated as soon as they realised the group was only there to provide a social licence alibi to the process. For all his efforts, Rushfeldt is unable to overcome the physical materialities which create problems for Nussir's realisation: where to deposit the tailings, and how to reach an agreement with the reindeer herders whose pathway to the summer grazing land is dependent on the very same area.

Mining in Finnmark is also a politically charged issue. The Sámediggi has rejected the government's Mineral Act of 2009, claiming it does not sufficiently secure Sámi rights, and demanded there is a compensation in the form of an indigenous revenue, paid to a fund the Sámediggi should be responsible for (Ot.prp. nr. 43 (2008–2009):92-116) . Another complicating issue is the structure of land ownership in Finnmark, where 95% of the land is currently managed by the Finnmark Estate. The process is often looked upon with suspicion, especially in coastal regions, where ethnic identity is more ambiguous and locals feel the ethnicization of rights threatens their own right to the same region (Ween and Lien 2012).

Kvalsund municipality approved a regulation plan allowing mining in the area desired by Nussir in May 2012, much to the woe of reindeer herders who use the area, local fishermen who fish in the fjord, fishing enthusiasts who fish salmon in the river upstream from the proposed tailings deposit, nature lovers who fear for the area and the life in the fjord, as well as biological and marine experts who have complained that the environmental impact assessment does not model the impacts satisfactorily and underplay the consequences that will follow from the development. The impact assessment for the subsea tailings deposit were carried out by Akvaplan Niva (2011), but has been contested as faulty and flawed modelling which does not measure the way the water moves in the fjord at different times of year (Dannevig and B. Dale 2018). If the sediment starts to move, the particles from the mining deposits can move far out to sea and upstream as well. Research carried out after the initial permits were

given show that the fish spawning grounds are closer to the deposit area than first assumed.

The structure of decision-making reflects how Sámi often lack opportunities of political and administrative influence over decisions which concern their own lives (Helander-Renvall 2016:28), and the dynamics between the coast and the inland impacts political representation, processes and decisions. In Kautokeino, where the reindeer herders are politically represented, the majority said no to the mining plans in Biedjovaggi, whereas in Kvalsund there was a yes to the planned mine in Repparfjord, even as the reindeer herders and local coastal Sámi who fish in the fjord have been vocal in their opposition. The Sámi identity markers are not as strong in Kvalsund, where the Sámi stakeholders never gained the same support from their local politicians as the herders in Kautokeino (Nygaard 2016:23).

In the spring of 2016, some of Kvalsund's local politicians also challenged the Sámediggi after their plenary decided to give a clear 'no' to Nussir, terminating a former consultation agreement. The mayor of Kvalsund claimed the Sámediggi were attempting to overrule a democratic decision made in the interest of coastal Sámi, as he himself and other elected representatives in Kvalsund were indeed coastal Sámi themselves. He thus cast the issue as a conflict between the Sámediggi who only have reindeer herders' interest at heart, and the coastal Sámi municipality in Kvalsund which needed jobs and income to revitalise the community (Brenli 2016) – clearly inspired by the petroleum development in their neighbouring municipality of Hammerfest. This was again challenged by coastal Sámi fishermen within Kvalsund, and by coastal Sámi representatives of the Sámediggi who expressed that 'mining and subsea tailings is not a coastal Sámi tradition' (West 2016, my translation). The controversy over the mine had not only cast the status of nature, models and management practices into the heated debate, but also a question of what counts as Sámi identity and Sámi values, and what futures are understood to be viable by

planners and political representatives, within the municipality, the Sámediggi, and the Norwegian Storting.

Another dynamic at play is the role of the consultation process, which is the only formal channel where local knowledge is guaranteed to be expressed (Dannevig and B. Dale 2018:157). The processes of impact assessments, though legislated to safeguard rights of interest groups and indigenous people, gives no guarantee of actually being heeded – and no real right to say 'no' in the process. The Sámediggi commissioned a report which re-examined the socio-economic benefits of the mine and found that the positive ripple effects did not outweigh the negative effects (Ibenholt et al. 2016), but this information came at a stage in the process where it was not heeded as decisions had already been made, regardless of what new information was brought to light.

Dissent and alliances

Sub-sea tailings deposits remains a highly disputed issue in Norway, both in Repparfjorden and in the southern fjord of Førdefjorden. The Repparfjord river is a popular area for salmon fishing, and fears of what it might do to the fish to have mine waste by the outlet was a commonly voiced concern if it was brought up in conversation. If the CEO of Nussir has worked hard, so has the opposition; The ecology of protest ranges across the political spectrum and a wide range of interest organisations, including NNV, NU, The Hunting and Fishing Association, and Bivdi (the coastal Sámi hunting and fishing association). Though there is no formal leader, whether person or organisation, there is a more or less common front against the current mining plans, even as there is disagreement as to whether that means no to the mine altogether, or yes if certain conditions and better environmental responsibility is fulfilled – as the below event illuminates:

In December 2015, whilst the world's eyes were on Paris for the UN climate negotiations, the Directorate of the Environment approved the permit for disposing the tailings in the fjord – leaving only the final operation permit to be approved. The approval sparked outrage and controversy, and a demonstration was mobilised in Hammerfest to show that there is a wide and solid local opposition against the 'madness' of the plans which threatened the life in the fjord. The initiative came from the local branch of the Socialist Left Party (SV), where several members are ardent opponents of the mining project. It was announced on social media and in the local media beforehand, with speakers were from SV, Bivdi, NNV, NU, and the Norwegian Sámi Association (NSR), one of the leading parties in the Sámediggi.

The demonstration took place in February, when the temperature was around minus 5 degrees in the morning, and snow covered most of the town and its surrounding mountains. With a large number of speakers, the whole event lasted close to 45 minutes, with passionate statements against the mining plans, particularly the planned dumping of mining waste in the fjord. Initiated by the local branch of a national party, and with local representatives of national organisations, there was nevertheless a clear presence of Sámi both from coast and inland. NU was represented by their regional leader from Alta, a young woman and a coastal Sámi who proudly wore her gákti, and spoke of not wanting her future poisoned or ruined by short-term interests. The representative from NNV in West Finnmark, a local resident in Hammerfest, was also wearing her gákti, as was the representative from NSR, who had driven 4 hours from Kautokeino to be here to mark the common opposition against the mine. Many more had come from Kvalsund, a 20-30 minute drive from Hammerfest, but few other than the speakers donned speficially Sámi clothing.

45 minutes is a long time in winter temperatures, and not everyone present looked dressed for the occasion. Some drifted into the kiosk to buy coffee and come out again, others came late or left early – but most of the demonstrators remained until the end.

There was a shared sense of importance to stop Nussir, and these alliances are built and made stronger through sharing public opposition. NSR's representative came to build those alliances, and to highlight the effects on reindeer herding which is not the main priority of SV or the fishing association. As remarked by author and mining critic Marion Palmer, who lives in Kvalsund and is a strong local voice; with all the plans following from the new High North Strategy, reindeer herding is the best environmental protector in the region – directly criticizing Rushfeldt's suggestion that Nussir could become a showcase for a successful High North Strategy (Palmer 2014). The message from Fiettar, the reindeer herding district with summer pastures in Kvalsund has been a crystal clear 'no', and an end of the dialogue. They, quite simply, have nothing more to say, because co-existence is not possible for them.

According to one of the central figures in West Finnmark NNV, it was the mining plans in Repparfjord which sparked their formation, though their concerns are broader today, including pollution, petroleum and protecting vulnerable nature. NNV and NU are national organisations which are not only or always focused on the same issues as the Sámi groups and individuals who are involved in frontline fights against encroachments on their lands, but where they sufficiently overlap, such as with Nussir, alliances are built which can last for years and pose significant threats to the realisation of particular projects. NU have a list of 2500 people from across Norway who are willing to engage in civil disobedience to stop the mining project (Vågenes 2018), and have staged rehearsals of actions in Kvalsund, alongside debates, concerts and mini festivals to celebrate the fishing and reindeer herding.

Demonstrations and opposition, then, are not uncommon or unheard of in the region of West Finnmark, nor even in Hammerfest. Protest does not only come in the form of public actions, but also op-eds and letters in newspapers, social media posts, and responses to public hearings whenever and wherever there is a chance to make a response. But collaborators do not necessarily share the same goal; SV, one of the

leading critics in Hammerfest, would be satisfied by an onshore deposit and a guarantee of no subsea tailings. Others – especially the herding districts Fiettar and Fálá – are completely against the whole mine, as its impacts are too significant to tolerate. Nevertheless, enough common ground is found in this case to directly and explicitly protest the narrative, and the combined voices have formed a strong opposition that is both local and regional – even as support for the project is also found in the same areas. Many talk of a potential for a new Alta conflict, as the battle to stop the dam also rested on a broad coalition between Sámi, environmentalists and salmon fishers.[26] In this sense, it carries a logic of coexistence and collaboration across difference, where environmentalists also work within the categories and structures generally accepted by society.

The opposition against Nussir highlights a key difference between mining and petroleum. Mines visibly pollute the environment, are on land, and leave scars that will never fully heal. At the proposed mining site in Kvalsund, the previous mining project, Folldal verk, was operational from 1972-78, and the landscape is still marked from the activities in ways that might never fully be restored. Oil is offshore, limited, and even the onshore parts, such as Melkøya, are seen as tolerable. But mining and the offshore are also connected: Cuttings from the Snøhvit field have been deposited in the old mining site, to fill some of the mine shafts left open. Polar Gjenvinning (Polar Recycling), now Finnmark Gjenvinning, was given permission to handle waste from the petroleum industry in 2007, but have since been sanctioned by the Environmental Directorate for not doing this adequately (Lund 2015).[27] Several environmentalists were

[26] Though the battleground today is much more than just one project; plans for windmills, fish farms, mines, holiday cabins and power lines encroach on land across Sápmi, from north to south, inland to coast. Whilst demonstrations and other ways of opposing projects appear fragmented and difficult to get across in the national media, the new wave of Sámi political art today (Stephansen 2017) is more focused on drawing the connections between these and bringing the discussion into a majority society which has very little knowledge of these issues.

[27] Other parts of the cuttings have been used to extend the industrial hub at Polarbase, to make room for more activity related to the oil and gas development.

concerned with the lack of public concern or knowledge about what happened with the waste, spills and leaks of chemicals from the deposits.

The heavy regulations on the petroleum industry, with a 'zero discharge' policy, nevertheless produces a perception that there is no discharge or negative effects from the activity– unlike the mining industry and fish farming, where regulations are less strict. In the absence of conclusive research on the matter, there is a general folk consensus that waste and toxins from fish farms are to blame for fish that has disappeared from the fjords. I was often told, when I said I was researching the impacts of the petroleum industry, that the real problem was the lack of regulation on the fish farming industry, as the pollution they caused was not good for the life in the sea. More than one fisher also pointed to the way small-scale fishers were losing their quotas to the big players, who were outright stealing resources from the small ones. 'If you really care about the environment', one of them told me, 'This is what you should be concerned with.'

When voicing their opinion on environmental issues in their local region, most Hammerfestians will do it for the fish. And the addressee – far more often than the specific company – is the state and authorities' lack of regulation, or inability to keep the industry to their word. Though the big buyers such as Røkke are seen as culprits, so is the state for allowing him to buy so many of the quotas on the coast. In the local ecology, the negative impacts of fish farms on the local environment and the sea is felt and experienced, unlike the oil industry which literally takes place far away from the everyday – and where the fishing is less immediately threatened than in Lofoten. Disagreement is often met with silence in Sápmi, but Nussir is a case where different actors make their opposition heard, and where people had clear opinions; they felt it as a matter that directly concerned them and the landscapes they move in, unlike the oil industry which is further out at sea.

Co-existence and oil spill preparedness

Why, then, if fish is so important to Hammerfest and the coastline in Finnmark, was there not a greater resistance against the exploitation of petroleum resources in the region? Again, it is necessary to go to the materialities of the resource itself, as well as the structural conditions and how this differs from Lofoten, where the narrow continental shelf leads to a more direct conflict between the fishing industry and the petroleum industry. The importance of the fishing industry for jobs and activity along the coast of Finnmark has also changed significantly. Between 1970 and 2009, the number of fish processing plants decreased from 850 to 500, and the number of people employed went from 18 000 down to 9000, of which 3000 worked in fish farming (Hersoug 2010:220). For the petroleum industry, this meant both that it was less risky to override the demands of fishers, as there are fewer of them, and that the fisheries are no longer a guarantee of employment, nor the most attractive jobs (ibid: 221).

Fishers I spoke with were concerned about Repparfjorden, and are internationally oriented in their thinking; will people want to buy the fish when they learn about the dust particles that spread from the fjord by the mine? The currents in Repparfjorden, which they are certain they know better than the models of the impact assessments, will inevitably lead it into the sea, and then the damage will be irreparable. Oil is less bad, in comparison: though it might be a short-term disaster, the long-term impacts are less feared than the sludge and toxins from the mine.

That the Snøhvit field was *gas* and not oil, meant that environmentalists did not have a natural ally with the fishers; the images of oily birds and dirty coastlines, which changed public understandings of petroleum's environmental footprint in the 1970s (Morse 2012), was simply not a useful image to when gas was the first project. It was useful for the when trying to block oil in Lofoten, but when gas was the only project planned at the time of approval, this was more difficult to argue. The size of the CO_2

emissions from the LNG plant were a topic of heated debate, but at the time was seen as a different matter than life in the sea.

Another factor is that Fiskarlaget (The Norwegian Fishermen's Association), an organisation for Norwegian fishers, has been enrolled in a coexistence-discourse – in effect reducing the resistance against oil in the north to a question of a few specific areas and special considerations (Hersoug 2010:232). The discourse of co-existence in Finnmark was established through the various government-appointed commissions on co-existence which worked in the 2000s, largely channelling resistance into roundtable discussions on co-existence, structured such that all players became parties in making agreements. Through the development of new fields, co-existence discourse has also been created in practice, as agreements and development of new solutions for oil spill preparedness create common ground through cooperation.

The emphasis on consensus and dialogue is a recurring trait across sectors of Norwegian society, politics and business, but this does not always create satisfaction; one former representative of a local branch of Fiskarlaget told me they were not satisfied with the route chosen for the pipeline from the subsea installation to the gas plant. There were three alternative routes, and Fiskarlaget had asked for the most expensive one, which interfered the least with important fields for fishing and fish spawning. In the end, Statoil chose a less expensive route – 'which perhaps is the most concrete example of a dialogue that doesn't necessarily end in agreement', according to him.

One of Statoil's former industry coordinators in the region understood the same process rather differently. He described the decision as a dialogue between more or less equal parties, where the initial idea presented by Statoil was not liked, but they had reached an agreement together. He described Fiskarlaget's positivity as building on an understanding that there was not enough work in the fisheries for there to be a

future in the regions, so other economic activities with new jobs and development was, in this sense, also positive for them and the next generation. In addition. petroleum activities meant increased safety, for example with a helicopter for Search and Rescure (SAR) in the region. His impression was that Fiskarlaget seemed to be in agreement that it was ok – in part because Snøhvit was gas, and not oil, which poses less of a threat to fish if something should go wrong.

Oil spill preparedness would become a bigger issue after the approval of the Goliat field in 2009, where part of the PDO dictated the build-up of better oil spill preparedness along the Finnmark coast. To stop petroleum in the Barents Sea was never a realistic alternative, and permanently petroleum free zones were not politically realistic at the time (Hersoug 2010:237). The pragmatic stance from Fiskarlaget was to participate in the way in which they best could: no one knows the coast here better than them. If there is an oil spill, the expertise of the fishing boats enrolled in the scheme might help stop it. This has led to a collaboration between Fiskarlaget, The Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies (NOFO),[28] and Eni for emergency oil spill preparedness, an innovate model developed with the Norwegian coastal fishers, and which enrol them in preparedness in a way which was part of their acceptance of the oil industry's entry. They perform exercises several times of year, but even with the Best Available Technology (BAT), equipment adapted to their fishing boats and several exercises involving popcorn as replacement for oil, unpredictability and changing weather conditions make the arrangement vulnerable. If the waves are higher than 1-2 m, there is not really much they will be able to do. Past exercises have been cancelled in fairly mild weather conditions, and there is major uncertainty with regards to whether this will actually be enough, should the wind come from the wrong direction or the waves be too high when a spill occurs. One fisher I interviewed just shrugged his shoulders about the whole affair, and said he didn't believe in it, even if he participated. Another said it was the best option there was: their participation as

[28] NOFO was established in 1978 to be responsible for oil recovery in Norwegian waters.

local experts who know the waters and the limitations of what they can and cannot do, can contribute such that it will be as good as possible, even if not perfect.

The shoulder-shrugging relates to how the infrastructure and potential oil spills are less of a concern than the seismic testing, which has more direct consequences on marine life. Fiskarlaget have on several occasions made complaints and demands that certain periods of the year when the fish are at its most vulnerable, no seismic testing should go ahead – and fishers have several stories to tell of their experiences of empty fishing fields after vessels have collected seismic data. When the Norwegian government announced new licences for petroleum companies in 2017, the leader of Fiskarlaget, Kjell Ingebrigsten, expressed concern that the tempo and number of blocks awarded would affect life in the sea very negatively, as the seismic activity would leave very few areas undisturbed and thereby negatively affect the fisheries as well (Fiskarlaget 2017b).

Distant views and invisible ties

Winter, 2016.

'Mordor', one of the young Sámi reindeer herders said, half-joking, as we sat down for a brief moment somewhere outside Hammerfest, catching our breath. Behind us in the fading light were the reindeer, gathered in the corral to be separated into the correct herds and taken to the mainland. One of the reindeer's antlers had torn a hole in my favourite pair of mittens, and I sat, mitten in hand in the winter breeze, thinking how I would mend it later. Whilst doing so, I was chatting away partly in Norwegian and partly in Northern Sámi, grateful for a chance to practice the language and to be trusted enough to lend a pair of hands in their work. In front of us was a view past the mountains to the edge of the city, where we could see the island of Melkøya even though the city itself was blocked from view. Sitting here, in the mountainous

landscape on an island near to Kvaløya, it admittedly *did* resemble the light from Sauron's Eye in the film version of the *Lord of the Rings,* an orange glow visible from the mountains around city as well as here. The flame lit up the sky with its characteristic glow, and he was not the first person I heard describe Statoil's production facility with a reference from Tolkien's universe. The resemblance did not bring up any evil intent, only the very visibility and the fact that the island upon which the plant is built, now is nothing but a barren landscape.

Barren that is, except for a colony of kittiwakes that moved in when Statoil carved into the mountain, unintentionally forming a sloped wall with perfect conditions for a colony of 2000 birds.[29] Their ability to make a home here might be seen as an example of co-existence in capital-led developments, though one that was unexpected both for scientists and for Statoil. Statoil could have chased them away by altering the conditions, but after the birds moved to Melkøya from elsewhere in Finnmark, the company decided to live with them, even when they cover the entire island in white excrement and produce almost extreme amounts of sound. During a trip where one of Statoil's local heads of operations showed me around, he told me anecdotes of these birds, and what it was like when they were at their noisiest in summer. The birds were an example of co-existence of the gas plant and the environment surrounding it, of how Statoil found a way of working around these threatened species rather than eradicating them.

Back at the reindeer corral, we did not have long to contemplate the gas flame or its ecological entwinement with the region, as there was still plenty of work to be done. During a few intense days, the reindeer are gathered from across the island, and herds belonging to the different owners in the district are separated from each other so each owner has their own animals before they move them to the winter pastures, and bring them here again when summer returns. The work is intense, and extra hands are often

[29] The kittiwake is considered a threatened species in Norway, where there has been a drop been from 700 000 birds to only 175 000 since 1984 (Species Databank of Norway n.d.).

needed at different times in the yearly cycle. In some parts of the region, there is still a friendship between some of the permanent residents and the reindeer herders who come in summer, a friendship that extends into the old notion of *verddevuohta,* or *verdde* – a Sámi word which can be translated to something resembling 'guest friend', from the time when there was a friendship built on mutual dependency between the reindeer herders and the coastal population. They would exchange goods and services at different times of the year; fish in the early summer, reindeer meat in the autumn before they left, milk, things they needed, sometimes bound also as family or relatives. As a system, *verddevuohta* is a two-sided exchange, reproducing bonds of friendly care between those who are part of the relation (Bjørklund and Eidheim 1998).

Some of the older generation who lived in the smaller fjords outside the city before the war, can remember that their parents would speak Sámi with the reindeer herders in the summer, and that these meetings were a part of the cycles of the year. Some of them also speak Sámi themselves, as they learnt it at home before they were sent away to boarding schools, and use the language amongst themselves when they visit each other's houses. Some, both those who command Sámi and those who never learnt the language, still retain the *verdde*-ties with their guest friends, inviting them home to their apartments or houses for coffee or dinner, or visiting the older generation who are too old to help in the corral, keeping them company whilst the rest of the family is busy. Whilst this is different today from a generation or two ago, when the herders would mostly stay during the entire summer months with their families, and sometimes have their children in schools for a few weeks in the summer area, they nevertheless become and remain part of each other's lives through these exchanges.

Today, due both to motorization and roads that make it possible to travel long distances in shorter time spans, and the rationalization of reindeer husbandry where state interventions have changed the structure of herding from an encompassing way of life towards a logic of meat production and profit-making (Bjørklund 2016), the

number of people who can work full-time in herding has changed. Many families have a spouse employed outside of herding, whose income is essential to keep the family and reindeer herding economy going, or work jobs on the side themselves; as teachers, lawyers, state employees of different kinds, the food or restaurant industry, and some even in extractive industries. This is also the case in other parts of Finnmark (Kramvig 2005b). We might say, then, that they are living in vastly different 'taskscapes' (Ingold 2000) where what one sees, values and experiences as meaningful in one's surroundings depends on what tasks one carries out in them – but also that gifts and exchange constitute a negotiation of continued dependency and autonomy, ways of living together whilst remaining different (Kramvig 2005a).

As they have been through generations, these friendships are practiced with no need to explain or elaborate, often invisible to many townspeople who have no connection to the reindeer herders residing outside the fence. As most things Sámi in and around the town of Hammerfest; if you don't know what to look for, you might never see it is there.

Summer, 2015.

The sun blazed as bright as it only does on a summer's night in the north. The band on the festival stage was Ylva, known for their stage shows and political edge, with a lead figure who also spearheads actions for Sámi rights and self-determination. He spoke in Northern Sámi on stage, and made the crowd chant a repeating, loud 'ČSV'.[30] Fists were raised towards the sky in rage and euphoric joy, as the stage show developed into a scene where a Sámi hat, of the kind often sold to tourists in Finland, and the colonist in a pig mask, were central elements. The enchanting atmosphere invited me to participate and let myself be carried with and into this body of Sámi pride. But something stopped my inclination in its tracks; next to me in the crowd was a coastal

[30] The slogan is from the political period in the 1970s and 80s, most often translated as 'show Sámi pride', or show pride in being Sámi.

Sámi woman I know, who I knew did not speak the language, and who was not involved with the rest of the crowd around me. Even if she had heard Sámi spoken at home in her youth when the reindeer herding Sámi came to the coast in the summer, she had never learnt it herself, and though she was comfortable enough in her own identity, this take-over by the 'ČSV attitude' excluded her from the common identity evoked by the young artist on stage. The use of Sámi language left her and other Sámi who have been taken away from the language through their upbringing and have not actively sought to learn it themselves later, out of the common understanding, as she did not know what had been said or whether she could agree or not. The 'militant' atmosphere, as she described it to me later, was not in line with her own feeling of what being Sámi entailed. She remained, but did not raise her fist or chant along with the crowd.

I recount this episode because it shows some of the complexities of what it means to be Sámi in all its different varieties and contradictions today. For many Sámi who are not from the inner Finnmark areas where language and Sámi clothing are in everyday use, the identity of being Sámi might not be the easiest to ascribe to, or to know *what one is ascribing to* when one says one is Sámi. Coastal Sáminess is not equivalent to being Sámi in inner Finnmark, or in other parts of Sápmi. For many, different ways of being Sámi can also be felt as a kind of cultural hierarchy, where someone is always 'more' Sámi than you (Åhren 2008). During the Norwegianization period, the traditional dress was amongst the things taken away or hidden, and many of those who consider themselves Sámi may not be comfortable with wearing Sámi clothing today – not because of shame, but because they might be struggling to find other ways of articulating and performing their Sáminess (Dankertsen 2016). Dankertsen's description of some of her informants in the Lule and Marka Sámi areas in Northern Nordland and Southern Troms (ibid.), resonate with something several Sámi from Hammerfest and the region around told me; that Sáminess was never spoken of at home – one *was* just Sámi, but it was never talked about as being such. In coastal

Finnmark, many insist on maintaining ambivalent identity categories and practices that transcend boundaries between these (Kramvig 2005a:105). In Hammerfest, ethnicity manifested itself as a performed ambiguity towards Sáminess. 'We are all Sámi if you look into our history', some would say, but whether this warranted a particular concern for Sámi rights or issues varied greatly.

Some describe the coastal Sámi as having 'always' been inferior to the reindeer herding Sámi, who considered themselves better and often richer than the coastal Sámi who lived on the margins in mixed income households on the coast. Often, the same people who make this claim also express their discontent with the 'super Sámi', such as the band chanting ČSV, for making themselves better than the rest of them, and excluding those who have a Sámi identity, but do not speak the language and might or might not have a gákti from their traditional areas, and who are not ready, or do not feel the need to stand on the barricades for their Sáminess or see a struggle between Sámi and Norwegian/Swedish/Finnish society.

Across Sápmi, there are an unquantifiable amount of ways one can be Sámi. Some of the coastal Sámi have friends and contact networks in other parts of Sápmi, whether further south, east or north. Festivals are gathering points that bind people together across vast distances, but there are also different experiences depending on which part of Sápmi you are from (see also Åhren 2008). Nevertheless, language remains an important marker of identity and revitalization. As with Sámi language media, where the use of the Sámi languages is a way of promoting the language and building a shared indigenous identity, it is simultaneously reinforcing a difference between those who can and cannot speak Sámi, whatever the reason for this lack (Pietikäinen 2008:185–86).

In parts of coastal Sápmi without the cultural festivals like Riddu Riđđu or Márkomeannu, or where language competence is rare, markers of Sáminess are often

less visible. This does not mean they are not connected to the Sámi culture, but rather that the way in which the culture is lived and expressed in the everyday is different. Indeed, festivals are foundations and building blocks for Sámi and indigenous identity across Sápmi, and the festivals' multilingual language presence, with speakers of different Sámi languages from different parts of Sápmi gathered in one place, builds on both a strengthened sense of a shared identity as part of *Sápmi*, and a recognition that there are so many different ways of being Sámi that there is room for more than just the reindeer herders.

Those who identify as Sámi in Hammerfest and the surrounding regions have different degrees of explicit and less explicit connections with Sáminess. Some of the coastal Sámi, such as Mari, have friends among the reindeer herders, whereas others don't engage much outside of their local community. Talking about the 'super-Sámi', understood sometimes as the cultural and political elite and sometimes as the reindeer herders on the inland, who are described as seeing themselves as better than the coastal Sámi, is an attitude that stretches further back, too, but which now, at a time of revitalization, is quiet in the sense that it does not involve vocal insistence as to whether one is Norwegian or Sámi. It rather takes forms that might not be immediately visible for the majority society writ large – or even for the majority in Sápmi, who tend to see Hammerfest as a town hostile to most things Sámi.

Resource rights and consultation

It is, then, not so strange that the groups who might at first glance be seen as most likely to be most impacted by petroleum development – the Sámi and particularly the coastal Sámi – seemingly remain silent. The Sámi never mobilised against the Snøhvit development, and were mostly absent both from the political process and from public debate – an absence that likely is related to the structure of the decision-making process where Sámi voices were new actors in the north and had difficulty being heard

in the debate (Henriksen 2010:63–64). Where Sámi issues *are* mentioned, they mostly remain marginal to the documents and impact assessments of Statoil and the regional, local and national government alike (Henriksen 2010; Henriksen and Hernes 2011). To protest Snøhvit or Goliat might have cost more in terms of credibility than it would have been worth, as the Sámediggi has limited credibility on the coast of West Finnmark, even amongst people who do consider themselves Sámi and are registered on the Sámi electoral roll (cf. Bjerkli and Selle 2015:275). Some of my interlocutors in Hammerfest thought it was undemocratic that the Sámi should have what they called 'special rights' in a region which in their experience and historical consciousness had always been mixed. Such attitudes underpin debates in newspapers, on social media, and in governance, as the questions of who is Sámi and not is tied to the question of who should have rights to resources.

A representative to the Sámediggi, during the summer of 2015, elaborated on the reasons why they were not constantly protesting or appearing in the media: 'Norway is built on oil', he said, 'so if you voice opposition you are treated like an idiot. No matter how you try in the media, we become the 'backwards Sámi', and it's not constructive at all. It's better to work discretely, lobbying politicians, instead of arguing with people who are just interested in arguing.' His observation is particularly acute on the coast of West Finnmark, where Sámi identity is a more complicated picture than can be translated into land claims or clear-cut ideas of us and them.

In the case of petroleum, the question of resource rights to a dividend or similar is considered a non-question by decision makers. In the early 2000s, demands were made by some Sámi leaders that there should be a tax on the petroleum from the Barents Sea – an idea inspired by indigenous peoples and their industry agreements elsewhere in the world. This was quickly waved off as an unfounded claim; The Petroleum Act (see Appendix B) does not recognise any particular right to Sámi people when it comes to dividends, but like all development that might have impacts on their livelihoods and

traditional activities, the Sámediggi has a right to be consulted, as do the impacted reindeer herding communities. In Report No. 7 to the Storting in 2006, it was noted that the Sámediggi thinks Norway has a commitment to pay a dividend of the income from petroleum, but the government disagrees and can't see that the Sámi people would have any special rights to a resource which belongs to all of Norwegian society (St.meld. 7 (2006-2007):34).

One former politician who held a leading governmental position during the first phases of Snøhvit's development, told me in an interview it was 'unthinkable' that there would be a Sámi claim on the petroleum resources, as the foundation for the oil industry is that the resources on the continental shelf are a national resource. This did not only concern the Sámi, but was a general rule. This was legislated in the 1960s, and to him, discussions about local ownership, which might surface from time to time, are vain regardless of ethnicity: 'There is no local ownership, there is no ethnic ownership, it is the property of the Norwegian people, and to change that is unthinkable'. The resources, as understood through the legislation and in society writ large, belong to the nation as a whole.[31]

Fencing in, fencing out

Hammerfest is rarely spoken of as a Sámi town, and Sáminess has until recently been under-communicated, even though a large proportion of its inhabitants are descendants of families who were Sámi before the assimilation period and even as late as the Second World War. The multiplicity of livelihoods, interests and ways of being in the landscape means that there is no *one* way of being a Sámi, or of being

[31] This conceptualisation of Norway as a nation, where 'ethnic claims' to offshore resources cannot and should not be made, is very different from e.g. Canada, where indigenous groups have managed to secure benefit agreements with extractive industries and command a language of rights which is more directly related to territory. Rooted in the idea of Norwegian sameness, there is a strong resistance to difference on ethnic or other grounds (Gullestad 1992).

Norwegian, in West Finnmark, even when working in a traditional livelihood. Even as some of the reindeer herders are impacted by the industrial expansion, others have found a way to continue making a living that caters to and for the new influx of people and interest in Sámi food and culture.

Overlooking Hammerfest city and the view to the surrounding islands, next to the city's iconic Turistua, stands a small *gamme*, a turf hut where a family of reindeer herders with reindeer on a nearby island have built a business over recent years, catering for tourists and other interested parties. This secured them income from regularly hosting events which involved serving a traditional stew of reindeer meat called *bidos*, telling stories and talking about the history of the Sámi from historic to modern times, touching both on colonisation and their own choices to use snowmobiles and modern equipment today. Their services were frequently used by Statoil during Snøhvit's construction, and Statoil's former industry coordinator spoke warmly of the interest he and other Statoil employees had for the Sámi culture in and around Hammerfest. Other parts of the business and cultural sector have also used it for their guests, making this entrepreneurial family ambassadors to a wide range of groups, from tourists to oil workers to dancers to politicians.

At a dinner held in this *gamme*, I started talking to a young Sámi girl from Inner Finnmark, who had studied in Italy through Eni's Master programme. She had hoped for a job in the industry after, only to find that there were none, as the times in the oil industry were changing, lower oil prices and company cost cuts meant fewer jobs, fewer internships, fewer opportunities. Neither her nor her boyfriend had managed to get a job in the industry, and were waiting it out, hoping for something to open soon. She was one of few young people from inner Finnmark I met who had tried for a job in the oil industry, who might at a later point be an oil worker rather than, or in addition to, taking part in reindeer herding. Statoil's arrival and the LNG plant has drastically shifted a generation, who started working in an industry with wages beyond the

wildest dreams of earlier generations. Yet as shown in the previous chapter, this looks increasingly unlikely to be the future of choice for the generation currently choosing their education and job qualifications, even if they might find other jobs in the region.

That this *gamme* is both an attraction and a local business asset in Hammerfest is somewhat special for a town with a long history of hostility towards reindeer herders and their animals. At the same time, it reflects a very particular trait in Hammerfest, where outsiders' attitudes towards the Sámi and reindeer herders in particular is often very different from the locals. There have been conflicts between the reindeer herding Sámi and the residents in Hammerfest at least since the early 1820s, when there were regulations on the number of reindeer allowed to graze on the state's common land, since it disturbed the newly established and growing city at Kvaløya (Zorgdrager 1997:89–91). Such conflicts also appeared in newspapers during the Alta struggle in the 1970s/80s (Mikkelsen 1980:135). I found numerous such comments of more recent date in the archives of *Finnmark Dagblad* , which I explored during one of my summer stays. More recently, the yearly phenomena of reindeers in people's gardens created so much tension in an expanding city, that the municipality has built a fence which rings the city in. The fence creates a zone which includes the centre, the 'Prairie' with the airport and a large portion of the city's houses, and finally Rypefjord. Approximately 20 km long, it is meant to cut off the reindeer from walking into the streets and eating plants from private gardens. Construction is said to cost 5 million over a period of 10 years when it was first decided on in an agreement between the district and the municipality in 2004, and was covered in both Norwegian and international press. According to Reuters, the fence was 'one of the first things' Hammerfest did with the money from Snøhvit (Moskwa 2007). The Guardian wrote of the 'rampaging reindeer' and framed it as an understandable desire of locals to keep them out (Fouché 2006).

From the municipal planner's point of view, the reindeer conflicts have practically disappeared after the fence. Though reindeer sometimes find their way inside the

fence and there are episodes of temporary conflicts over the duty to herd, the level of conflict is much lower now. Partly, he also attributed this to more modern politicians, and to how they dealt with the issue of reindeer on the search for their pasture grounds. The fence has been effective in keeping reindeer out, but not perfect, and the various points at which reindeer enter the city has given the mayor a name as a 'reindeer herder', always the first to get on his motorbike and drive them out if they dare cross the lines into the city. The fence has calmed conflicts with residents in the city, but on social media, in particular, posts about 'reindeer eating plants', 'reindeer in my garden again', or 'reindeer inside the fence, where are the owners?' appear on a regular, nearly daily, basis, during summer. Angry letters in the newspaper were fewer, with media giving less coverage to the phenomena in general – likely a combination of the changing role of print media, a new generation of Hammerfestians who are less hostile to the herders, and a shift to social media – but it was not completely gone.

From one perspective, the town has built a fence to keep the reindeer out. From another, they have rather fenced themselves *in.* One member of a herding family described to me how unwelcoming it felt that the fence had been built around the growing city, as we sat in a café in the centre. Every time she drove past the fence, she could feel it, being in the city where the reindeer were not allowed. And though she had come to know more friendly people and faces in the town in recent years, that feeling of being unwelcome was hard to shake.

Some of the local politicians understood this very well. During a longer conversation, one of them told me he regretted the existence of the fence; 'That thing with the fence', he said, 'It's just really sad. I'm not originally from here, but I think it's sad both for the people on the on the inside of the fence and those who are on the outside of the fence. It doesn't give a good impression to fence in the city in this way.' Drawing a distinction between short term and the long term, he said that people didn't want shit in their gardens, but long term, it doesn't give anything positive at all. 'Maybe if our

communication was better, it wouldn't be this way,' he continued, explaining how the municipality often didn't manage to get hold of the reindeer herders on the phone – but that the herders, very likely, had so many bad experiences with people shouting at them on the phone that it was – from his perspective – no wonder they didn't want to pick up. And that, he thought, was precisely the problem: 'No one is willing to talk. Instead, they go out and chase the reindeer, and then there are angry newspaper articles, and then they reply… and that's why we are where we are. Building fences between people like this – it's not good. Even if the animals are the cause – it's not like we are trying to fence the people out. But when we fence out their animals, we fence them out too.'

The fence also has direct effect on grazing patterns. By keeping the reindeer away from migration areas, it changes both the town inhabitant's relation to the reindeer and the reindeer herders, and the reindeer's relation to their summer pastures. With a fence separating them from some of their old pastures, some of the male reindeer push the females to other areas in their search for food. The fence has dampened conflicts locally, but also figures in a pattern of bit-by-bit land loss of grazing land, adding to the cumulative impacts which is stretching their ability to sustain grazing areas. A growing city pushes their animals away, within and outside the fence, where an increasing number of people have started to use the mountains. This often happens without knowledge of the calving season and the need for the animals to be undisturbed, and though the local branch of the trekking association (DNT) tries to work with the reindeer herders and write on their maps which trails should not be used at certain parts of the year, this is no exact science. When there is a map, there are people who will feel the 'care' for reindeer is over-exaggerated; reindeer don't mind cars or fences, so why should they mind a few walking people?

Reindeer herd and behaviour are studies of themselves within anthropology (recent contributions include Anderson and Nuttall 2004; Rees et al. 2007; Sara 2009; Vitebsky

and Alekseyev 2015), and my aim here is neither to elaborate or challenge any of this – but rather to point to the existence of a body of literature which acknowledges reindeer are not a single entity, but different individuals within a herd, with different characteristics and tolerance levels for noise and disturbance. Whereas some of them might get used to cars and people and be 'repeat offenders' in crossing the fence on their search for greener pastures, others shy away from people – particularly calves and their mothers. The herders are familiar with this and know their animals, including which ones will find ways into the town, but this is not common knowledge within Hammerfest (see also Sara 2009:165-166). Many people who see *some* reindeer come into the city and be habituated to ignore cars, have transposed this to a belief that *all* reindeer have either already learnt the same, or have the potential to – that the reindeer are able to adapt to infrastructure, people, roads, cars, snowmobiles and hikers – an idea which seems to be almost as old as the conflicts between the town and the herders. Through this structure of ignorance or indifference, the effects of industrial expansion on reindeer grazing areas disappear as matters of concern for people in the town.

After going on one of these trips myself, through a valley and round the foot of a mountain where it was just me and the sea, I paid a visit to Mari, who took me on the trip at the beginning of this chapter. Mari can be said to be a *verdde* of the herders, and she asked me if I had seen any of their reindeer, to which I had to reply no; there were no reindeer on the route. 'That's a shame', she said, and told me it was a good area to graze for mothers with young calves. I didn't make much of the comment at the time, but as I gradually got to know her and the patterns of the city and its reindeer attitudes better, I understood more of both the physical and the people-animal geography of the places. Though only a short drive from the city, this area was close to other infrastructural developments which had encroached on the reindeer. I might be partly responsible for disturbing the animals myself, through following a path made by others.

Racism and colonial legacy

The episodes above are linked to a rather unpleasant reputation of Hammerfest; that it is the most racist part of Finnmark, the city that hates Sámi people the most, and where Sámi from Inner Finnmark often raise an eyebrow if they hear talk about it. Sámi from these areas do, at the same time, often have business here, since the only hospital in all of West Finnmark is located in Hammerfest, a four-hour drive from the town of Kautokeino and even further from some of the smaller communities inland. Simultaneously, Rypefjord, which up until its merger with Hammerfest was the administrative centre of Sørøysund municipality, is often talked of as 'the largest Sámi village in Finnmark', referring to the large number of coastal Sámi who were relocated here when villages were gradually dwindling away or closed down throughout the last century. For a town where there are so few visible signs of Sáminess on an everyday basis, and so much overt and covert racism, one can almost be blown away by the political consciousness existing within people's homes – such as paintings by explicitly political Sámi artists or the constant lashing out against the fish farming industry and the way they ruin the fishing in the local fjords.

One Sámi woman from Rypefjord told me of her childhood memories, when the young herder boys would lie in the hills above their houses, looking after the reindeer in the summer. She has lived here most of her life, and can remember the time before the fence appeared, as well as the time when the reindeer herders would be present most of the summer. 'We called them the 'Finn boys'', she said, recalling memories from a time when there was agriculture here too, with sheep grazing closer to the sea. She remembers there to have been a hierarchical difference between the coastal Sámi and the Mountain Sámi, particularly those from Kautokeino, where the herders who come to Hammerfest live the rest of the year. 'The conflict is more marked here in Hammerfest, we've been called racist by others in newspapers and in Finnmark numerous times. If you go to Vadsø, or to Sørøya just across, it's different. Maybe it's

got to do with the property tax and those things. If it's that, or just persons…' Her voice fades out in contemplation, before we move on to different themes in our discussion. She laments the lack of distinct Sáminess in the local high school, particularly on the Sámi National Day on 6 February, and the lack of understanding of what coastal Sámi culture is, as distinct from the reindeer herding culture from Inner Finnmark.

As I made to leave her house, I noticed a work of art in her living room, immediately visible on the wall just round the corner from her kitchen, where we had been sitting. We had been talking for an hour and a half, and she had not said anything particularly explicit about indigenous rights, direct support of reindeer herders, or of resistance to resource extraction. But this painting was one of Máret Ánne Sara's paintings, a Sámi artist from a reindeer herding family with summer pastures for reindeer on Kvaløya. Much of her artwork is a graphic expression of the contemporary struggles of reindeer herding Sámi, in their battles against the Norwegian government and others who threaten their land and livelihood. Symbols of reindeer heads; the lion in the Norwegian state's coat-of-arms molesting reindeer; piles of skulls in various states of decomposition – and most recently, her work *Pile o'Sápmi* (discussed in Chapter 1).

I commented on the painting, showing my host I recognised the artist, and tried to ask her what it meant to her. She likes it, she said; that it provokes a bit, and she liked the *political* in it. Where our conversation had captured articulations of her thoughts and feelings about development in Hammerfest, her choice of painting showed a side which these words had not expressed. Bonds, then, are tighter than they may first appear. But demands on the coast are rarely made in terms of Sáminess – they are made in terms of us locals vs someone from the outside asserting their power, whether the Storting in Oslo or the Sámediggi in inner Finnmark. Local candidates to the Sámediggi do exist, both in Hammerfest and in other parts of the region, but the sentiment remains, for many people on the coast, that those 'super-Sámi' who are in inner Finnmark have forgotten them or 'don't represent us'.

Impacts and concerns

In an environment that is essentially hostile to reindeer herding, whether heartfelt, structural, or both, it is perhaps not surprising that protection of areas for reindeer herding or the notion of Sámi rights are not top of the agenda. The impact assessments of Snøhvit did not pay much attention to Sámi issues beyond cultural heritage on the building site and a narrow consideration of reindeer herding. Explicit concern for the coastal Sámi or coastal Sámi fisheries, was absent. Though pointed to in the public hearing, it was largely seen as a non-question by politicians, both locally and in the Storting (Henriksen and Hernes 2011:197). The impact assessment for Snøhvit never said that the impacts on the reindeer herding would be too big for the herding district to handle, as they were seen as 'marginal' to the construction of the facility in itself (Statoil 2001). There biggest issue identified by Statoil concerned the relocation of a cell phone mast, where the company paid compensation for relocation rather than waiting for a departmental process which might delay construction and create bad relations between them and the herding district. Several of Statoil's activities caused headlines throughout the construction period, but their relation with the herders mostly took place outside of the media spotlight (Henriksen and Hernes 2011).

Many of Statoil's employees, who came from the south, found the reindeer captivating, an exotic and immediately visible marker of Sáminess. One of Statoil's former industry coordinators reflected on their interaction with the reindeer herders as a mixture of fascination and extensive dialogue to impact them as little as possible, which he said was 'not to be kind, but because they were genuinely interested'. Statoil also took guests to Inner Finnmark in their spare time, and once sent a taxi all the way to Inner Finnmark to buy a flag last-minute in order to flag for the Sámi National Day (there were apparently none for sale in Hammerfest).

In the hearing rounds for the impact assessment, representatives of Sámi interests asked the Department of Petroleum and Energy to carry out an assessment of the cumulative impacts, but the department deemed it unnecessary (St.prp. nr. 35 (2001-2002)). Defined as an externality, this was outside of Statoil's concern, and – as indicated by my interlocutor in Statoil – was not something that preoccupied them that much. He never found there was a discussion about the cumulative impacts on reindeer herding in the municipality, or that more people in the town would mean more pressure on the herding areas or cause disturbance to the reindeers. On the contrary: this was a period of heated tempers between the herders and the town, just before the fence was built, and local youth would sometimes mistreat the reindeer that wandered into town. Statoil, from his perspective, had done everything they could do as a responsible developer, and did what was required, maintained a dialogue with the herders, and showcased Sámi culture to their guests by using the restaurant at the hilltop.

A report prepared by the Reindeer Herding Centre in Kautokeino for StatoilHydro in 2009, told a different story. The scenarios in Barents Oil towards 2030 (Vistnes et al. 2009) looked at what impacts might be expected if the most expansive petroleum scenarios were to be realised, and how it might threaten the future of reindeer herding. Statoil's Snøhvit is used as a 'textbook example of how a single industrial project results in a series of associated infrastructure development' (ibid:18). Though the direct impact is relatively small, the regulatory frameworks are simply not equipped to consider the many and complex ways in which energy infrastructure ripples out into other infrastructure and impacts on lives, landscapes and livelihoods – not only on reindeer herding, but also fishing and other traditional land use that is not readily thought of as indigenous.

That the Sámediggi was a relatively new player on the arena of resource management might partly explain why their influence in the Snøhvit development was not bigger, as

the structure of the licencing process makes it difficult for Sámi voices to be heard (Henriksen 2010:63–64). More telling is the amount of money and time allocated to assess what the cumulative impacts might be from the proposed petroleum activities in the work on the Integrated management plan for Lofoten and the Barents Sea. The background report concerning impacts on the Sámi, prepared as part of the process of the management plan, stated already in the introduction that the time allotted to the assessment was not up to the size of the task (Eythórsson 2003:11).[32] Throughout its pages, it stated that petroleum activity in Lofoten and the Barents Sea will increase infrastructure construction along the coastline and accelerate the loss of important pastures for reindeer herding – impacts which are not visible in conventional impact assessments due to the piecemeal nature of development (ibid:62). To avoid severely threatening the future of reindeer herding, it recommended a thorough analysis of how to control and protect parts of the coastal areas, and that mapping the impacts on reindeer herding in the region without such a thorough analysis would not be responsible (ibid.). As far as coastal Sámi are concerned, it noted how little research exists on recruitment to traditional Sámi livelihoods such as coastal and fjord fishing and duodji, making it hard to say whether the petroleum industry will compete for the same workers or otherwise impact these livelihoods (ibid.:8).

To date, such a 'thorough analysis' has never been conducted, although 15 years have passed since the recommendation was made. In the meantime, the first oil project in the Barents Sea has been approved (Goliat), and new licences have been awarded to companies in both the 23rd and the 24th licencing round, meaning that the whole of the Finnmark coast is now open to petroleum development. Statoil's next project, Johan Castberg outside Nordkapp, is close to approval in the Storting.

[32] The time allotted to the different expert reports varied widely as each ministry allocated time and money for areas under their responsibility, with petroleum activity receiving a relatively larger sum and more detailed assessment than other areas (Knol and Arbo 2014:255).

How did the responsibility for the onshore impacts disappear from view? The answer is at least in part in Section 2 of the Integrated management plan: 'Activities in the coastal zone on the landward side of the baseline that do not affect the sea areas outside the baseline have not been included, as *coastal zone management involves problems of a different nature and to discuss these here would not serve the purpose of this management plan*. However, impacts on the coastal zone caused by activities in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area, for example acute oil pollution, have been included.' (St.meld. nr. 8 (2005-2006):17, my emphasis).

Landward impacts, then, were defined as outside the scope of what is considered, a clear example of a process of 'managing resources and mentalities' (B. Dale 2016). The management of the petroleum resources were understood as related to what takes place off-shore, and on-shore only in the acute event of an oil spill. Thinking of how petroleum development impacts landscapes onshore through infrastructure development, increased traffic, black carbon, or any other form of impact, quite literally disappears from view.[33]

This performatively fragments the picture into a thousand pieces, such that it lies partially at the level of the central government and the Storting (which validated the plan and decides whether petroleum projects are allowed to go ahead or not), and partially with the regional and municipal level (where land use planning is managed). Each municipality and each reindeer herding district meet the consequences of the cumulative impacts, with no overall impact assessments or public hearings on what they will mean for the future of those industries and cultural traditions active in the region today (Bjørklund 2016b:187–88). The ripple effects created by other types of development, and the relatively late involvement of impacted Sámi herders, because the LNG plant did not directly happen on their grazing grounds, show that the process

[33] It is also a change from petroleum governance in the 1970s, when there was more concern with the onshore effects of industrialisation than the effects of the petroleum industry's environmental footprint (Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken 1997:173).

and regulatory frameworks are not prepared to consider the many and complex ways in which megaprojects such as energy infrastructure impact the traditional and indigenous livelihoods of those who live in the region. Instead, this piecemeal development fragments responsibility and leaves it to the herders to constantly explain to planners, consultants, researchers, and politicians what a given project will mean and what else it will bring with it in terms of cumulative assessments. That the effects are so little known, even after the expansion has begun, is telling for which types of activities – and what type of knowledge – the Norwegian governance structures value or include as a basis for decision-making.

Conclusion: On benefits and social fabric

In this local ecology of conflicted identity, deep-rooted conflicts and aftermaths of Norwegianisation policies, it is perhaps not so strange that it is mostly environmentalists and oil-friendly politicians who come into view in public discussions relating to the town's new cornerstone industry. Indigenous livelihoods in Finnmark, as with many other Arctic peoples, are subject to ebbs and flows of both markets and government policies, 'that either contributes to a redefinition of hunting, herding and fishing, or threatens to subvert subsistence lifestyles and indigenous ideologies of human-animal relationships.'(Anderson and Nuttall 2004:201).

The frequent lament that people in Finnmark 'are too silent', alluded to in the epigraph of this chapter, is repeated and repeated again across sectors of society – by politicians, environmentalists, artists – and is a somewhat curious statement, as northerners are known as some of the most outspoken people with a language of more swearwords than any other dialect in Norway. It is not only environmentalists or Sámi that are silenced by the structure of petroleum-consensus in Hammerfest: people who identify as Norwegians, whether local or those who have moved here from elsewhere, also feel that the petroleum-optimism is hard to criticise. Scott, reminds us of the 'vast realm of

political action (…) that is almost habitually overlooked' (Scott 1989:33): the everyday acts of resistance, non-compliance, and often covert small actions that are neglected by elites and social scientists alike, but which 'may have aggregate consequences all out of proportion to their banality when considered singly' (Scott 1989:34). Scott's context is resistance by peasants in societies with much greater class divides than Norway, but the idea of everyday forms of resistance resonates with how people in Finnmark have dealt with official decrees throughout the centuries, from those who moved back to their home places and refused centralisation after the end of WWII, to the way various bans or restrictions on harvesting local resources is often quietly resisted through simply acting as if this law did not exist at given times.

Looking beyond the edges of the immediately visible, then, might give us a different view to how the framing is created, retold, and performed – in conferences, interview settings, and in people's everyday lives and conversations; and to how they are resisted, whether by remembering what is not part of this celebratory narrative, by explicit protest at strategic moments, by speaking softly and in safe spaces, or by performing everyday acts of resistance. The latter might not be about it being recognised as such, but continuing life in a hope for the future. In the following chapter, I turn this analysis away from the 'protest' slot, tuning instead to how Eni Norge create consent locally and navigate a disputed political landscape through platform opening ceremonies. We are moving into a wider understanding of performance; as part of narrating a future north by industry players whose interests lie in opening for further petroleum development in the Norwegian Barents Sea.

Chapter 5

On failure and performance: the battle over Goliat

Today is Goliat Day.

- Finnmark Dagblad, 17.04.2015

When Goliat arrived in Hammerfest in 2015, it was a momentous event for the town. The regional newspaper, *Finnmark Dagblad* declared that 'Today is Goliat Day' on their front page, and live streamed the platforms' arrival on their web pages. The municipality hosted a small party at the town hall, reported to be a lively event with crowds of people happily eating cake whilst hearing about the technological giant that had just arrived in their fjord (Jørstad 2015a). Some of the national media outlets also reported on the occasion, but not without emphasising the cost overrun of 15 billion NOK, the drop in oil prices that threatened the project's profitability, and the deaths during construction in South Korea (Barstad 2015; Kongsnes and Seglem 2015). Local and regional media in Hammerfest, on the other hand, did not concern themselves with such externalities when they had an industrial event to celebrate. *Finnmark Dagblad* had the bright orange platform centre stage both inside the newspaper and on their website (Jørstad 2015a). Flags from public buildings and biblical references abounded; the mayor told *Aftenposten* that the arrival was like 'manna from the sky', at a time which otherwise was tough for the oil industry (Barstad 2015).

Figure 6. Front page of Finnmark Dagblad, 17 April 2015.

'Follow the approach into Hammerfest: Today is Goliat day'.

In the midst of these celebrations, the only explicit counter-protest was from four people from NNV in Finnmark, who had placed themselves outside the hall, next to the pair of iconic polar bears of Hammerfest, and hung a bright heart around one of their necks. What would happen, they asked, to Hammerfest's icon in a warming world? 'People have to think, but no one thinks when they just celebrate the oil', one of them told me later, clearly furious with the lack of thought many Hammerfestians had for the future beyond their own generation and maybe – at best, their children. Their public demonstration made the link between carbon emissions, melting ice and threatened polar bears, scorning Hammerfest's leadership for neglecting the future of the planet and their own municipal coat-of-arms in the rush for petroleum wealth. They received some media attention, too – a photo in the local press – but the journalists covering the event were more interested in the giant Goliat than they were with those raising their concern for the increased carbon emissions and ecological risk posed by its arrival.

The intended audience for such messaging is never insignificant, as performances are ideologically relative; they mean different things to different publics (Kershaw 1992:33). The context surrounding the event also affects its perceived meaning. This chapter examines how Eni's Goliat platform is understood and performed across contexts: From Eni's self-presentation of Goliat when it arrived in Hammerfest, to the ritual celebration when it started production a year later and the way in which the media stories and resounding silences are entwined in performances of both employees, politicians and other industry workers – as well as local townspeople and environmentalists in Hammerfest, Finnmark and Oslo. Framing these discussions are snippets from a series of formal interviews and informal conversations with Eni employees, conference participants at industry conferences, politicians and local residents in Hammerfest. Throughout, I highlight some of the demonstrations and interventions carried out by environmental organisations and artists, discussing how they seek to perform a counter-narrative which challenges the status of Goliat and in

some cases alter what the platform is altogether. My aim is to examine not only the discourse around Goliat, but the performance which constructs it, and the ways in which such performances can both keep together and unravel what a platform is.

Registers of protest

When Goliat arrived in Hammerfest, NNV were in fact not the only protestors against Goliat. Whilst the newspapers reported about the Goliat celebrations, a dancer in a group of Russian and Norwegian artists (who happened to be at the end of a residency with the regional dance network), published a Facebook post saying 'Huge healing work needed', with a picture of the newspaper article and the Goliat platform. Hashtagged with #healingday and #crapcorrective, they went on a dance expedition, or a healing mission, into the streets of Hammerfest and outside Eni's office. The police intervened after reports of three people 'behaving strangely' on the street, hugging bus stops, bowing to cars and, according to the local newspaper, licking a wall (Gaare 2015). The intervention later moved on to the end of the pier where Goliat was visible, making a dance ritual to heal the town afflicted by Goliat. One of the dancers, a non-local and committed environmentalist, later told me she also *cursed* Goliat during their performance, seeing this platform that would cause future carbon emissions materialised and celebrated. She, and her dance partners, performed an ambiguously serious *and* ironic ritual, simultaneously mocking and showing their concern about the petroleum euphoria.

NNV's activists never knew the dancers had intervened on the same grounds as them. But they were aware that 10 days later, five people from NU in Finnmark protested during the Barents Sea conference. The arrival of the Goliat platform in Hammerfest neatly coincided with this yearly conference, and Eni invited conference participants on a boat trip to get a closer view of the platform alongside some of their top international employees. As a conference participant I also went along. To board the

boat, we had to pass the teenagers from NU, who stood next to the gangway with a banner that spelt in a catchy Norwegian phrase that 'Goliat boils the globe' and 'the future in the north is renewable!'. The mayor of Hammerfest stopped to have a chat with them, and a photograph of their conversation appeared in one of the regional newspapers the next day (Eilertsen 2015).

It was a bright, sunny day, and on deck I continued a conversation with one of Eni's Italian CEOs, whom I had spoken to at the conference reception the day before. He wore a formal suit, and though many of the Norwegian conference guests were donning rain jackets of various kinds, the passenger boat gave ample indoor room to stay away from the cold which still clung to the April air. Northern Norway was much colder than his home country of Italy, but the day before, during the conference reception, he had told me he preferred Norway to working in Angola, where he was stationed before. 'It's not corrupt here,' he said, and no one accused the company for being responsible for corruption. He did not particularly mind the protestors on the gangway, and told me 'It's good they protest, it shows they are engaged'. The impossibility of the same kind of protest taking place in Angola, where dissident voices are not only dismissed, but 'silenced through threats or acts of violence, patronage networks, and corporate compensation' (Reed 2009:2), did not surface in our conversation. But protest, of the kind performed by the young activists from NU, is both a safe and almost expected way to show disagreement in Norway. NU sports a long track record of banner drops and civil disobedience, but here, their engagement remained onshore, without disrupting Eni's event.

Out on the fjord, we could admire the view of the city behind us and the mighty mountains of Sørøya in front, with Melkøya on our starboard side. Goliat was still on top of the Dockvise Vanguard – the world's largest transportation ship which had carried it from South Korea. My first thought was how much *smaller* Goliat was than what I had imagined, though the orange, round platform soon enough grew in size,

recognisable from the videos of its journey from South Korea to Hammerfest, which had been played at the conference. Aboard the boat people lined up to take selfies and be photographed with the platform behind them, images that later would become important visuals in narratives of Barents Sea oil: pictures taken during this period of the then-Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Tord Lien, the Director General of NOROG, Karl Eirik Schjøtt-Pedersen, and of Eni Norge's employees, including their spokespeople and the then-managing director, Ruggero Gheller, are frequently reproduced when they are mentioned in the media: men in suits with the giant, Goliat, in the background.

At the conference, the director of the Petroleum Directorate, Bente Nyland, called Goliat a 'joy for the country and for the region' – echoing the parliamentary politicians' celebratory words when they approved the platform six years earlier. Little did she know that it would be more than a year before production would finally start, and that next year's conference, yet again, could spell out 'Congratulations, Goliat', on chocolate mousse cakes.

A platform of many names

As the first oil platform to enter production phase in the Barents Sea, Eni Norge's Goliat project has faced much scrutiny and public debate. Goliat was to be the flagship of responsible exploration and production in the north, both according to the company and to the Norwegian Storting, which approved the Plan for Development and Operation (PDO) for Goliat in 2009. Although the PDO assumed Goliat to be 'marginally profitable' and vulnerable to fluctuations in oil price and investment costs, the project was to be an important contribution to the 'sustainable development of the petroleum resources' – central to the government's High North Strategy (St.prp. nr. 64 (2008–2009):5-6). In his opening speech in the Storting during the approval process,

Ketil Solvik-Olsen of the Progress Party (FrP), who was Rapporteur for the case in the Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment, put it this way (my translation):

> *'The completion of the Goliat project is important because many will see it as a point of reference in the continued petroleum debate in Norway. The petroleum industry therefore have to prove in the Goliat project that they can handle the environmental conditions. They must be aware of this in their control of the economy, choice of technology, local ripple effects, environmental precautions and oil spill preparedness – to mention but a few things. I say this to emphasize the responsibility of the developer and operator to complete the project in a best possible way, and to create a positive foundation for further petroleum development in the Barents Sea.'*

Solvik-Olsen remarked that there was broad agreement in the Storting to approve Goliat, from his own party FrP to the Socialist Left (SV), even if the Liberal Party (V) and Christian Democrats (KrF) had diverging views, and named this a day of joy for Norway as an energy nation and petroleum nation. Ann-Kristin Engstad from the Labour Party was no less congratulatory, and talked of how the eyes of people in northern municipalities were now 'lit up' by the opportunities petroleum would bring (ibid.). She also emphasized how the Red-Green government coalition's (2005-2013) High North Strategy saw petroleum development as a central pillar, which should benefit those living near to the resource in terms of jobs and other opportunities. SV's representative, Inga Marte Thorkildsen, said SV would not have approved Goliat if they ruled alone, but only V and KrF voted against the approval. The vote marked the Storting's trust in Eni and their proposed PDO. In the nine years that have passed since, the plan, along with its consequences, have unfolded across localities and landscapes, from Oslo to Stavanger to Milan to South Korea, and of course to Hammerfest, where the platform arrived in 2015.

Though many were against the development, protests and direct actions in the early 2000s did not stop the drilling plans. In the process of new management plans for the Barents Sea, which were made in the same period, environmentalist concerns were to a large extent co-opted by the pro-drilling advocates by framing a start of the 'inevitable' drilling in the Barents Sea before Russia started, to ensure Norway could set an example of the highest environmental standards (Jensen 2007, 2011). Geopolitical concerns and the image of Norway as a 'best practices' nation defused the environmental argument by 'questioning and challenging their key argument and standing it on its head' (Jensen 2007:249).

Conquering a willing North

'Tord, I love you!'. The front page of the local newspaper, *Finnmark Dagblad*, could hardly have been more enthusiastic the day after the Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Tord Lien, officially opened the Goliat platform for production (*Finnmark Dagblad* 19.04.2016).

It was a year since Goliat had arrived in Hammerfest, and local media were yet again in a celebratory mood. Across two pages inside the newspaper, the article proclaimed how 'Goliat has finally started', and the journalist left little doubt as to the sincerity of the mutual feelings between the Minister and the mayor of Hammerfest, who declared his love for the Minister and his continued encouragement during a 'tough time' for the industry (ibid.). Pictures of platform workers and officials (with men in an overwhelming majority) in bright orange and yellow survival suits, cutting ribbons and celebrating, also made the national news, as did fragments of their speeches praising the first operating oil platform in the Barents Sea. The opening ceremony (again) coincided with the Barents Sea Conference in Hammerfest, such that celebrations could take place when the operator, Eni Norge, hosted their annual reception to welcome conference participants.

Figure 7. Front page of *Finnmark Dagblad* 19 April 2016. Mayor Alf E. Jacobsen to the left, Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Tord Lien, on the right.



Figure 8. Tord Lien officially opens the Goliat field for production. Screenshot from Eni Norge's video, shown at the Barents Sea Conference. (News On Request, 19 April 2016. Screenshot taken 10.11.2018).

What none of the newspapers said at the time, nor during the speeches that evening, whilst guests were happily drinking Italian wine and munching a dark, rich cake of chocolate mousse, with 'Congratulations Goliat!' spelled across them in Norwegian, was that the ritual lacked a crucial element: Goliat was in fact *not* producing when the opening ceremony took place. There had been a gas alarm the night before, and for safety reasons the operator had stopped production. It was only three days later, after all the conference guests had gone home, that *Teknisk Ukeblad* (TU) reported on the gas leak. The alarm had gone off once more that morning, just four hours after the opening ritual was performed. Then, the alarm had been fake, but the journalist of TU was still on the platform and amongst those called to head for the lifeboats as a safety precaution (Taraldsen and Urke 2016).

Such delays and stoppages in production might be considered routine for the oil industry, a safety precaution to avoid larger incidents or accidents, and might not signal any significant problem at all, as indeed the spokesman of Eni said to the media (ibid.). But for the Goliat field, the gas leak was not the first problem on the platform; it was the latest in a series of problems which seemed to haunt Eni Norge on this project. Their giant, Goliat, had overcome the environmental and political hurdles trying to stop it from being approved in the Storting, but the technical difficulties and ongoing financial insecurity had not stopped haunting the field.

This was a problem not only for the company, or their partner, Statoil, but for all who had a vested interest in a petroleum-driven future in the north. Goliat is both a test and a milestone, a project which is greater than itself because it also signifies the entire future in the Barents Sea. Goliat was meant to serve as proof that operations in this region are safe and responsible, that they create local ripple effects, and that they bring revenue for the company and the Norwegian state, despite the low oil prices in the aftermath of 2014. Goliat, then, is a prestige project with a lot at stake, not only for Eni,

but for the government, for Finnmark county, and for other companies within the oil industry who have interests or investments in the Barents Sea. Placing Goliat's opening within the structure of the Barents Sea Conference, creates a natural stage for support and celebration which guides the focus to a particular narrative where Eni Norge's success, openness and responsibility fulfilment of their social responsibility in Finnmark is foregrounded. The problems encountered at Goliat therefore raise the question of who controls the narrative of a platform's success or failure, and how performances may alter perceptions of what 'actually happened' or what might be a serious problem to consider. In short, is Goliat a 'failed performance', or a highly successful one?

Eni Norge presents Goliat as a daring, adventurous and promising venture.
In the video shown to conference participants during the Barents Sea Conference, the narrative is one of utmost success and technological innovation. Dramatic music accompanied the video material of the platform, monumental in size next to the supply ships and Sørøysund mountains. The video cross-cuts to Eni's employees sitting concentrated, but smiling and relaxed in the control room, looking over documents and nodding to each other, indicating an orderly and well-run organisation with gender balance and ethnic diversity. Next, some of Eni's employees walk along the platform with its majestic view. After a while, the ceremony starts: a frame with the minister, beaming as he shakes hands with workers and says to a journalist that 'the future of Norway as a big energy exporter lies here, outside the coast of Northern Norway'. We then see him cut the ribbon, which is held up by the mayor of Hammerfest on his right side and Eni's CEO on his left, before the video zooms out on clapping men in yellow suits, indicating that all of them are part of the celebrations. The next frames show the platform and supply ships, and a female worker with Goliat's logo on her back looks from the platform over to Scarabeo 8, the drilling rig looking for more resources to come on stream in future. As the image zooms out, the Eni and

Statoil logos appear, as operator and partner in the licence. The video ends; the conference participants break into applause.

An opening of an oil platform is a ritual of state, and a ritual for the company. The presentation of Eni's Goliat, like that of Statoil's Snøhvit, engages in a 'creative, visual place-making' which can be seen as a 'visual colonisation of the Far North' (Vik 2017:45). In such visualisations, nature is 'backgrounded' (Plumwood 1993), and in the case of Goliat, the technological innovation *foregrounded* by being celebrated as 'the first oil field in the Barents Sea' and breaking into new, virgin territory. But this is more than just a *visual* place-making: it is a performative place-making where the presentation of Goliat at key events becomes a way of asserting authority over the narrative of what Goliat is and means.

The statements by the minister were broadcast from location to the whole of Norway, and made news agendas far outside the country's borders. The woman in the video was an actual engineer educated at the University of Tromsø, the video made by News on Request, and the music by a musician who lives and works in Finnmark. By commissioning local business and local artists to create the visual and audio profile of the video, they also root it in the north, making Goliat a northern Norwegian project which contributes to the 'ripple effects' of their operations. The opening ceremony, a ceremonial addition to video material used in the past, and hence delivered almost immediately after the event, encapsulated its ritual in the video and *presenced* the event into the conference room, making us all witnesses to the events on the platform a few hours earlier. Through the applause that resounded from the audience, we enacted that very act of witnessing, affirming Eni's accomplishment and endorsing their place as petroleum producers in virgin northern territory. We, too, became part of the colonisation of the north, by participating in the ritual of dominance and accomplishment in extreme environments.

In his address to the conference, Eni's Management Director explained that they have set up office here because one of Eni's objectives, and one of the nation's objectives, is to develop this region. Eni Norge, he said, want to 'grow' and 'strengthen the competence' of their Hammerfest office and the young people there, continue to build their relation with the Hammerfest community and the Finnmark community, and make sure they are well received and provide opportunities. They are here for the long term. He thanked Statoil, their partner, and the supply industry, who have set up offices in Hammerfest and linked their future to that of Goliat. In closing, he made it a point to thank personally the Mayor of Hammerfest for coming out on the platform for the opening.

Such gestures strengthen the structure of the event's crafting of a success narrative, by again marking the regional content and the values created for their host municipality. The official opening of the field is a rite of institution, which *constitutes* the status of Goliat as a producing field – it 'act[s] on reality by acting on its representation' (Bourdieu 1991:117). Eni, and the conference, perform the same narrative again: Goliat as success, Goliat as value producer, Goliat as a symbol of what can be achieved in the north, in collaboration with regional actors.

Necessarily, this framing downplays all events that take place *outside* of the region. Eni is Italian, and global, but here, they are local, too. Goliat was built in South Korea, but it is the local deliveries in Finnmark which are scrutinized in research on ripple effects. What Goliat means is made equivalent to what it means to people *here*, where local value creation amounts to 1,1-1,3 billion NOK (Nilsen and Karlstad 2016) – numbers proudly announced by Eni during the conference. Local ripple effects in South Korea do not form part of this follow-up research.

One could say that Eni engage in what Björkman calls 'ostentatious display' (Björkman 2015:156–57), following Eco's notion of ostentation as the process when an object or

person comes to stand for and represent an entire class of things by being placed onto a stage to signify it (Eco 1977:110-111). By having their platform's inauguration ceremony attended not only by the Minister of Petroleum and Energy, but also celebrated by a whole conference, Eni make their oil platform stand for the future in the north, and simultaneously show and display their strength and credibility as a company. They thus make it a ritual for the rest of the oil and gas industry, compelling consensus whilst also validating a particular way of seeing the world which constrains the possibility of contestation (Bloch 1989; Rajak 2011:10). Regardless of whether conference attendees agree or believe them, their participation in the applause make them both spectators and participants in the signifying process through which Eni build their strength and credibility, confirming the company's authority by their act of participation. The Minister, by cutting the symbolic ribbon and congratulating them on stage, ceremoniously bestows recognition and trust which is stronger than the critique of environmental organisations and the political opposition.

The Mayor's declaration of love for the minister on the occasion of the platform opening, is a display of the willingness and agency of the host municipality as co-player in this northern Norwegian petroleum adventure. It is also an affirmation of his own part in this petroleum dream; the Mayor was a representative to the Storting for the Labour Party when Goliat was approved, and said, then, it was a good day for Hammerfest, Finnmark, Northern Norway and the nation (Stortinget 2009). Now that promise was fulfilled, and the narrative co-created by a charismatic mayor and enthusiastic journalists in the media.

Mediated narratives

Finnmark Dagblad, the same media house that celebrated Goliat's arrival on their front page, had editorial responsibility for a newspaper supplement distributed to conference goers, with 20 pages providing stories of local opportunities and business

developments, Goliat's production start, and high optimism for securing an oil future in the north (Jørstad 2016b). In the editorial, the editor – who had also written all the articles in the supplement – made it crystal clear that regardless of current oil prices, he thought the future of the petroleum industry lies in the north– just like he had done in 2015 (Jørstad 2015b). This year, he also added that the 'green shift' was still far away, and Norwegian petroleum cleanest in the world (Jørstad 2016c). Such statements echo a more-or-less unified voice across the industry, from suppliers to producers, from highest level of government to local level politicians. Not only is it a highly integrative narrative, it also leaves little room for any critical voices which are not part of the celebratory events that the Barents Sea Conference. The 'north' that is present at these events is one that is more than willing to partake in conquering its own natural resources.

According to former journalist and communication worker Anne Karin Sæther, there is less critical journalism about the petroleum industry today than in the 1980s and 1990s, when media houses had dedicated petroleum journalists who followed the industry closely and had wide networks inside the companies themselves (Sæther 2017:238–61). In the 2000s, the media entered a state of crisis with cuts in resources and competition with digital outlets, but also a change in culture. Media houses seek to protect their integrity and no longer accept that companies pay for their journalists to travel and hotel for conventions and meetings, which also means fewer editors prioritise following the petroleum industry closely. With the exceptions of *Teknisk Ukeblad, Dagens Næringsliv* (the Norwegian equivalent of the *Financial Times*), and some regional newspapers such *Stavanger Aftenblad,* with offices in the petroleum hub of Stavanger, there is little petroleum expertise amongst Norwegian journalists. Instead, many of those who could have worked as journalists have become 'information workers' or similar positions for the oil companies and their fast-growing communication departments, which often pay twice or three times that of a standard journalist job (ibid:243).

The divergent media portrayals thereby play a role in defining a public image of Goliat as success or failure. After the cake is consumed and the pictures taken, some of the national media outlets deal a blow to the performance, but the regional media remain celebratory. It is as if the optimism of the media coverage is a driver just as much as it is driven by the optimism in the industry. In one of the local Business Association's meetings I attended, some of the industry leaders jokingly said to the journalist present that they expected good coverage in his paper the next day, sometimes turning to him and asking if he got this or that quote.

This is not a phenomenon exceptional to Hammerfest. Rune Ytreberg, an experienced Norwegian investigative journalist, found in a study that a large proportion of press coverage of potential oil in the Lofoten area were almost direct reprints of press releases or of the central news agencies NTB and ANB,[34] meaning little original content was produced (Ytreberg 2013). Newspapers in Helgeland, when there was talk of local petroleum fields, covered the oil industry almost exclusively in positive terms (Vatne 2011). Both studies found that critical questions were more concerned with what the government would do to keep the companies in the region, rather than critically question the companies and their operations. This is not dissimilar from Hammerfest and Finnmark: when national media scrutinised the safety and cost problems of Goliat, regional media often limited themselves to reprints, rather than their own investigations.

Distance and proximity, then, comes to serve opposite roles; though the local media are closer in proximity to Eni's offices and to potential adverse impacts from an oil spill, they are also closer to the people who work there. Local journalists cover a wide range of news in the community, and are less specialised in oil and gas. Though they

[34] Norsk Telegrambyrå (NTB) and Avisenes Nyhetsbyrå (ANB) are media houses that publish news and press releases, which newspapers often turn to for source material.

can play a key role in critical coverage of local news, they also need to strike a balance to remain on good terms with their sources of information and their local community, some of whom they might be in kin or friend relations with.

Lack of local coverage also meant less focus on the issues amongst locals in Hammerfest. During a heated period of coverage in the national press, when the Petroleum Safety Authorities (PSA) had closed the platform after discovering immediate danger of explosion due to inadequate safety around potential gas leaks, I checked in with a friend whose work is not in the oil industry. Had he heard talk of the latest events concerning Eni? No, he said – people were preoccupied with a local scandal of an electricity firm, the death of a local musician, and the opening of a new shop in town. What happened on the platform was not reported on to the same extent, and was anyway far away from the town itself. Jokingly, he said that people don't care so much, as long as the municipality earns money from their activities. No letters to the editor were written, no campaigns started on social media. Another friend responded with a sigh about people's indifference, but was happy to hear the national media had picked up what was known but not spoken about. Eni's people are all afraid, she said – they won't talk about it because they've signed agreements with Eni that they won't.

The politics of openness

'We are the most open oil company you will ever meet. I can guarantee you that.' The words closed the first interview I had with one of Eni's local employees in Hammerfest, Georg, less than two months after the Goliat platform had arrived in the city. We had exchanged a conversation once before at the Barents Sea Conference, walking back from the boat trip for conference guests, where I explained my business in town and we discussed the presence of the young environmentalists and the complicated picture where 'the world needs more gas to manage the transition away from coal', as he put it

at the time, not unlike his Italian colleague on the ship. Those very same words could easily have been articulated by anyone in the Norwegian petroleum industry. Almost like a mantra, it is repeated time and time again when the Norwegian environmental movement marks their opposition against any further petroleum development or other projects which will cause damages to nature or put it at risk.

Eni's employees were no different in this respect; though they respect the protest, a common statement is that 'we have to acknowledge the realities' – an appeal to the ostensibly fact-based assumption about future energy demand: The world needs energy, and *coal* is the worst enemy of the climate, not oil and gas. We would continue that conversation half-way through our first semi-formal interview, when he reminded me of this exchange after the boat trip, and our disagreement even as we agreed upon the challenges. I had been invited to his office in the Eni building after requesting an interview, and as he signed me in at reception, he did not miss the opportunity to tell me that the security guard was one of many people who were employed through Eni's activities in Hammerfest. Their coffee machines, from which we each got our paper cup (apparently for health and safety reasons as mugs needed cleaning) of black coffee, were provided by a local entrepreneur who thought a modern town needed modern coffee machines. We then moved to his office, with bright windows and a view across the harbour. Georg appeared fully at ease, moving seamlessly between discussing the regional development in Hammerfest and the north and the bigger picture of petroleum in the global energy supply.

'It is difficult', he said, more than an hour after our initial appointment had spilled into the early afternoon, and proceeded to remind me of all the things *other than energy* produced from petroleum; medicines, clothes, even the glasses I was wearing – all of this depends on oil. 'Do we have the alternatives today?', he asked, and without waiting for an answer, proceeded to say that yes, there might be alternatives in wood and rock, but it will be difficult. Even when we cut all the 'ridiculous things' we use

petroleum for, most refined products will be kept, and tail production will last for thousands of years. And then who should produce it – those who pollute more or less than others? 'It's an objective fact that the Norwegian oil industry on average pollute 60% less than [the world average],' he continued, and assured me there is no adverse effect on the fisheries, as the cable providing electricity to the field is buried beneath the sea bed, covered up so as to not be in the way.

Impact assessments, the PDO, and other mechanisms give clear directions and criteria Eni have to fulfil to be allowed to operate in Norway. Their stakeholder management measures blend into this, and though Eni no longer use CSR as a term, they participate in what the language of CSR does, namely 'promising to harness the global reach and resources of corporations in the service of local development and social improvement' (Rajak 2011:9). Whilst Eni do not see themselves as a development agency, they do speak of acting responsibly at the local, global and national level, clearly indicated by the term of 'Stakeholder management in the influenced areas', as it is called by the organisation. But what does this term mean? They do it everywhere they are, Georg explained, 'as a consequence of being there (…). In Nigeria and Australia we do different things (…). In Norway we do the things that are appropriate for Norway.' Locally, he was convinced their activities make the region both more connected and safer. Eni's activities require fibre optic cables and high speed internet connections. Installation of these on the islands that did not have them before, have benefited the small municipalities in Måsøy and Hasvik. The requirement for Search and Rescue (SAR) with helicopters for emergency preparedness, have increased the safety in the region, and already benefited several fishermen who have been saved by the helicopter which Eni was required to ensure was part of their presence and emergency preparedness. Emergency oil spill response makes shipping safer, too, he said, and Eni is visibly proud of their collaboration with fishermen in the region.

As one of the public faces of the company, Georg carried a large part of the responsibility for the message on his shoulders, but he also *identified* with the company values, performing a personal identification through his discourse about the company and his own reasons for working there. After his long explanation and discussion about oil, plastics and pollution, he leaned in: 'I'm a nature guy, you know, and I think I'm credible when I talk about these things'. Based on how much time he spent outdoors and how much he cared about not leaving traces in nature, Georg considered himself an honest man who meant what he said and who worked for a company he believed in. This might not be Eni's policy to say, he concluded, but it was his: if you're going to have opinions about what we just discussed, you have to know your facts. The realities of what the world will need of oil and gas in future, and the importance of producing the oil we still need in as clean a manner as possible. What does this oil mean, for a town, for a region, for Norway? Rhetorically posed, sitting in a town 'saved' by petroleum development, the conclusion seemed to be given.

Before we concluded what was now a discussion more than an interview, he hammered the point home in a direct appeal to where *we both* were from, as fellow Norwegian citizens. '7000 billion [NOK], Ragnhild,' he said, and looked directly at me. 'You own 1 million 355 520 of those, as the result of an oil fortune, collected since 1966 – you are aware of this? If we're going to keep producing oil [it should be] *our way* – collecting resources for future generations.' At this point, we were no longer in a standard interview setting; our personal opinions were at stake, and would determine the direction of the conversation to follow.[35] Georg's question put me as researcher in a situation where I had to respond morally, to *take a position* on whether oil and gas, produced in Norway, is better for the world or not, to either confirm or oppose his perspective not only as an oil company employee, but as a Norwegian citizen. His link

[35] This resembles Tim Choy's experience researching environmentalism in Hong Kong, where the answers to questions in his research and interviews often depended on how he answered questions of particular events of environmentalism and protest that were of a divisive character amongst his informants (Choy 2011:1–5).

between responsible Norwegian oil and the wellbeing of future generations acknowledged climate change as a 'complex challenge' on a level that is deeper than just a statement. He had put both his own and my integrity into the equation, in a move that can only be understood as a form of 'strategic intimacy'; statements which are as sincere as they are strategic, appearing to speak to ethical contestations within a company, whilst also being of high strategic value, as they raise rather than lower the defences between the researcher and the inner workings of the company (Müftüoglu et al. 2018). On our way out, he took me through to see an artwork in their office building, stretching over two floors on a white wall. The artist, Georg told me, collected pieces of drifting plastic from the region which was made into this work of art. It signified an important reminder to him: that they should never spill a single drop of oil in the sea.

At the end of such conversations, questions remain unanswered, shifted away from Eni and onto the Norwegian system of resource management: 'We' have the best industry standards in the world, also in the north, and therefore production is responsible. For Georg, it was quite simply explained as 'in Eni's values' to produce with the best safety standards possible. Eni has also been awarded licenses off the coast of East Greenland, as far north as you get, or as Georg put it; where 'there is no ice edge – we talk about the 'sea edge'', before he looked at me with a serious expression: 'The point is that we do what is necessary where it's necessary.' In the Arctic, that means Arctic technology and know-how –he claimed to be urging Tromsø's research and business environments towards constant innovation in Arctic technology, to promote an active involvement in the north across the globe. 'We are the ones who will do it best,' he said, and before I had time to wonder who he meant by 'we' – whether it is Norway, or Eni, or Northern Norway – or perhaps all, at the same time, he brought it back to Eni. This is about Eni's values, he held; economic and societal values.

For Georg, being part of an organization tasked with the responsibility of the first oil platform is the Barents Sea is equivalent to being responsible, because it's in Eni's values and because petroleum production in Norway is the most responsible production in the world; a way to give the world what it needs whilst also performing the extraction as safely as possible. Using 'we' as a term performs a double and ambiguous role: Eni the Italian oil company which he worked for, but also 'we' the Norwegian people, who presumably have the same interests at heart – responsible production, local ripple effects and tax money for the state. He also put his personal integrity on the line, by making himself, and his openness and authenticity stand for the conduct of the company writ large – further backed up by his revelation of being a nature-loving person who genuinely cares about safe production and doing the best possible in a complex reality of climate change. This strategic intimacy, whether intentional or not, serves as a personal guarantee which comes to stand for Eni's responsibility too. It illustrates how 'corporate virtue operates through estrangement as much as intimacy' (Dolan and Rajak 2011:6). His honesty and responsible manner becomes metonymical to the company's responsibility – his openness is a sign of Eni as 'the most open oil company you will ever meet' – because it is staffed by employees like him. Simultaneously, he linked Eni's values and the Norwegian petroleum development, making them pioneers in responsible, weather-proof exploitation of resources in the Norwegian north, where they take responsibility for the particular circumstances in the places where production takes place. In this case, the context is that of a Norwegian welfare state with a publicly perceived spotless environmental track record on the production side of oil and gas, and whose revenue is dependent on the resources the industry brings to the world.

Performance and truth

A politician from SV flipped Eni's local success on its head when I interviewed her at the start of 2016. It was 10 months after Goliat's arrival in Hammerfest, and several

delays had prevented the field from starting production. Though SV was part of approving the field in the Storting, many of their representatives have been firm critics of the project throughout, particularly as local ripple effects were a condition for them if the field was to be approved in the first place. She held that the expectations did not correspond to the reality of what it brought locally. Furthermore, the field had several severe events linked to it, lives lost in the construction phase, and decline in Norwegian industry whilst Goliat was built abroad, under conditions that would never be allowed in Norway. 'To have support amongst locals they have to buy support,' she said, indicating the way Eni behaves as a patron for culture. 'So they have to give away festival tickets to politicians, and sponsor the same festivals with artists they otherwise wouldn't be able to afford, to show that they know the terrain they are manoeuvring in. But that doesn't do any good for those who have seen their dad come home in a coffin in a different part of the world'. This, she told me, says everything about an industry which does not show social responsibility at all.

Her focus, then, were the parts of the Goliat process not measured in the reports of local ripple effects (see e.g. Nilsen and Karlstad 2016). When Eni awarded the contract for constructing the platform to Hyundai Heavy Industries in Ulsan, South Korea, instead of the Norwegian company Aker Solutions, it caused an outcry over what this meant for jobs in Norway, at a time when the shipyards were struggling financially due to the low volume of orders. It was not only the unions that were concerned: a representative of the KrF directly asked the then Minister of Business and Industry of the Labour Party, Trond Giske, about this during Question Time in the Storting in February 2010, just after the news was known. Concerns were related to the 7000 man-years of work it would have created in Norway, and that the shipyard in South Korea was under-pricing the costs and was thought to be sponsored by Korea against international trade competition rules (Stortinget 2010). The Minister replied that everyone simply had to accept that Norwegian business could not win all contracts. The outcome had been decided: Goliat would not provide as many ripple effects in

Norway as many had hoped. In Hammerfest, the Labour-led municipality wanted Goliat to entail on-shore processing in one of the nearby municipalities, but when these plans dissipated, they were still happy to gain the offices from which the project operations would be run, and a guarantee of local jobs in their town to populate this building.

Construction started in South Korea, but in 2013, it became known that the platform was delayed, and the initial start date which had been set for that year was not realistic. In May 2014, Eni sent a letter to Norwegian authorities to let them know the cost of the field exceeded expectations; from 30 billion NOK, the new estimate was 45.9 billion (Ramsdal og Taraldsen 2014). Between October and December the same year, three people died in accidents at the South Korean shipyard, whilst building the Goliat platform (Ramsdal 2015). In February 2015, there was an incident at the drilling rig Scarabeo 8 in the Barents Sea, where a man fell overboard.[36] There have been several incidents with chemical spills, even though there is a 'zero discharge' policy in place for chemicals.[37]

The Petroleum Safety Association (PSA) discovered problems on the electrical system of the platform already in September 2015, and ordered Eni to fix them (PSA 2015a). Two years later, these had been fixed on paper, not in practice, which PSA discovered during one of their audits (PSA 2017a). Further incidents included injuries to personnel,[38] complaints from Norwegian unions over the safety measures on the platform,[39] incidents which were not reported but discovered later on (PSA 2016),

[36] The incident was investigated by the PSA in April 2015 (PSA 2015b).
[37] These were reported in the media by *Teknisk Ukeblad* amongst others (Taraldsen 2017c, Taraldsen 2016c).
[38] In June 2016, there was an incident of serious personnel injury. The PSA conducted an investigation where they found the worker was "hit on the head by wire rope being reeled in using a work winch", and also identified several regulatory breaches (PSA 2017). A letter of concern signed by two unions, Industri Energy and Lederne, and three senior safety representatives, had been sent to the PSA just 12 days before the incident occurred (Taraldsen 2016b).
[39] A union representative from Safe, which is part of the larger organisation YS, told media in August 2016 that many of their members no longer trusted Eni's leadership and felt unsafe on the platform

power outages and stoppages in production due to gas leaks and immediate danger of explosion. The latter was discovered in the autumn of 2017, when PSA visited and immediately shut down production with a letter ordering Eni to fix the issues before they could resume production (PSA 2017a). The media jumped on the matter, and made timelines of events, cited reports, and interviewed NGOs which were opposed to the platform as a whole. Eni's CEO relayed to the press that they had a 'good working relationship' with the authorities, and that much of the critique was based on old cases that were not relevant anymore (Lorentzen and Hovland 2017).

The PSA took the Goliat problems very seriously; the Norwegian system operates on trust, where the company is asked to do something, and then do it. When a company does not comply, this threatens to undermine the whole system of safe and responsible petroleum extraction on the NCS. The case eventually made it to *Dagsnytt 18*, an early evening discussion show on TV, and became the topic of several debates. Added to the cost overrun, the question quickly started revolving around whether Goliat would ever break even, let alone make money for the Norwegian state. The Ministry of Energy and Petroleum received a written question from the opposition (Stortinget 2017), but instead of going to the Directorate of Petroleum for numbers of when Goliat would start making money, they asked Eni. This would further complicate matters: Not only were the numbers wrong (as the break-even price for the company and the government are not equivalent), but the fact of the Minister asking the operator rather than his own people, led to controversy and distrust in his handling of the process (Taraldsen 2017b).

Goliat resumed production, but its status as failure or success depends on whose perspective you're looking from; whether you are seeing like an oil company, like a

(NTB 2016). An audit performed by the PSA in January 2016 had found non-conformities and improvement points identified during logistics audits in 2012, 2014 and 2015 had not been rectified. It also identified lack of employee participation, and gave Eni two orders on the basis of these findings (PSA 2016).

local politician in Hammerfest or a politician in another Finnmark municipality, like an NGO, or like a local who wishes for a different development in the region (Ferguson 2005; Powell 2008). Goliat as a project is understood and engaged with differently across a range of contexts, in ways which make it more than a simple epistemological question about the 'facts'. Asserting authority over the narrative is as important locally as it is nationally. It is, as Brigt Dale has also argued about petroleum contestation in Lofoten, an *ontological* question (2011). As if to illustrate the point, *Finnmark Dagblad* made a two-page report from Eni's offices in Hammerfest only two weeks after PSA had shut down production (Østvik 2017). The story was not about platform safety or economy, but architecture: Eni's building had been nominated for an architecture award, and the journalist wrote what in Norwegian is called a '*gladsak*' – a 'happy story' – about the architecture, the art, and the people who work in the building. The contrast to the news stories in national media could not have been more striking.

Opposition and counter-expertise

Though Greenpeace did not send any kayaks to disrupt the performance of the platform opening, they and other environmental organisations have done so in the past, and have also criticised the project on several occasions before and after it was approved in the Storting. In 2003, they were co-founders of the 'Stop Goliat-alliance' (*Stopp Goliat-alliansen*) consisting of 17 environmental organisations and youth parties from both left-wing and liberal parties. The alliance organised several demonstrations and actions, including banging oil barrels outside the Storting and installing small platform rigs in the water outside governmental buildings in central Oslo. Greenpeace also took the fight to Italy, intervening at the Annual General Meeting of Eni to inform shareholders of the vulnerable conditions in the Barents Sea and dissuade them from going ahead with the project (Greenpeace 2004). But the efforts to stop Goliat did not convince the politicians, who decided to let Goliat pass in 2009, seeing it as an

important step in building a petroleum region in the Barents Sea (St.prp. nr. 64 (2008-2009)).

The NGOs have since continued their protest in different forms. Bellona has reported Eni to the authorities several times for non-compliance with chemical discharge rules – discharge which has happened despite an exceptionally strong 'zero discharge' policy in operation in the Barents Sea.[40] These, alongside the many safety breaches and economic issues, have recently been detailed in a report compiled by Friends of the Earth, calling the Goliat field a 'betrayal of the Barents Sea' due to all the things the operator has done and still been allowed to carry on their business (Lerkelund 2018).

Many of those who work in these NGOs understand that the infrastructure that is Goliat is informational as much as it is material (Barry 2013:78), and that the information flow is key in enabling the materiality to be both created and operated. In different ways, Bellona, Greenpeace, NNV and NU have sought to disrupt the information flow that comes from the company and government with the 'real' numbers and the 'real' impacts and risks of production. To do so they are not just looking to 'lay science' (Beck 1992), but also commissioning experts and leading economists in Norway to do the calculations for them and thereby granting authority to their claims –such as Greenpeace's commissioned report on profitability in the Barents Sea South East (Greaker and Rosendahl 2017), which refers to Goliat's cost being higher than projected. Commissioning expert reports to look into taxation regimes, safety, and other documents to counter the oil industry's claims, they question the company's authority and truth-telling on the 'real' costs, as well as the role of the government and whether petroleum in the Barents Sea can ever be safe, particularly when Goliat is not the success it was foretold to be.

[40] Bellona's charges were filed to the police in 2016, but the Regional Public Prosecution Offices in Rogaland found the evidence to be lacking and closed the case in April 2017 (Taraldsen 2017c).

Again, Goliat is the first; a symbol that stands for more than itself; the giant that is meant to prove that petroleum operations in the Barents Sea are both safe and responsible. The repeated Goliat celebration is thereby significant not only as an industry event, but also in its integration of local and regional politicians and industry, as well as the key players in government and regulation. Rituals have an intrinsic capacity for 'self-healing' (Michaels 2007:131), where Goliat's celebratory events in Hammerfest two years in a row turns delay and cost overrun into occasions for celebration and admiration of Eni's abilities to master an Arctic environment. An oil rig is an impressive, enchanting structure – and the invocation of its first soon-to-be and then newly started production, are innovations of ritual which smoothen the turbulence surrounding its life up to this point. It also mystifies the parts of Goliat's history that the company does not wish to remember – those parts which the opposition against the project refuse to let them forget. At the same time, '[e]nactment of all ceremonial (or theatrical) performances is inherently risky' (Schieffelin 1996:80). The flipside of Goliat coming to stand for the future in the north is that the performed success is disputed and made to seem just like performance in the more reductive, theatrical sense – as *inauthentic*, untruthful and as a reputational risk for the entire industry in the north.

Murmurs and contradictions

In the introduction to this thesis, I alluded to silences in life stories and experiences that get left out of the official narratives, whether sidelined by performative practices or self-imposed by historical structures of assimilation and active denial. There is also another form of silencing at work in the development of petroleum projects, relating to those who work in or are otherwise close to the industry. Somewhere between the jokes about the Italians arriving in Arctic Hammerfest in their finest leather shoes and the Norwegians enjoying both the office view, hiking and snow mobiling, there was a tension which was deliberately left unarticulated, expressed only as low murmurs that

are not meant for quotation. Whether it was murmurs from workers contracted by other companies, or shoulder shrugs by those within the company itself, silence when questions were asked, or concerned headshakes by other companies when asked informally, the performed success story had an undercurrent of discomfort. Murmurs and whispers in corridors and pubs, and anonymous messages of concern to the Petroleum Safety Authorities (PSA), would surface in the media every so often. Throughout the period of 2016 and 2017, it came more to the front, as unions battled Eni's repeated safety offences and the PSA kept an extra close eye on the platform.[41]

When the media stories broke in the national press I was not *surprised* – it only confirmed the fears of those of my interlocutors who had confided their own worries or those of others close to them, fears and concrete knowledge of faults and mishaps which were not meant for citation. Eni have operated with confidentiality agreements that their workers sign, making both the extent of these agreements and who has signed them or not, beyond access for an ethnographer not embedded in the institution itself. Suspended in this silence is a fundamental contradiction, which does not square with the care that is displayed in media statements from Eni's spokespeople, nor the care for nature, environment and the world that comes through in conversations, on the one hand, and the story that emerges in the media as happening behind the scenes, combined with the lack of responsibility taken *outside the documents* by the company itself, on the other.[42] The whispers and rumours I *did* come to know, particularly in the informal conversations off record during conferences, could be seen as kind of 'ideological resistance' (Scott 1989), performed in the quiet through non-compliance and withdrawal of deference. That these concerns later surfaced through the unions organising workers at Goliat and through anonymous expressions of concern to the Petroleum Safety Authorities, reflect the

[41] In the yearly report to the Norwegian government, the PSA highlights their close monitoring of Eni and the Goliat project, and state they will continue this in 2018 (PSA 2017c: 5, 18-19).
[42] These are detailed in the audits carried out by the PSA and the orders they have given Eni (see PSA 2015a, PSA 2015b, PSA 2016, PSA 2017a, PSA 2017b).

Norwegian model of an organised state with established channels for dealing with such issues when they arise – but also a challenge for them to deal with when companies do not fully comply with the Norwegian system.

The scandal, as referred to by the representative from SV, came not only from what was known to have happened then, nor from what has been revealed later, but rather from the breach of the trust which Norway's petroleum governance builds on, and the timescale it has occurred on. That this is a matter of concern is shown in how the PSA has put extra focus on trust and safety at every petroleum conference I attended in the years 2015-2018, whether in Hammerfest, Tromsø or elsewhere in the north. The PSA have stated to the media that they have spent more resources on monitoring the Goliat project than any other field on the Norwegian continental shelf (Skarsaune et al. 2018). Eni might have a working social licence in Hammerfest, but their reputation is more ruffled than their ritual ceremonies can heal.

An Italian way?

How much of this relates to Eni's international organisation? The Italian oil giant has never operated in offshore Arctic waters before, and most of their operations are in countries where environmental and safety regulations are far less strict than in Norway. Statoil is by far the largest and most well-known operator in Norway, but they dwarf in relation to Eni abroad. The close ties between the Italian organisation and the Norwegian daughter company makes it necessary to follow leads to the Italian office in Milan – as the journalists writing the story for *Stavanger Aftenblad* pointed out in their exposé of Goliat's many transgressions (ibid.). The Italians in leather shoes were more than just curious presences in Hammerfest; they were the power of the Italian oil giant at work. The local Head of Operations was made to leave his post, according to himself because he insisted that Eni should stick to the plan they had committed to with the PSA and their co-licensee Statoil, and that the Italian headquarters should not have a

direct line to the platform which cut past himself (ibid.). Unions have also had to fight for employee's rights to be permanently employed by the organisation (Taraldsen 2017a).

The turbulence and these entanglements have certainly been felt higher in the organisation too. In 2016, the managing director at Eni Norge, Ruggero Gheller, was replaced by Philip Hemmens. Hemmens himself told the media he was sent to 'tidy up', and the unions also seemed to be happy that he was chosen as leader (Ytreberg 2016). Meanwhile Gheller, who came to the position with experience from the USA, North and West Africa, was under investigation for severe mismanagement of waste and pollution nearby Eni's facilities in the Basilicata region, Italy – an issue an Italian geologist had been sued by Eni for researching and publishing on, according to the newspaper *Stavanger Aftenblad* (Skarsaune et al. 2018), which unrolled the deep-ploughing story of what they called the scandals or behind-the-scenes events during the construction of the Goliat field in South Korea in April 2018. This story was previously unknown to the Norwegian public. Simultaneously printed in *Bergens Tidende* and *Aftenposten*, it reached at least 250 000 subscribers across the country as a 14-page weekend supplement. The journalists systematically ordered the history of the platform around a narrative of how Italian oil company had tried, repeatedly, to evade the rules set by the Norwegian law, the billions of cost overrun, the deaths during construction, the near-accidents on the platform after it arrived in Hammerfest, and the criminal investigations against one of the former heads of Eni Norge, Ruggero Gheller, who was at the top during the critical phase just before and after Goliat's arrival in Hammerfest.

The article led a parliamentary representative from SV (and former leader of NNV), Lars Haltbrekken, to demand that the government again reconsider their trust in Eni as an operator on the Norwegian continental shelf (Seglem 2019). The Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Terje Søviknes, who had replaced Tord Lien in the role,

declared his trust in Eni as a company.[43] Statoil stated to the media that they had fulfilled their duties as co-owner in the licence, and that this was documented in reports (Skarsaune et al. 2018). Beyond this, Eni as operator was responsible for making public statements about the project. The story in the national media was of a top-down 'Italian way', a way which threatens the Norwegian system and particularly the importance of safety first, no matter the cost. Eni's claim to 'Eni standards' as the best ones there is, was questioned by this and the way it was handled by former Ministers of Petroleum and Energy.

Managing openness

What is to be made of these widely discrepant stories, of success and failure, safe operation and reckless risk-taking? The many issues binding and complicating the project point to how Goliat is not only an object of controversy, but also as a question of perspective. The risk it poses in terms of cash flow, safety procedures and environment, are key points in a contestation over whether Goliat is a success story or a disaster, and varies both locally and nationally. The success or failure of the performance – whether different publics will grant the success of the ritual even when there are things that go wrong – depend on their trust in the organisation and on whether it has followed the correct procedures with the right outcomes before.

Anthropologist Roy Wagner reminds us that '[s]ymbols and people exist in a mediating relationship to one another' (Wagner 1981:xix), and Goliat as a symbol is both contested and rapidly changing. Contested, that is, not only in terms of whether it will be profitable or not, but also as to whether or not it can be said to stand for what the rest of the Barents Sea production will be like. Goliat forms part of the Norwegian government's High North strategy and is a prestigious project for Eni. It is also a

[43] In a written response to Haltbrekken, Søviknes wrote he did not see any indication that Eni was not fulfilling its role as operator of Goliat according to the law (Stortinget 2018).

project with stakes for other companies with plans for developing resources in the Barents Sea, especially for Statoil who hold a 35% stake in the licence. Unions are also concerned about this: If Eni Norge's reputation for handling Arctic production is bad, it will have consequences for the support from people both locally and nationally for future oil production in the region. A bad reputation might delay other petroleum development in the north (Bendixen and Forland 2017).

For Goliat, it was not the lack of transparency per se, but the lack of performing what they put in the documents that caused the public dispute and media attention around the cost overruns and safety slippages. They were *performing* openness, but failed to make this performative, as they came across in media as closed, elusive and untruthful. Their regime of transparency created an optic of responsible behaviour, but the optic could not repair the problems identified by the PSA, who found after repeat inspections that the issues had not been fixed (PSA 2016). For Eni, this was another document to which they had to attend, again performing awareness and improvement of their compliance with regulations. This came across not only in their responses to the media, but also in interviews and conversations I had with employees at different levels of the organisation, where the openness of the company was put front and centre but there was little willingness to discuss specific issues as they would all be dealt with in reports.

Thus, *openness* comes to play a foundational part of exchanges not only in interviews, but in discussions and exchanges of opinions – showing how the values of a company and the values of an employee can both come to stand for each other and diverge, as openness is never unconditional, but always contingent on trust and intimacy, whether that of the Norwegian system writ large, with trust as a key component of the interaction between authorities, regulators and operators; trust as the key for the union reps and the whistle-blowers who made the conditions at Goliat known; trust between journalists and their sources; or trust between an anthropologist and her

interlocutors, that the information shared will not be traceable back to individuals. All of these different forms of trust and openness complicate what should be considered as Eni's performance in a local context in Northern Norway – and what that means for what Goliat *is*, beyond the first oil field in the Barents Sea.

Questions of what is made public or not are increasingly important political questions, and the way in which transparency is exercised might also influence whether an issue becomes a public dispute or not (Barry 2006, 2013:17). Public trust in transparency and safe operations in the oil industry is generally high in Norway, where the three-party corporative structure of state, industry and unions, means bonds are close and trust levels high between these different players, with a system of checks and balances and mutual understandings. Sometimes, such bonds can end up downplaying environmental concerns for the benefit of keeping the country's largest industry going, or declaring his faith in a company's numbers and reports, as the Minister of Petroleum and energy did during the worst disputes over the financial income of Eni's project. Here, the Minister, by not playing with open cards, caused *more* controversy over the Goliat project instead of calming the water.

Defining stakeholders

On Eni's website, the information on their activities with local communities is filed under Sustainability and Stakeholder Relations on the international site, where the opening sentence states that 'Dialogue and co-operation with stakeholders are fundamental to Eni when creating opportunities and value.' Headings that follow are 'The importance of relations', 'The principles of relations with shareholder' (which include involving them in all phases of Eni's activities, promoting and sharing common principles, and sharing information), 'Managing relationships with local communities', and finally 'People, issues, action'.

Eni Norge files this information under Environment and Society (Miljø og samfunn) and Social Engagement (Samfunnsengasjement). On the splash page for Environment and Society, the visitor is immediately met by a message in large, red letters: 'Low risk, a good working environment, know-how, preparedness and community engagement'. The menus to the left lets one find each of these areas, whereas to the right and in the main body are lists of safety standards and links to explanations of what they do to safe-guard the environment from spills. Flagging an HSE policy and industry standard certifications, they claim a 'corporate culture based on health, safety and environment'.

The final bullet question concerns the local level: 'What does Eni do for local communities through their operations?' The first answer is 'Company strategy to ensure ripple effects of our operations'. Here, then, the reports discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 become important again: they document what Eni does, directly and indirectly, through their activities. Elsewhere on the website, stories of what they do, from oil spill preparedness to their cultural sponsorship, are showcased as examples of the collaboration and patronage at the local level. Making up an archive of activities Eni wants to showcase, it contains some of the material included in reports of the ripple effects of the Goliat platform (see especially Nilsen and Karlstad 2016). Such expositions serve a double effect; they overwhelm potential critique whilst exposing faults – though more importantly, they frame the kind of questions which can be asked and the terms they can be asked on (Barry 2015, 2013). Each bullet point appears self-contained, but can also form part of disputes, negotiations and debates which are not necessarily finished (Barry 2013:11). As such, the making of stakeholders also makes expectations, disappointments, and closure to narratives which might remain open for others, even if the company has left them behind.



Figure 9. Eni Norge: Environment and Society. www.eninorge.com (Screenshot taken 12.09.2018)

The second bullet point on Eni's social responsibility concerns their indigenous policy with regards to the Sámi people. Linked from the website, the policy is a downloadable Word-document, which despite its short length of less than a page of A4 has performed an important role in the development of the Goliat field. The document states that Eni will 'establish an effective and inclusive framework for the free and informed participation of Sámi People in the consultation process' (Eni 2007). Part of the required Impact Assessment for the field development has been an assessment of the impact on the indigenous Sámi. Eni Norge also initiated a kind of consultation process with the Sámediggi, who took this as a token of willingness to approach, negotiate and respect the Sámi people as indigenous people (Sámediggi 2009). In effect, the document stretches no further than what they already are required to since Norway has ratified the ILO 169, but the direct negotiation with the Sámediggi to reach an understanding of each other's viewpoints, was a powerful leveraging tool. Eni was the first oil company to ever approach the Sámediggi for direct conversations, signalling their commitment to 'get it right' in an indigenous region. The Sámediggi recognised this effort as positive in their hearing responses to the Government, but also noted they expected this to continue if a development of Goliat was approved (Sámediggi 2008). Whether it has, remains more of an open question, as the dialogues were more informal than actual consultations; there is a difference between what goes in a PDO and becomes a requirement to do, and what might surface after less formalised negotiations – but it is nevertheless clear that Sámi interests were more present in the impact assessment for Goliat than for Snøhvit (Nilsen 2016). That the Sámediggi did not consent to or approve the PDO for Goliat was first and foremost related to a disagreement with the government, who did not want to give any rights to a revenue or other benefits from development to the Sámi specially, but saw the oil and gas as belonging to the Norwegian people after the Petroleum Act.[44]

[44] See OED's reply to the Sámediggi in (St.prp. nr. 64 (2008-2009)).

To this date, Eni remains the only company to have come directly to the Sámediggi, but their dialogue with other Sámi stakeholders is harder to trace, particularly as coastal Sámi identity is mostly left unarticulated on the coast. Resources and capacity are also factors that affect visibility and recognition of interest in a way that a company might recognize and dialogue with. This also applies to the dialogue with the reindeer herding district at Kvaløya, Fálá. As one Sámediggi's employed advisors pointed out, whilst discussing Eni's engagement with Sámi society in the spring of 2015; Sámediggi are paid to answer the phone, whereas a reindeer herder's work is not in an office, and they might be more difficult to get hold of – both for petroleum companies and social anthropologists.

Whilst Eni might have given some money to projects with a Sámi profile as part of their support of local culture (see Nilsen and Karlstad 2016), the presence and benefits of the coastal Sámi remains unclear and unmapped. The Sámi hunting and fishing association, Bivdi, a small NGO with limited resources, have never prioritised Goliat; it dwarfs in comparison with other and more directly negative issues, particularly the Nussir project in Repparfjord which will have direct and severe negative impacts on the conditions in the fjord and the fishing for the coastal Sámi fishermen in the region. Trawlers, industrial scale fishing and impacts of fish farming are more direct threats to the coastal and fjord fishing their organisation supports. Oil is too big, but also marginal, for their direct day-to-day concerns, particularly as the question of rights to the resource were swept off the table in the Snøhvit process.

How much of this is known to those who work in Eni, remains an open question. Though Sámi knowledge is supposed to penetrate the entire organisation, I would constantly be referred to a few individuals within Eni Norge who were assumed have the competence when attempting to discuss their relationship with Sámi, whether as stakeholders or otherwise. Eni has no particular policies in place to recruit Sámi, besides translating some material into Northern Sámi, and providing funding for the

online Reindeer Herding Portal and some other small projects. Most of Eni's workers whom I encountered, whether during interviews or in informal settings, seemed to know very little about the Sámi people and even less about coastal Sámi who inhabited the very municipality Eni was operating in. Many of the Italians who frequented the same hotel I stayed at for parts of the summer months in 2015, would ask me to tell them more of the Sámi people and seemed oblivious of their presence in the region as well as indifferent to the policy document. That, for them, was the concern of someone elsewhere in the organisation.

Nevertheless, Georg's remark, that Eni as a company does 'what is necessary, where it is necessary', holds; the dialogue with the local reindeer herders did lead to considerations of where to place infrastructure that had to be moved due to the platform's power station, and one of Eni's employees ensured me that the use of helicopter was minimised (though not eliminated) in the calving season of the reindeer. For those in the organization who had to deal directly with issues of Sámi reindeer herders, the knowledge was necessary. For others, it seemed to stay at arm's length distance, the reindeer an exotic other rather than a matter of concern, and the indigenous policy unknown to those who do not frequent the websites of their own organization.

Promise and disappointment

'In the beginning, Eni ran around the region almost like a prostitute, promising everyone both one and the other…', a municipal employee in one of the West Finnmark municipalities told me, in a straight-forward manner of speech so common across all sectors of society in Finnmark – a directness that leaves little doubt of what they actually think about a particular matter, whether about a politician, a decision in government in Oslo, or the behaviour of some other powerful person or corporation. It was autumn, 2015, after Goliat had arrived in Hammerfest, and an otherwise

uneventful time with no certain news from any of the other oil companies about their prospective drilling projects. His municipality had not hinged all their hopes on these promises by Eni, but both they and others had expected some of the ripples from the oil platform to touch and transform at least *part of* their society. Some of this enthusiasm from just five years ago had worn off now, leaving little to hope for – though who could know what the future holds? He cast his mind back to a scenario assessment from VRI Finnmark in 2012-13 (Foresight Finnmark 2013), which had gathered 50 people from politics, business, administration, R&D, and organisations to imagine possible future scenarios for a Finnmark in 2033. Here, changes to the profitability of oil and gas was a 'joker'; left out of the discussion alongside the possibility of a catastrophic oil spill, sudden onset of climate change effects and an atomic accident – risks seen as too improbable to be in their scenarios.

His anecdote of this scenario-making – neither the first or the last made about Finnmark – made it clear what kinds of ideas are most commonly discussed. The idea of a possible oil spill was as far away from the Norwegian elite's plans as was climate change and atomic bombs, neither of which seem to get in the way of future planning or scenario forecasting. 'No one' had foreseen the drop in oil price – not the politicians, and not the industry, nor the business networks who had started initiatives to build competence for serving the oil and gas sector many years ago, in anticipation of what was to come. Goliat, with its assumed 'marginal profitability' with a current oil price of just above 50 dollars per barrel, did not enter production in 2013 when the oil price was still high. Production began in 2016, when the price had dropped to just over 40 dollars according to OPEC's statistics (Statista 2018). It is safe to say the klondyke mood was rather dampened – at least outside of Hammerfest.

In Hasvik, located on the island of Sørøya just outside Hammerfest, local politicians had been much more invested in the outcome. The island sits furthest out to sea, shielding Seiland and Kvaløya from the most extreme weather. As Goliat's closest

neighbour, Sørøya is in the impact zone where an oil spill will hit land if there ever is a blowout from the platform. On a clear-weather day, the platform is visible from the top of the mountains near Sørvær, the smallest of the municipalities' towns. On a sunny day during the long northern summers, it is hard to imagine such a thing could ever happen – or that the sandy beaches and green coastline could become blackened by crude spilled from Eni's operations or a passing oil tanker.

One of Sørøya's fjords, Dønnesfjorden, was also one of the locations Eni considered as a potential landing site for their onshore operations. The area is known as particularly beautiful, and tourists are normally recommended to make a trip to see the views it has to offer. With a beach facing northwards, Eni's location-scouting in the area left Hasvik's politicians with the impression that an oil terminal might be built in their municipality. Hasvik's mayor from 2003-2007, Geir A. Iversen of the Centre Party (Sp), explained in a TV documentary that he feared their region would die if they failed to bring some of the offshore activity onshore along the coast (NRK Brennpunkt 2009). Like in Hammerfest, the idea that onshore processing guarantees jobs and subsidiary activity was present also here. The documentary follows Iversen and other Finnmark politicians to Oslo, where they lobbied national politicians on several occasions before the decision for offshore processing was made. In keeping with the demands there would be local ripple effects in the region, Eni placed their offices in Hammerfest, whilst Hasvik saw their potential ripple effects disappear before their eyes – that is, save for an oil spill preparedness centre, its janitor in a 50% position, and some trainings which took place there each year (Dale 2018). The picture may be modified by pointing out that some people from Sørøya also work for Statoil and other parts of the oil industry, but compared to what has come ashore in Hammerfest, the ripple effects elsewhere in Finnmark are small.

Conclusion: controversial legacies

'That platform was always over-the-top', one of Statoil's employees, Tom, told me over a beer in Tromsø, during an Arctic conference the year after Goliat started production. The conditions in this part of the Barents Sea are not so harsh and cold as to warrant their 'extreme' design; on the contrary, the brand new design structure almost went *contrary* to intentions: a prestigious design project which 'failed' its own safety standards. Statoil's concept solution for Castberg, their next planned field development outside Nordkapp in Honningsvåg municipality, should be proof in itself: the field is located further north than Goliat, and after Statoil decided not to bring the oil to an onshore terminal, they have opted for a solution with a production ship rather than a full-fledged platform. This is a much less costly solution, which they judge to be adequate and safe for the conditions. As the largest and long-standing operator on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, Statoil holds a great deal of credibility, but their choice of production solution show both that Eni's Arctic conditions are not as stereotypically Arctic as they might appear, and that the Arctic is more than just 'one' environment. Where the Barents Sea on the one hand is north of the Arctic circle, and presented as part of the Arctic strategies of both Statoil and Eni, they also emphasize how *normal* it is, how close to standard operating procedure the Barents Sea conditions are.

Like Georg from Eni, Tom insisted that this part of the Arctic is unlike the offshore Arctic of Canada or Greenland, where there is ice even at more southern latitudes. The Barents Sea is a north they know how to operate – though unlike Eni, he sees this north as one where Eni's platform is over-dimensioned, where a less flashy solution might have done the job without complications. Tom is certain Statoil's Castberg project will do better, as it is adequately dimensioned for this part of the Barents Sea.

The contestation over what Goliat is, and whether its performances are successful or not, look different in regional and national perspectives. Different audiences carry

different understandings of what a good performance is, what it means that a company is 'open', that their information workers tell everything like it is, and what a good future for the north is. Exploring the tension between what Goliat is as narrated by the industry, how it is narrated by other actors, and how the performance of celebratory events to mark milestones in the Goliat project attempts to smooth over the undesired events, shows that a narrative of success cannot undo the other narratives. They will keep 'sticking' to the platform's history and by extension to all future petroleum expansions in the Barents Sea.

This does not mean the performance of all these narratives has an equally strong ability to influence materialities. If Eni's performance is, literally, set ablaze by an accident or gas explosion on the platform, or documented repairs are found not to have taken place, then the performativity of the company's media statements cannot undo the fracture of the communicated real. Here are competing claims as to what this real really is; the documents of Eni and the documents of the PSA are both trying to describe the entwinement of risks, materials and hazards on the oil platform itself, but the authority of the inspections of the PSA have repeatedly found that their realities do not correspond. Likewise, the economic reality both is and is not a matter of perspective; whatever predictions were made in the planning stages of Goliat, expectations of growth in oil prices and industrial activity was the narrative that gained sufficient support to allow Eni to realise their plans. Even as the development has deviated from the original, the compulsion to return to this image through various ritual events and celebrations remains strong. Regionally, Goliat has come both to mean disappointment and growth, the gain of some and the loss of others, such as destruction of grazing land to meet the demands of land-based infrastructure directly (Vistnes et.al 2008), and adding to the indirect effects of industrial expansion which lays claim to other areas where the reindeer are currently grazing in summer.

Casting our mind back to Hammerfest and the winter of 2016, the politician from SV voiced a concern shared by many others who do not support the platform's entry into the region. Her insistence of drawing the undesired events, those that Eni Norge wish to see as externalities, back into the narrative, is to ensure the platform remains disputed and that the full consequences are continually talked about – that Eni's local ripple effects do not smooth over or cover up impacts which extend beyond the shores of the Barents Sea. Her point connects the regional jobs and the millions given to local culture, the 70 millions to culture and the 1,1-1,3 billion NOK in local value creation documented by Norut Alta (Nilsen and Karlstad 2016), with the wider narrative that was then already in the national media, and which would unravel throughout 2017 and 2018. Whatever the future holds for petroleum in northern Norway, Goliat will continue to be controversial – whether celebrated or condemned – and the final chapters of the platform's history have yet to be written.

Interlude: Don't you fuck with us

Local disappointment in Finnmark has not only been related to Eni and the Goliat project. In February 2013, Statoil staged a performance with wide-spread consequences in Nordkapp municipality, the nearest neighbour to the Johan Castberg field. Popping the champagne with the mayor and invited guests, Statoil promised that they would bring the oil onshore on Veidnes, a location that would bring the municipality significant income from economic activities, jobs and other ripple effects. The performance created expectations that Nordkapp would experience growth similar to Hammerfest. Newspapers reported on an oil terminal would be ready for 2018, whilst the municipality started celebrating themselves as a 'champagne municipality' and a soon-to-be new 'petroleum city' in the region (Joakimsen 2013). House prices rocketed, and people's optimism was high.

It hardly took six months before the joy turned to a waiting game. Statoil didn't find as much oil as they had hoped in the Castberg field, and postponed their decision about the field. During the same period, the government adjusted the tax regime to shift more of the economic investment onto the oil industry. Oil prices were still high, but Statoil doubted Castberg could carry the costs of an onshore terminal alone. They hired Aker Solutions to work on the second alternative; a floating production unit offshore. Nordkapp kept hoping the tide would turn their way, but expectations cooled as more time passed. Then, oil prices crashed – and Statoil postponed their decision again.

When I visited Nordkapp in the autumn of 2015, even the municipal planner told me they had almost stopped waiting for news. 'If anything comes', he told me, 'it's a pure bonus'. Their economy is first and foremost built on fish. Then on tourism. But if oil *were to come* outside their shores, both the local political leadership and county-level

politicians were clear: oil in the waters outside Finnmark should benefit Finnmark. The best guarantee would be to bring it onshore.

Fast forward to April 2016, where these tensions played out on and off stage at the Barents Sea Conference in Hammerfest. Each conference session was hosted by two municipal mayors from the Northern Norwegian coastal municipalities, and to introduce Statoil's project director of the Castberg field, Erik Strand Tellefsen, were none other than the mayors of Nordkapp and Porsanger municipalities. Tellefsen, who three years ago had promised Nordkapp an onshore terminal, explained to the audience that Castberg had turned out to be a smaller field than initially expected. An analysis Statoil carried out in January had compared the cost of pipelines to land with a floating production solution offshore, and offshore was by far the most cost-effective solution. By changing the concept and reducing the number of wells they had to drill, Statoil had cut the costs nearly in half: from 100 billion NOK to a mere 50-60 billion NOK – with a goal of reducing this even further. Tellefsen went on to say that the terminal at Veidnes was not *cancelled,* but that Castberg alone would not make a return on the investment in a terminal. However, as petroleum companies Eni, Lundin, and OMV all have found oil in nearby fields, a terminal *may* be economically profitable if costs were shared. In 2016-18, they would establish a design for a cost-efficient terminal and determine whether there are more resources in nearby fields, including what might be found after new licencing rounds.

No promises were made this time, but he ended the talk on a humorous note: 'We are constantly working on improvements', he said, 'so we can make better friends with Christina' – referring to the Nordkapp mayor by her first name. Laughter followed from the audience. As Statoil's representative made to leave the stage, the mayor of Nordkapp announced that he first had to come get his gift. As he walked across the stage, she made another joke, this time at his expense: 'Yes, because it's *you* that should come to *us*!'

The point strikes home: if Statoil wants to drill for oil up here, they need to meet the local expectations. Though the tone remained friendly, the message was clear.

Later in the conference, the local radio station NRK Finnmark did several live broadcasts. One of these debates centred around the future of the Castberg field and the different perspectives on what it should be for the region, the nation, and the company, inviting the mayors of Nordkapp and Hammerfest to talk about the prospects of oil and gas without onshore processing. The mayor of Hammerfest emphasized that the oil and gas industry was a new industry in the region which had to be built step by step, but was also clear that each municipality had to do what was best for them – although, ultimately the politicians in Oslo decided. Nordkapp's mayor said that Hammerfest didn't see the onshore processing as a be-all-and-end-all because they had a supply industry that was built in conjunction with Eni's oil field Goliat, which will be prepared to handle increased activity. But, she insisted, these resources are a common good, and should not only be concentrated in Hammerfest. For Nordkapp, oil will be another leg to stand on, in addition to fisheries and tourism – but the county of Finnmark is united in a demand to create onshore activity.

Statoil, on the other hand, explained to the radio host that their main concern was a robust project economy – repeating the on-stage message to the conference. One of Statoil's key employees in Hammerfest during the Snøhvit construction also reiterated this to me a year later: it is not Statoil's responsibility to develop the region, but to ensure the project is economically viable. That the Minister of Energy and Petroleum supported Statoil's prioritisation of the economic bottom line, without which there would be no project and no ripple effects at all, did not soften the aftermath of the popped champagne which had by now left a sour stain on the social licence of the company. The minister said on the radio that with the huge petroleum resources off the coast of Finnmark, onshore infrastructure is likely. Without cost control, the industry can't extract the resources and there will be no ripple effects or local content

to distribute. Responsible resource management and ripple effects will follow the best plan for field development.

Later in the day, I attended the Statoil-sponsored conference dinner, held in the combined sports and events hall in Hammerfest, which for the occasion had been filled with long tables with free seating. Food from the region – elk, reindeer, fish, and a variety of less locally sourced dishes – was served as an enormous buffet. After dinner, one of Statoil's company bosses, then the head of operations in the North, got up to hold a speech. He declared that he had wanted to make a reply to a song sung to him and Statoil in Nordkapp some weeks earlier – when some of the locals had performed a song originally created for a local comedy show, with a clear message to not 'fuck with them' with false promises about the onshore terminal they promised three years earlier. Though the singer wasn't present, he wanted to address it to the mayor of Nordkapp and everyone else instead, and started singing 'Long December Night' by the band Dance with a Stranger. As he and a hall full of semi-reluctant dinner guests started singing without accompaniment, the symbolism was hard to loose: '*In the darkest situation / you can find the crimson light (….) Long December night / is part of paradise.'*

To be sure we didn't miss the meaning, he explained his interpretation: Whilst there are dark clouds on the oil prize horizon right now, and the relationship with some of the local municipalities might be difficult as a result of this, it will clear in the end, and everything will be all right – or rather, the development of Barents Sea oil will go ahead. Nordkapp and other coastal municipalities had to be patient, and in the end, they might get what they want. Serious on the radio and in public settings, the industry still had the confidence and ability to joke when they were amongst their own – even if the nature of the humorous intervention was prompted as a response to someone who was, in fact, not there, but in their home region of Nordkapp, where

they were still waiting for news as to whether or not the oil field next door to *their* municipality, Johan Castberg, would be built with an shore terminal for oil or not.

After dinner, I continued an earlier conversation with some of my Statoil contacts about the developments in the region. One of them remarked that – though he only flew in here for conferences and didn't see much more than the hotel and the cultural centre, he was impressed by the development of the town and how modern it had become after the entry of the petroleum industry. Holding a petroleum conference here each year, whilst anticipating future developments that would bring growth and northern business opportunities, was laden with both national, international and regional imagery. The entwinement suggests narrative that one might have it *all ways* when developing oil in the Norwegian north: low emissions, responsible and high safety standards, local development, investments, and jobs. After the 'Long December Night', perhaps another Hammerfest was waiting beyond the horizon?

* * *

Or perhaps not. In June 2017, the final decision by Statoil was made: oil will not come onshore in Nordkapp. The operations will be located in Harstad, and not in Hammerfest as the region of Finnmark was hoping for.[45] Politicians in Finnmark and particularly Nordkapp were disappointed by Statoil's new signals that development will happen without the guarantee of local content that comes with onshore infrastructure.

Labour Party politician Ingalill Olsen gave a public face to these sentiments, which were also expressed by many of my interlocutors from outside the political sphere: that

[45] Rystad Energy actually warned already in 2013 that bringing the oil onshore for processing would not be profitable, whereas Statoil's spokesperson insisted this was the baseline scenario' (Ramsdal 2013). Four years later they had changed this position.

if there is no local content, then the oil might as well stay in the ground. After waiting patiently and believing Statoil's promise that oil development at Castberg would bring a boost to Nordkapp municipality in the form of jobs and other spin-offs, she 'converted' in a newspaper chronicle in March 2018 (Olsen 2018). We have been fooled, she wrote, and we are tired of it. The argument about jobs has disappeared, and without these local spin-offs it just is not worth the risk to the local environment.

Several others have written angry letters in newspapers, expressed discontent in radio debates and even made into the topic of a cabaret song, which had prompted Statoil's conference song; 'Hey, mister Statoil – don't you fuck with us'. There is not only indignation and passive waiting in the north, but also pride in the places and industries that are already here, from fishing to tourism and culture. Statoil, they warn, would be well advised to not try and fool them with false promises.

Researchers at Norut, Trond Nilsen and Stig Karlstad, wrote in the regional newspaper that the 'informal and unwritten relationship of trust' between the Statoil and important political and industrial actors in the north has been solidly scarred by this decision: after the disappointing loss of a terminal, people had expected that the other operational activities would, at the very least, be located near the field (Nilsen and Karlstad 2017). They conclude that the *trust is breached*: Statoil cannot count on the same support from Finnmark anymore.

'Don't you fuck with us', indeed.

Chapter 6

Stately rituals: the 23rd licencing round

Central to this thesis is an examination of how not only activists, but also industry players and politicians engage in the staging of events which either strengthen narratives or counter them by disruption, counter-narratives or emphasising a different aspect of a project, development, report or plan. In this chapter, I turn to how the announcement of the 23rd licencing round is precisely such a staged event, where a controversial decision is moved to the location currently benefiting the most from northern petroleum development, the level of social acceptance is high, and 'Oslo' is safely at a distance. I seek to show how this choice of place and venue is a claim to legitimacy and authority over the narrative of what petroleum development will mean in the north, how creativity shapes the narrative in particular ways, and also how particular persons come to matter in a fusion of public role and personal character (cf. Abeles 1988).

I will follow two lines of action and their protagonists: the presentation and the Ministry's planned performance, and the intervention staged by the environmentalists in NU. Flitting back and forth between these, I wish to show both how stately rituals are performed and have a capacity to deflect, edit out or incorporate counter-performances, and how these counter-performances might have a different agenda that works with and against the stately ritual, at once confirming and challenging its legitimacy. This exposé then sets the stage for the second part of this chapter, in how the licencing round has been challenged by a 'scaling up' of the legal process to question the legitimacy of these licences in the legal system.

Rituals of the state

'We marched FOR Snøhvit, we who are from Hammerfest', said the Mayor of Hammerfest to the Minister of Petroleum and Energy, as they were walking along the brand new wooden pier outside the Arctic Cultural Centre. It was a sunny day in May 2016, the day after Norway's national day – the peak of national symbolism across all regions of Norway. On 17 May, people dress in their finest national dress, march in parades, wave Norwegian flags, and sing songs of how much they love their country and the struggles their forefathers went through to make it the great and free nation it is today. The only workers who will not have the day off work are those who work in health services, police, the fire brigade, public transport, or the hotel and restaurant business, and even they will be seen smiling and waving on the day itself. Even school students, who are in the middle of their exam period, will have the day off to take part in festivities, before returning to their books and exam revision the following day. The month of May is full of public holidays in Norway, from International Worker's Day on 1 May to the remnants of the Protestant Christian Church calendar of Pentecost, settling both people and news into a slower pace, as people often use the days off to get out of the city or extend the time to a long weekend, no longer thinking of the religious reasons for days off. News and announcements that might be controversial in Norwegian politics, are often announced towards the summer, when fewer eyes are on the media and more are looking toward their soon-to-be-holiday.

But this 18 May was anything but a slow news day in Hammerfest. Flags were still flying high on public buildings in town, not because they were forgotten or left overnight, but because the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy had come to Hammerfest to deliver an announcement of the 23rd licencing round, which would open new areas in the Barents Sea South-East (BSSE). The process of the licencing round, and the procedure of the announcement, is part of a process regulated by the Petroleum Act (see Appendix A), but the announcement itself is a stately ritual which takes place in

order to make the decision of the government public, and on this occasion the ritual was utilised to its fullest. The location made the announcement part of framing the narrative of northern development and energy security, effectively side-lining questions of climate change and energy transitions. Instead of holding a press conference in Oslo, the Ministry had chosen the one place in Finnmark where there was already petroleum activity as the stage from which the announcement was made. This act both recognises Hammerfest as *the* petroleum hub in Finnmark, and builds on that narrative to launch the news of the future potential of riches in the Barents Sea.[46]

The invitation to the press had been sent only five days in advance, where it was said that the news of the 23rd licencing round would be given at the Arctic Cultural Centre in Hammerfest. The mayors of both Hammerfest and Kirkenes, the latter a town on the Russian border in East Finnmark, were present to give speeches. In their company were also the Director General of NOROG, Karl Eirik Schjøtt-Pedersen, and the head of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Bente Nyland. 'After the press conference', the invitation said, 'media will be invited on a boat trip aboard the MS Mårøy', which would take them on a small trip out past the harbour of the town.

May is exam period for secondary, high school and university students in Norway, so when the press invitations were sent, the mobilising potential for teenagers in NU in Finnmark was far from its highest; its members likely to be either sitting in exams or too busy preparing for them to travel to Hammerfest to show their disapproval. The activists from NU who were there, were part of the leadership in the organisation, including their leader at the time, Ingrid Skjoldvær, and the regional secretary for the northern regions. All three were from other parts of Norway; two had flown in from

[46] The announcement in Hammerfest took place before the formal approval by the King-in-Council, and was special for a number of reasons. Not only were new frontier areas awarded, this was frontier area in an area of the NCS never before opened for petroleum production; further north and east than the government had ever awarded licences before. It was also the first time in more than 20 years that the government opened a new and previously unexplored area for business.

Oslo, and one from Tromsø. Through the words of the mayor, they were cast as youngsters from 'outside', with a lonely banner and no local allies to support them in their concerns for the climate, the fish and other life in the Barents Sea. On the banner, the minister himself was pictured, with a speech bubble saying 'Fuck the pole ice' in big, black letters on a white background.

The NU leader would rally with much greater numbers behind her in Oslo two days later, when the government gathered for the weekly Friday meeting with the King in Council at the Royal Castle. According to media, 200 youth were present, chanting the rhyming phrase 'Hva faen driver dere med? La Arktis være i fred!' [What the fuck are you doing? Leave the Arctic alone!] (Møller 2016). Some of them donned paper masks of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Petroleum and Energy with dollar signs in front of their eyes, whilst others carried large banners and posters. A globe on top of a barbeque left little doubt of the message: Arctic licences were directly linked to a roasting of the globe, for which Norway was making itself responsible. Joining them was also Greenpeace with their characteristic, inflatable polar bear, a symbol most would recognise as a trademark of Greenpeace International.

But in Hammerfest, they seemed much more alone in public. The leader of the Finnmark branch of NU, though not present on the day, had written an op-ed on NU's web pages (Samuelsen 2016). 'The world needs us to calm down our petroleum production, and not open new areas', she wrote, claiming that the 'oil mafia' are given everything they point to. She criticised the Norwegian government for 'moving the ice edge' with the new licences and for ignoring scientific advice which says that all Arctic oil must stay in the ground to stay below 2 degrees of warming globally (McGlade and Ekins 2015).[47]

[47] The reference to McGlade and Ekins' study has been highly popular both within academic communities and the environmental movement in Norway, mainly for its modelling of which resources will become 'unburnable' under policies which succeed in limiting global emissions enough to be consistent with a 2 degree target.

Present in writing and online, but not in town, it seemed the only local or regional character was Mayor Alf, who was on home ground as he walked down the pier. The cartoonist of the local newspaper *Hammerfestingen* would draw a picture of the scene later, with a young woman in a pink coat holding a flyer in front of a polar bear dressed in a suit, responding to her presence with a cascade of words that reflect his conflictual relationship to the oil wealth. The cartoonist, Åge Eriksen, has created a plethora of such drawings over the years, often making fun at the overly optimistic politicians and petroleum lobbyists who promise wealth and riches to the north in terms that belie how little of the enormous investment sums *actually* come ashore in Finnmark and Hammerfest. That Hammerfest's icon, the polar bear, is depicted as an oil industry worker, calls forth an ironic link: the Arctic, its home territory, is warming up precisely because of the petroleum activities it earns its living from.

The irony was probably lost on the Minister and his guests, as both the newly established oil wealth of Hammerfest and the prospects of what this might bring to other municipalities in the north were recurring statements in the speeches during the press conference. The minister, Tord Lien, started by congratulating everyone present and stating that this licencing round was the beginning of new chapters in the Norwegian petroleum adventure. This industry, he said, is by far the largest sector in Norway, employing more than 200 000 people directly or indirectly. Even during this demanding time for the industry, it brought significant income to the country, and his job – as well as those who were ministers before him, he added – was to create the conditions where these energy resources will create as much value and profitable jobs as possible for the country. He emphasized how the petroleum politics are supported by a wide majority in the Storting, and that this fairy-tale has not come about by itself, but through research, science and technological development, which makes extraction both more profitable and more environmentally friendly.

Figure 10. 'Little protest in Hammerfest against more petroleum exploration by the ice edge'.
From Hammerfestingen *25 May 2016.*

Save for this remark, climate and the environment remained external to his speech, reflecting how emissions from the same petroleum is external to Norway's responsibilities; the oil burnt outside the nation's borders is not counted as Norway's share of global emissions, but within the borders where it is burnt. Lien then moved on to talk about Hammerfest, Goliat, and the further potential of the Barents Sea, emphasizing the safe and responsible operations and the many exiting projects ahead. One chapter, he remarked, has already been written, but the time for Finnmark as a full-blown petroleum province was now. He – like the industry in their Basec report discussed in the interlude preceding this chapter – emphasized that the conditions in this new area was not in any way like northern areas elsewhere in the world. On the contrary; the operational conditions are known to the industry, and there has already been exploration activities here for 40 years. After revealing the blocks and the operators on his PowerPoint presentation behind him, the minister neared a conclusion. 'If the companies hit their target', he said, 'Finnmark will meet a new era'. For the industry, for Finnmark and for Northern Norway, it was 'a day to rejoice', as these 'fantastic opportunities' were now there for the industry to make use of.

After the minister's speech, the word was passed to the mayor of Hammerfest. He drew a historical line back to 1973, when the regional council made a plan to create 3000 jobs at Rypklubben, a planned industrial area the neighbouring municipality that was now part of Hammerfest. He outlined how the municipality decided they would benefit from the oil even before exploration activities started, and had worked to bring oil activity to the region since 1985. The results were clear: Snøhvit was now producing, and would do so until 2052. Then there is Goliat. And everything, he said, with a particular emphasis on *everything*, that was lost in the fish industry was back, including 1550 new inhabitants, most of them in the age group 20-40 years. Jobs for the young and money for the nation were good reasons to let the Norwegian flag fly high, even if the national day was yesterday. In conclusion, he thanked the minister for

being a minister that's friendly to Northern Norway and who comes to the north to deliver the news in person.

The mayor of Kirkenes was also invited to give a speech, which he used to emphasise the opportunities ahead of the nation and East Finnmark, where the petroleum adventure had arrived, 45 years after the first production on the NCS. Licences this far east, near Russia, also meant something else: cooperation with the Russian company Lukoil and possibilities of collaboration which is important in a peace-building perspective.

This rhetoric, where the Arctic is both known and unknown, already open and yet-to-be-explored territory, strikes a balance between the white, unknown spaces where the Arctic is a place to be conquered, with an Arctic where conditions resemble what the industry already knows – what Statoil used to call the 'operable Arctic' only a few years ago. The territory is both new and exciting, the next chapter in the 'petroleum fairy-tale', and familiar, therefore in an area where operations are safe and manageable. There is a strong nationalist element in the ritual of the licencing round, where it is linked to Norway's future as a nation, of income, wealth and prosperity, but also a particular Norwegian know-how and ability to handle the challenging environment of the sea.

Performing northern prosperity (again)

After the official speeches were done, the press and invited guests started walking towards the harbour. We passed the environmentalists from NU, and went aboard the M/S Mårøy, a veteran ship refurbished by local enthusiasts in Hammerfest. On board the boat, the purpose of the boat trip became clear; more than just an opportunity for one-to-one interviews and rendezvous over waffles and coffee, we had ventured out of the harbour for the symbolism of the LNG plant to become part of the narrative told to

the Norwegian people in the media. The announcement of the wealth-to-be was made against a backdrop where this wealth was already material and real.

The very same morning, my role had been recast from observer to reporter, as the local newspaper I shared offices with had been commissioned by one of the national news channels in Norway, TV2, to carry out the filming and interviews on their behalf. None of their journalists had capacity to come along for the full event, so they asked me, knowing my interest in oil, gas and its development in the region. Not wanting to turn down either the opportunity to be behind the scenes nor the possibility of doing my office colleagues a favour, I happily accepted, and went along together with one of their photographers. I was given a list of two questions from TV2, but also allowed to ask follow-up question if relevant, and to include interviews with the Minister, NOROG, and the mayor of Kirkenes. The editing for television and final clips were carried out by TV2, and only contained snippets of the full interviews. Here, I cast a look to what happened during the filming, and the attention paid to details by the main protagonist: the Minister of Petroleum and Energy.

Aboard the boat, we were given priority to interview the minister, but only after the boat had left the harbour and could have Melkøya in the background in the distance as the interview took place. The minister directed the final part of this staging himself. As we were about to start filming, he looked behind him at Melkøya, and realised the boat had turned slightly, so that the LNG plant was out of the frame of the photographer. He asked us to wait, and turned to catch the attention of the captain of the ship. The captain was not looking our way, so the minister jumped and waved to capture the captain's attention from the bridge. He then made gestures so the captain would understand and turn the boat, and patiently waited until the angle was right, checking with the camera man to ensure Melkøya was in view before he agreed to proceed. As we started the interview, the minister yet again looked directly in the camera, checked the angle behind him and asked the captain to turn ever so slightly, not hiding his

Figure 11. The Minister of Petroleum and Energy is interviewed aboard M/S Mårøy. Melkøya LNG in the background. (Photo: OED)

excitement of how good it would look with Melkøya in view. Even if only a few seconds of the clip made it on national television, the intended effect was that the LNG plant would be visible behind him as he spoke; a concrete example of petroleum bringing prosperity from the Barents Sea to the shores of Finnmark.

A picture of this interview with the Melkøya LNG plant in the background was featured on the Ministry's website (see Figure 11), accompanying an update on the day's events and information about the 13 companies which had been granted shares in the 10 new licences. Written as a press release, it included quotes from the minister which emphasized the same points that had been highlighted in his speech: these are newly opened areas, but in a region where there is '40 years' experience with exploration', with strong health, safety and environmental regulations in place (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016).

Seen as ritual, the event was doubly meaningful; not only did the minister tie a metonymic bond from the present to the future where Melkøya comes to stand for a potential future for other municipalities along the coast, he also made his own personae a node connecting the old, the new and the promised: the boat on which the interviews were made, M/S Mårøy, was once a tourist vessel in Vesterålen, where a young Lien spent six summers as a boat guide for tourists on whaling safaris. For the adult minister, this was what he called a 'very nice surprise', as the reunion awakened memories of his past, where he also made fish soup for the guests as part of the job (Jørstad 2016a). This intimate connection, whether deliberate or coincidence, anchors the event in the local and the northern: not only the cultural house, but also the veteran boat enthusiasts, are enrolled in the celebratory events for the future in the Barents Sea. The minister is seen both in his role as a government official and as 'Tord', the oil minister of the people with a personal connection which strengthens his position as a northern minister who understands this part of the country and is perceived as real and 'one of them'. When he announced it is now Finnmark's turn to

partake in the petroleum adventure, his enthusiasm was believable, just as his enthusiasm for the veteran boat rooted him as someone with a connection to the sea and the people on the coast. Through his charisma, he was perceived as real and authentic even by those who did not agree with the politics his government led.

Nationalisms, as Kapferer has remarked, are part of a social and cultural process and thereby contingent on history and other circumstances (Kapferer 1988). The staging of such an event, unlike Eni's or Statoil's which we have seen in chapters 4 and 5, is a ritual of state that is already in itself verified: it does not create, but presuppose solidarity (Abeles 1988:393). The use of this solidarity during the announcement of the 23rd round, from the evocation of the nation and its sea-based past and future, to the direct link made between the petroleum exploration and the future of the Norwegian welfare state, become fused through the minister's movements and his speech, enacted precisely such that this should become the overarching narrative. It also evokes a *peopled*, rather than a white and unknown Arctic, in line with the government's Arctic Strategy. The emphasis on Norwegian oil production as cleaner and safer than other petroleum resources is placed within a future scenario in line with projections from the International Energy Agency, where oil and gas is part of meeting energy demands in 2040. Even if much of the planned Barents Sea Petroleum will only enter production phase after a major reduction if a 2 degree limit is to be reached – this performance partakes in the 'masking' of the real need for a transition *away* from petroleum rather than clean petroleum production (B. Dale and Andersen 2018:38–39).

As an event, the announcement ordered both time and space, designating the role of the journalists as well as the space for dissent. Whilst NU might oppose the licencing system itself, their protest is not a challenge to the structure of the event or the legislative process but rather part of a democratic society with freedom of expression. In regional dynamics, they furthermore become 'proof' that those who disagree are 'not from here', but just the usual suspects who meet the minister everywhere he goes.

The minister, standing together with the mayor of the town, becomes at once the messenger and the official which effectuates the news he brings. In a wider sense, the event is part of a process which regulates both the stately ritual and its counter-performance into a strictly delineated form and repertoire – but the dynamics are not only for the Ministry or the media to control, and NU makes use of both this and their own channels to get a different message across. It is to these performances I now turn.

Channels of addressing others

Back on the harbour in Hammerfest, the activists from NU had wrapped up for the day. Their performance might not have convinced the mayor or the minister, and was only marginally visible for the people in the town, as the event took place in the middle of a working day. But their performance was far from unnoticed, and was given a two-page spread in the regional *Finnmark Dagblad* two days later, where the photographer had captured Mayor Alf, backpack over his shoulder, in conversation with the youth leader who held a corner of the anti-oil banner. The journalist quoted the statement from NU's Facebook page, where they claimed the minister of Petroleum and Energy was 'showing the finger' to future generations, and, 'breaks the Norwegian constitution the day after our National Day' by awarding the licences (Skotnes 2016). The image, of the mayor calmly and generously meeting the angry youth, looked strikingly like the picture taken during the Eni-organised boat trip a year earlier: the registers of the political staging and the industrial staging emulate each other, whilst the counter-performances of their opponents respond in similar ways to similarly staged events. That none of the local youth were present did, however, create a particular image which is then used in the narratives of local politicians and oil company workers: the youth were not 'from here', but from another part of the region. Eriksen's polar bear-cartoon was to the point.

But to only see NU's performances within the framework of the local would be to misrecognise who their performance is intended for. Whilst their arguments were not delivered on the national news, the banner was clearly present, following an expected pattern of NU being present to speak out about these events. In addition to the media coverage which they might or might not get from their actions, NU used the own channels on Facebook to show the (Norwegian-speaking) world and to share their anger online. Their role during the announcement can thus be seen as a continuum on a line of events and geographies of protest that stretch from Hammerfest to Oslo, and follows the minister in his tracks as he gives out licences and attends industry events where the environmentalists rarely are invited to speak, but find other ways of addressing omissions from the agenda.

Just after the announcement was over, their leader, Skjoldvær, entered a discussion with the minister, which was broadcast to Facebook by the videographer from one of the local newspapers, *Hammerfestingen*. In the video, Skjoldvær expressed a hope that this would be the last time the government would give out licences to drill, and that she couldn't understand how it was compatible with the Paris agreement. Lien answered that Norway's production is cleaner than anyone else's, and that the climate challenge is global and requires global solutions. Skjoldvær replied that Norway has a responsibility to take leadership if emissions are to be brought down, whilst Lien said that if Norway stops producing, then more quotas would be available, and they would be used for coal production instead. At this point, his political advisor intervened: it was time to go. NU did not attempt to hinder him or any of the other participants; in the context, they accepted the frame of the event, playing into and disrupting the message, but without hindering them from continuing with the set programme of the boat trip and licence celebration.

NU's display of disagreement was, then, both symbolic and more than symbolic, as it had a direct effect on the agenda and discourse during the day. None of the official

speeches mentioned climate change, but with NU present outside, this became part of the narrative which emerged in the media afterwards. The stately ritual was thereby interrupted by a creative engagement from the environmental activists, who not only protested outside, but also entered the room and engaged in a public debate, bringing new elements into the event which otherwise would not have contained discussions of the Paris climate goals. Just as the minister's performance was set in Hammerfest to legitimise the oil industry's entry to the north as *good for the north* and *good for the nation*, the intervention of NU was a counter-performance, to show that the oil industry is *risky for the north* and *bad for the climate,* at the expense of future generations.

The significance of their presence is also meaningful for the organisation itself, and for the story they tell to the rest of the world, particularly other activists and international media. A year after the event, Skjoldvær would retell this story to a journalist on the podcast *Unburnable* by Radio Wolfgang, an independent online radio channel which made a 6-episode series on Norway and Arctic oil. Reminiscing about the event, she said: 'It was just like all these men in black suits – and us. I think we stood out.' 'I guess that's the problem with the oil policy making in Norway, is that no one really has any space to confront them and ask questions, it's just that 'oh, this is the natural way forward.' (Radio Wolfgang 2017). Through their presence, they wanted to show that not everyone agrees, and that a different outcome, one where licences are *not* awarded and precautionary principles are followed, was possible. They also form a contrast to the 'men in suits', the middle-aged men in positions of power, who are failing to secure a future for the planet and future generations. According to what NU write on their own website, this is the end of Norwegian credibility on climate issues, and 'showing the finger' to those who are young today (Storsveen 2016).

Some 1300 km from Finnmark, in Norwegian capital of Oslo, a different procedure was also taking place, which concerned both NU and the government. Scientists,

environmental NGOs and other interested parties had been invited to a hearing in the Storting's Committee on Energy and the Environment about Norway's ratification of the Paris Agreement, a procedure where Norway would commit to their part in the global agreement to keep global warming to less than two degrees and as close to 1.5 as possible (Stortinget 2016). The representative from NNV started his assigned ten minutes by pointing out that their hearing took place only moments before Tord Lien was to enter the podium in Hammerfest, where he would declare new licenses to be awarded in the Barents Sea. This, NNV's representative said, is the ultimate paradox in Norwegian climate politics: on the one hand, the Norwegian Storting ratifies the Paris agreement, and on the other, the government grants new licences to drill for oil. 'Perhaps Norway's efforts to stop climate change is not particularly admirable after all?', he asked, invoking the Norwegian institution of 'dugnad', where everyone contributes to the community they live in and roll up their sleeves to take part, rather than watch others do the work. He reminded the Committee that the Executive Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Christiana Figueres, just six months earlier had responded with a clear 'no' on a direct question of whether there was room for more Arctic oil within the limit of 2 degrees of global warming. He then presented a petition signed by most of the environmental NGOs in Norway, several church organisations, and one of the unions. Alongside demands for cuts in the transportation sector and Norway's role in the world, the Arctic got a special mention: as an Arctic state, it is of utmost importance that Norway leaves the Arctic oil in the ground.

NU and their allies, then, invoked a context that goes beyond the local. Their banner drew a correlation between oil drilling and melting ice, connecting petroleum development in the Arctic with global climate change; a reckless and irresponsible action towards them and future generations. Norway has a special responsibility to leave oil in the ground, act as a leader and show the way to decrease emissions and

meet the climate goals from Paris. To open new areas for development is to breach these agreements, as far as they are concerned.

Two different temporalities are at work here. The government opens new areas for the industry on the expectation new activity will transform into new income, jobs nationally and locally, and economic growth for the nation-state – a continuation of a great success which will last for another generation or more. The environmentalists invoke a temporality in which the carbon should be kept in the ground because the effects caused by CO_2 emissions from the oil and gas will lock carbon in the atmosphere long after current decision-makers have left their post; their concern is with future generations and a planet where global warming is limited as much as possible, and thresholds of climate agreements are not crossed. The government, on the other hand, appeared to see no conflict between ratifying the Paris agreement and unlocking carbon in the Barents Sea South East. The two did indeed take place as parallel processes, in different ministries and committees, in different locations, concerning different but entwined futures. One focused on the level of CO_2 in the atmosphere, the other on Norway's economy and its largest industry.

Regulating dissent

As Fabiana Li points out, the form and process of Environmental Impact Assessments 'enfolds individuals and institutions into itself regardless of whether or not they agree with its content' (Li 2015:204). The argument can be extended to the entire process of licencing rounds and petroleum extraction, as the Petroleum Act defines what kind of concerns are valid at different points in the process (see Appendix B). The law enables and regulates petroleum extraction, but also narrows the scope of concerns; climate change and the effects of emissions when exported out of Norway, are not part of the remit for impact assessments. Subsequently, attempts to bring these concerns into the process are dismissed in hearing rounds as they are considered externalities. Further,

Norway's petroleum industry is regulated within the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS); petroleum-related emissions within Norway will not, in theory, lead to increased emissions on a world basis, since Norway pays for a quota and this keeps carbon in the ground elsewhere. Climate change stays out of the equation.

At this point, it is worth casting our mind back to Chapter 2, and the work on the *Integrated management of the marine environment of the Barents Sea and the sea areas off the Lofoten Islands* (Ministry of the Environment 2006, revised in 2011). The plan is meant to ensure regulatory regimes with a special concern for vulnerable areas near land and closer to the sea ice, but expert advice from hearing rounds never made it into the actual plan (B. Dale 2016). In 2015, an updated map of the 'ice edge' sparked controversy amongst environmental organisations, scientists and the political opposition in Norway for 'moving the ice edge' further north, which would allow oil companies to drill in areas that would not be open if the map had not been redrawn (Steinberg and Kristoffersen 2017). None of the scientific evidence or advice led the government to change their mind. When the licences were announced in May, these northernmost blocks were indeed granted, despite the recommendations in the hearing round from the Norwegian Polar Institute and the Directorate of the Environment that they should not be opened for petroleum exploration (Miljødirektoratet 2014; Norsk Polarinstitutt 2014).

In a certain sense, then, the process of opening new areas for exploration is a kind of trapwork (cf. Gell 1988); it traps the citizen, industry, NGOs, local and national politicians alike in a *structure* which orders the development of petroleum – and thereby the imagined possibilities in the north – in ways which are articulated in the words of the Minister: oil is good for the nation and provides opportunities for growth in the north. Norwegian petroleum, furthermore, will not increase emissions worldwide, as the industry is nested within the quota system of carbon trading in the EU. This is a kind of structural power that structures not just consciousness, but the

entire political economy (cf. Wolf 1999). To challenge this *within the legislature* will only remain within the documents and in recordings of discussions, media clips, social media and retold narratives, such that counter-discourses, whether performed in the city of Hammerfest or in the Storting, are deflected by the procedures of the wider political process the particular event is part of. The presence of the environmental organisations may change the discourse around the event and bring climate change back into the frame, but their appearance is unable to halt the 23rd licencing round. Like the local youth who protested Snøhvit, they manage to show that not everyone agrees, but to actually stop the process remains out of their power as they perform their dissent.

Plot twist: Scaling up the legal

My analysis could end here, within the boundaries of a system of governance which structures opposition within its framework, and thereby keeps opposition to business-as-usual in check with at best tweaks to licencing rounds and stricter environmental regulations an outcome of their efforts. To an extent, such a perspective would seem to strengthen the idea that the Norwegian environmental movement gets co-opted into state practices (Dryzek et al. 2003), even those NGOs which are not funded by the state. But such a perspective is too narrow, as the movement also seeks other avenues of influence, which extend beyond my former analysis of local celebration, ritual creativity and symbolic rebellion. In the autumn of 2016, a plot twist that had been some years in the making was made public in a direct challenge of not just the government's policies, but their modes of operation and the structures that make petroleum extraction possible. Following this development makes it necessary to leave Hammerfest for a while, and follow the Barents Sea oil to Norway's capital and into the legal system:

On 16 October 2016, six months after the award ceremony in Hammerfest, Greenpeace and NU held a press conference in Oslo. In a room crammed full of journalists and supporters from other environmental organisations, they declared – in English as well as Norwegian – that they had just filed a lawsuit against the government because the new petroleum licences breach the environmental paragraph in the Norwegian Constitution, paragraph 112, which gives citizens the right to a viable environment for current and future generations:

> *Every person has the right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a natural environment whose productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural resources shall be managed on the basis of comprehensive long-term considerations which will safeguard this right for future generations as well.*

This was the first time the paragraph was used to contest a governmental decision in court, but the need, they announced, was great; by opening new areas for petroleum exploration in the north, the Norwegian government was committing an unacceptable deed against current and future generations. Alongside the environmentalists, the Norwegian author Jostein Gaarder, known for the international best-seller *Sophie's World,* gave a speech on the moral responsibility Norway has to the rest of the world. The international scientist-superstar James Hansen was flown in to be part of the global mobilisation of 'The People vs Arctic Oil', as the international campaign name titled itself. Also present were indigenous representatives, including from the Norwegian side of Sápmi. Though the formal plaintiffs were Greenpeace and NU, the first public act of the lawsuit made every effort to show the diversity of supporters nationally and internationally – a grassroots rather than NGO-controlled initiative.

We might see such a move as an attempt to 'draw accountability out of a complex system' (Fortun 2001:xvii), seeking a form of justice that is not granted through the

Figure 12. Greenpeace and NU with supporters after the press conference in Oslo. (Photo: Greenpeace)

avenues of political process, protest and lobbyism, but which gives the impression it should be there.

The case was filed to the Oslo District Court, and the court's acceptance soon after moved the petroleum debate, and the processes regulated by the Petroleum Act, onto a new arena of contestation. From here, other discourses and other arguments than those performed and contained within the business-as-usual process come to matter, within the boundary of the law rather than parliamentary politics. Bourdieu remarks; 'The judicial field is a social space organized around the conversion of direct conflict between directly concerned parties into judicially regulated debate between professionals acting by proxy' (1987:831). This is not so much stepping outside the document (cf. Li 2015), as it is stepping inside *other documents,* scaling the legal to a level where the state had not anticipated it would be challenged.

The lawsuit is one amongst a 'wave' of such lawsuits worldwide, which some social scientists refer to as 'climate change lawfare', seeing law as a tool for social transformation, contestation and seeking to prevent harm to vulnerable groups (Gloppen and St. Clair 2012; Vallejo and Gloppen 2013). Taking climate change to the courts brings what has been a political struggle into a new arena with the aim of creating transformation. One type of such mobilisation seeks to *change* the law, another to mobilise *within* it (ibid:909). The Norwegian lawsuit does the latter, appealing to the Constitution to bring climate change into the fold of what the Norwegian government is responsible for considering before opening new areas for petroleum exploration. The paragraph entered the Constitution in 1994, following a period of the environmental awareness when the Kyoto Protocol and *Our Common Future* (United Nations 1987) were produced. Until now, its wording has mostly been of symbolic value, but this changed in 2014, when a number of changes were made to the language of the Constitution to suitably meet its 200-year anniversary. The environmental paragraph moved from being 110b to its own paragraph, 112, with

stronger wording on a suitable environment as a right – and thereby a possibility of suing the state if it breaches this.

In more than one way, such a change was a gift to the environmental movement. Any constitutional change has to pass a vote in the Storting not once, but twice, in two different periods, making its democratic anchoring stronger than any other law (Sunde 2017). Should the Supreme Court rule that the 23rd licencing round breaches Paragraph 112, the politicians would have to change the law again to undo the power of the verdict, since the Constitution is *lex superior* (Thengs 2017), over and above all other laws by which Norway governs.

Much of the public debate has, on the other hand, centred around whether bringing climate into the courtroom is undemocratic or not. My interest in the following is what an appeal to such a law does to change the relations between humans, carbon, and the global, as well as that between environmental NGOs, the state and petroleum interests.

In the months following the lawsuit, the Norwegian public sphere was overrun with commentators, politicians and others claiming it was undemocratic by the environmentalists to sue the state just because they had not gotten their way (Aftenposten 2016; Kristjánsson 2016; VG 2016). Some feared the plaintiffs was were 'Americanising' Norwegian politics, and that this marked a turn where 'everything' could be brought to the courts should the lawsuit be approved and the environmentalists win (Braanen 2016). A government representative for the Conservative Party, Peter Frølich, wrote that they had made the Oslo District Court a 'theatre stage', and vowed to 'eat his hat' if they won the lawsuit (Frølich 2017). He thereby pointed to the theatrics of their strategy, but also willingly made himself an actor in the same; his bet that they would not win was performative in itself, albeit in a genre that is not unknown in politics. Others have argued that this is part of the democratic structure; the role of the courts is to keep the government in check, to

make sure they are abiding by their own laws (Martiniussen 2016; Sunde 2017). Even if the Storting had approved the Constitutional change, it was still unclear for some what the law would mean in practice.

During the lawsuit, the government's lawyer, Fredrik Sejersted, said that politicians would not have approved the paragraph had they known it could be used for this purpose and have such effects on the Norwegian petroleum sector. The plaintiffs disputed this by referring to the documents underpinning the initial wording and the new version of the Constitution; documents which matter for interpretation in the Norwegian system. The question in public debate revolved more around the staging and the stakes for the petroleum industry, than the question of planetary futures or Norway's responsibility in fulfilling the Paris agreement.

Disruptive interventions

A courtcase is an institutionalised performance, but the lawsuit concerned is the first of its kind in Norway, and thereby directly challenges the institutionalised way of managing Norway's petroleum resources for its disconnect from climate emissions on a global scale. Where the process of management plans and hearings form a power/knowledge nexus, where a certain kind of techno-scientific knowledge is the only legitimate governance tool (B. Dale 2011:14-15, Knol 2010, Jasanoff 1990), the environmental NGOs have moved the question *beyond* this framework and appealed to an institution which even the state cannot reject. By appealing to its highest law, it captures the state within its own legislation, and poses a peculiar democratic dilemma; the very same politicians which helped pass the updated legislation, disagree as to what it actually means. Some of the objections against the lawsuit must also be seen in this light; as this is, indeed, a performance the state cannot decide the outcome of.

It is precisely by appealing 'to the system' that the environmental organisations have staged a successfully disruptive intervention in the regime of petroleum governance. Questions in the field of law are – unlike discussions about politics, arts, sports, or politics – expected to be settled in a way where all parties have to bow to the conclusion (Graver 2011:12). By bringing the issue to the courts, Greenpeace and NU challenge not only which futures are morally better or worse, as when they create or participate in demonstrations and actions, but which futures are *legally* possible, aiming to outlaw their undesired future though the laws the state has made for itself.[48] To make the licences illegal would render void not only the ceremony in Hammerfest, where the Minister announced the licences, or the subsequent award by the King-in-Council, but also all the drilling activity which has happened in the time-space since awards were granted, the hundreds of millions invested by Statoil and other companies, and the thousands of litres of petrol and hours of work which has been used in the search for more black gold in Statoil's treasure map of the Barents Sea. It would, in effect, render the state ritual in Hammerfest void, and the announcements of drilling rights infelicitous.

(Towards a) conclusion: politics performed

The stakes were heightened in November 2017 in Oslo. The plaintiffs had planned daily events at a venue in Oslo in parallel with the court hearings, with debriefs from the day in court, debates, films, mini concerts, and other cultural events. Outside the court, they had commissioned an artwork by a Norwegian sculptor, a statue of ice with the environmental paragraph of the Constitution carved into it. Whether it was the statue, the people dressed in their national dress, the *bunad,* or the never-ending queue

[48] Greenpeace continued to protest in the Barents Sea, where they started their own political action by the Songa Enabler rig whilst it was drilling at Korpfjell, the northernmost licence in the summer of 2017. The legal pathway, through the Norwegian Constitution, is another tool in their toolbox, but does not preclude *other* means of stopping the oil companies from drilling in Arctic waters, even if these actions are largely symbolic.

outside the courtroom the government's lawyer appears to have lost his temper with the environmentalists. In court, he proclaimed that these *theatrics* were not anything the state wanted to be associated with. He called it an 'environmental-political performance', referring to the 'unnatural' number of events happening in relation to this lawsuit, from podcasts to ice sculptures. Waving a pamphlet his daughter had apparently been given on the street, he proclaimed this must be the first lawsuit in history with its own programme of events. His statement drew a clear line between the court proceedings and the events taking place outside the courtroom – but he also dismissed the environmentalists for not respecting the courtroom and the law, by making so much noise 'outside'. This is a judicial question, he emphasized, and the state will treat it *as that*; a question of the law.

Former Supreme Court Judge and legal aid for the plaintiffs, Ketil Lund, saw matters rather differently. In court, he stated that the environmental paragraph was a last bastion to protect us against politicians who were not fulfilling their duty to provide a safe environment for future generations, and heavily criticised the government's lawyer for his condescending and ridiculing tone. For the plaintiffs, the idea that the social order of the Norwegian system of governance would be overturned by such a lawsuit does not ring true. Rather, they see it as *within the law*, and within the system, to use environmental paragraph as a means of protecting the politicians against themselves and the rest of us against their lack of wisdom. An unstable climate system is a greater threat to the current social order, dangerous to the future of the planet and therefore the future of Norway as well as the rest of the world.

Oil lawsuits have a social life, as they circulate in spheres where no one actor can control how they become embedded in meaning-making across scales and formats (Davidov 2016:57). The issues discussed in the Oslo District Court call into question whether there is more at stake than simply right or wrong, guilty or not guilty. As I observed in a commentary following the court proceedings, the courtcase seemed to

expose contradictions and paradoxes in Norway's climate policies, where no one actor has or takes the responsibility for a problem which undermines the very conditions of future lives and livelihoods (Dale 2018a). The proceedings raise the question of who has the power to draw boundaries and reshape what is recognised as real, and brings into play the way responsibility and causation of climate change is understood; whether it can be attributed to oil from a specific place, or if it is divined away by the EU's Emission's Trading Scheme, where emissions from the Norwegian petroleum sector will keep carbon somewhere else in the ground.

In place of a chapter conclusion, I leave these statements hanging in mid-air, suspended in the plot twist that has yet to find a resolution. As professor of law at the University of Oslo, Hans Petter Graver, pointed out in a newspaper commentary, the courtroom is also a stage, where the public, not just the lawyers, are to be convinced. Perhaps the question is not so much whether this is a performance or not, but that this is *a performance the state does not control* (Graver 2017). We can only presume that the government's lawyer is aware of this – he acts by proxy, with the future of oil in the Barents Sea and Norway's petroleum management at stake.

Conclusion: Performing resource futures

Here is a lesson: What happens to people and what happens to the land is the same thing. (Hogan 1996)

My writing began *in medias res,* and this is also where it ends. At the outset of this thesis, I asked where academic work begins, when it lands itself in a colonial context not widely acknowledged as one. In many senses, I have also grappled with what it means to write an ethnography of petroleum expansion in a climate changed world, where any illusion that socio-cultural worlds can somehow be separated from natural worlds is dissolved (Chakrabarty 2009; Cruikshank 2005). These questions continue to make themselves present in my thinking and writing, as indeed also my world has shifted through the process of this research.

As we have seen throughout this thesis, stagings to marshal support for narratives is a strategy employed widely by different social actors, from politicians to environmentalists, petroleum companies and artists (Abeles 1988; Schechner 2006; Schieffelin 1996; Turner 1982). Their definitions of what is staged and what is serious, what is play and what is not, or what is theatre and what is reality, do not neatly correspond, even if they all assume to be operating within the same social field. This non-correspondence, the frictions and tensions between their understandings of what they themselves and others do, suggest that there is more at stake than figuring out the facts or measuring ripple effects of petroleum developments. As we could – and should – study the powerful because they influence the lives of so many (Nader 1972), we must ask what futures their actions in the present make possible, and what futures they exclude, shut down, and cancel out. We must also ask how their performed narratives are challenged in different ways, whether recognised as protest or not. And finally, we must ask how indigeneity is fronted or concealed, as this matters for the

narratives that catch and hold sway, and for how claims to rights and viability of livelihoods are seen, silenced, recognised and enacted.

Sitting in Georg's office in Hammerfest, I could understand his perspective on the development of the town and the buildings he saw popping up to create good lives for the inhabitants through the activities of the companies he worked with. Walking with Mari, I encountered different worlds displaced and made impossible by the very same development, worlds which she was still fighting for through environmental activism and everyday acts of continued life within her changed homestead. Speaking with frustrated members of NU who knew that the Minister of Petroleum and Energy wielded a power they could not stop through lobbying and public demonstrations alone, highlighted the efficaciousness and limits of their respective performances. Later, whilst listening to the lawyer of the Norwegian government proclaim that the actions outside the courtroom were mere performances, I became aware of how similar they act in their differences, how the ways in which people defend their notion of a 'good' society comes in a variety of strategies that fail to fall into neat categories.

Seen together, such perspectives yield important insights and provocations for further discussions about what is at stake in the development of large-scale resource projects. Beyond the narratives of policy documents and the measurements of impact assessments, we need to ask how they are understood by social actors, and what social lives they lead as they weave through local perceptions and understandings in Hammerfest. We need to ask how Hammerfest and the Barents Sea is understood through the performances conducted at industry events, and how state rituals are modified and creatively engage with crafting a narrative of petroleum as a future driver in the Barents Sea. None of these are neutral undertakings: they are deliberately and carefully crafted to have an effect on the world they see themselves as operating in.

We spiral round, not exactly to where we started, but a point close to it: asking what it means to see certain social events as performances, without collapsing everything into stage drama. Rituals of state and stagings of environmentalists and industry are comparable, but that does not make them equal. An environmentalist's motivation for staging their environmental-political performance is different, and often diametrically opposite, to the petroleum-political performances of Statoil, Eni and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. It is not my claim that the events analysed in this thesis 'really is' theatre, but rather that analysing them *as performance* shows where these different actors share strategies, and where they differ in their tools, tactics, expressions, and self-understandings.

Across double binds and differences, indigenous, non-indigenous, environmentalism and industry, their actions contain the making of the future, collectively performed and constituted. The thesis might conclude here, but the performances of resource futures, and my work to understand them, continue.

Bibliography

Abeles, Marc. 1988. 'Modern Political Ritual: Ethnography of an Inauguration and a Pilgrimage by President Mitterrand'. *Current Anthropology* 29(3):391–404.

Abram, Simone. 2011. *Culture and Planning*. Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Abram, Simone and Marianne Elisabeth Lien. 2011. 'Performing Nature at World's Ends'. *Ethnos* 76(1):3–18.

Abram, Simone and Gina Weszkalnys. 2013. 'Elusive Promises: Planning in the Contemporary World An Introduction'. Pp. 1–33 in *Elusive Promises: Planning in the Contemporary World*. New York ;Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Aftenposten. 2016. 'Aftenposten Mener: Domstolene skal ikke styre klimapolitikken'. *Aftenposten*, October 25.

aks.no. n.d. 'Et Signalbygg: Arktisk Kultursenter'. Retrieved 11 June 2018 (http://www.aks.no/om-huset.154477.no.html).

Akvaplan-niva. 2011. *Konsekvenser for det marine miljøet i Repparfjorden ved etablering av sjø- eller landdeponi for gruveavgang fra Nussir og Ulveryggen i Kvalsund Kommune, Finnmark*. Tromsø.

Amundsen, Terje. 2012. 'Snøhvits Lange Oppvåkning'. *Lokalhistorisk Magasin* 3:4–8.

Andenæs, Johs and Arne Fliflet. 2004. *Statsforfatningen i Norge*. 9th ed. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Andersen, Gisle. 2017. *Parlamentets Natur*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Anderson, David G. and Mark Nuttall. 2004. 'Cultivating Arctic Landscapes : Knowing and Managing Animals in the Circumpolar North'. xvi, 238 p.

Andersson, Atle. 2002. 'Natur og Ungdom klar for aksjoner og sammenstøt'. *Bergens Tidende*, March 7.

Appel, Hannah. 2012. 'Offshore Work: Oil, Modularity, and the How of Capitalism in Equatorial Guinea'. *American Ethnologist* 39(4):692–709.

Asdal, Kristin. 2015. 'What Is the Issue? The Transformative Capacity of Documents'. *Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory* 16(1):74–90.

Asplan Viak/Barlindhaug Consult. 2001. 'Konsekvensutredning Snøhvit: Lokale Samfunnsmessige Konsekvenser i Hammerfest.'

Aure, Marit. 2015. *Goliat og stedsattraktivitet: En analyse av tilflytting til Hammerfest. Rapport 27 : 2015.* Tromsø.

Austin, J. L. 1962. *How to Do Things with Words : The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Ballard, Chris and Glenn Banks. 2003. 'Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining'. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 32:287–313.

Barry, Andrew. 2013. *Material Politics Disputes along the Pipeline*. Malden, Mass.; Oxford; Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.
Barry, Andrew. 2015. 'The Oil Archives'. Pp. 95–107 in *Subterranean estates : life worlds of oil and gas*, edited by H. Appel, A. Mason, and M. Watts. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
Barstad, Stine. 2015. 'Denne Kostet 3 Liv Og 15 Milliarder Mer Enn Planlagt'. *Aftenposten*, April 17.
Basso, Keith H. 1996. *Wisdom Sits in Places : Landscape and Language among the Western Apache*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
Bastien, Betty, Jürgen W. Kremer, Rauna Kuokkanen, and Patricia Vickers. 2003. 'Healing the Impact of Colonization, Genocide, and Racism on Indigenous Populations.' in *The Psychological impact of war trauma on civilians. An international perspective.*, edited by S. Krippner and T. M. McIntyre. Westport: Praeger.
Bauman, Richard and Charles L. Briggs. 1990. 'Poetics and Performance as Critical Perspectives on Language and Social Life'. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 19:59–88.
Beach, Hugh. 1994. 'The Saami of Lapland'. Pp. 150–94 in *Polar peoples : self-determination & development*. London: Minority Rights Publications.
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society : Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.
Behrends, Andrea, Stephen P. Reyna, and Günther Schlee. 2011. *Crude Domination: An Anthropology of Oil*. New York: Beghahn Books.
Bender, Barbara. 1993. *Landscape : Politics and Perspectives*. Providence, R.I: Berg.
Bendixen, André and Kristin Forland. 2017. 'Redd Goliat-Problem Kan Bremse Oljeutvinning i Nord'. *NRK Finnmark*, January 5.
Benjaminsen, Tor A., Hugo Reinert, Espen Sjaastad, and Mikkel Nils Sara. 2015. 'Misreading the Arctic Landscape: A Political Ecology of Reindeer, Carrying Capacities, and Overstocking in Finnmark, Norway'. *Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - Norwegian Journal of Geography* 69(4):219–29.
Berglund, Eeva. 1998. *Knowing Nature, Knowing Science: An Ethnography of Environmental Activism*. Cambridge: White Horse Press.
Betti, Marianna. 2018. 'What Lies below: The Politics of Resource Conflict in Turkana, Kenya'. Pp. 159–76 in *Energy, Resource Extraction and Society: Impacts and Contested Futures*, edited by A. Szolucha. New York: Routledge.
Bjartnes, Anders. 2015. *Det Grønne Skiftet*. Oslo: Frekk forlag.
Bjerkli, Bjørn and Per Selle. 2015. *Samepolitikkens Utvikling*. Oslo: Gyldendal.
Bjørklund, Ivar. 1985. *Fjordfolket i Kvænangen : fra samisk samfunn til norsk utkant, 1550-1980*. Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget.

Bjørklund, Ivar. 2016a. '«Er Ikke Blodet Mitt Bra Nok?» - Om Etniske Konstruksjoner Og Identitetsforvaltning i Sápmi'. *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 33(1–2):8–20.
Bjørklund, Ivar. 2016b. 'Fra Formynder Til Forhandler: Om Inngrep, Konsekvensanalyser Og "Balansert Sameksistens"'. Pp. 177–94 in *Samisk reindrift, norske myter*, edited by T. A. Benjaminsen, I. M. G. Eira, and M. N. Sara. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
Bjørklund, Ivar. 2017a. 'Arctic Frontiers - Eller Kunsten å Overleve Med 75 Rein'. *Nordnorsk Debatt*, February 2.
Bjørklund, Ivar. 2017b. 'Landsmøtet i 1917 Og Samebevegelsen i Nord'. *Heimen* 54(02):121–29.
Bjørklund, Ivar and Terje Brantenberg. 1981. *Samisk Reindrift - Norske Inngrep: Om Altaelva, Reindrift Og Samisk Kultur*. Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget.
Bjørklund, Ivar and Harald Eidheim. 1998. 'Om Reinmerker - Kulturelle Sammenhenger Og Norsk Jus i Sápmi'. *Reindriftsnytt* 32(2):25–33.
Björkman, Lisa. 2015. 'The Ostentatious Crowd: Public Protest as Mass-Political Street Theatre in Mumbai'. *Critique of Anthropology* 35(2):142–65.
Bjørst, Lill Rastad. 2016. 'Saving or Destroying the Local Community? Conflicting Spatial Storylines in the Greenlandic Debate on Uranium'. *The Extractive Industries and Society* 3(1):34–40.
Bloch, Maurice. 1989. *Ritual, History, and Power: Selected Papers in Anthropology*. London: Athlone.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. edited by J. Goody. Cambridge University Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. *Language and Symbolic Power*. edited by J. B. Thompson. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996. *Symbolsk Makt : Artikler i Utvalg*. edited by A. Prieur. Oslo: Pax.
Brenli, Erik. 2016. 'Nussir har ført Wikstrøm inn i samemanntallet' *Sagat*, April 22.
Brody, Hugh. 1986. *Maps and Dreams*. New York: Pantheon Books.
Braanen, Bjørgulv. 2016. 'Leder: Miljøsøksmål'. *Klassekampen*, October 20.
Burkett, Maxine. 2016. 'Climate Disobedience'. *Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum* 27:1–50.
Butler, Judith. 1993. *Bodies That Matter : On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'*. New York: Routledge.
Butler, Judith. 1997. *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*. London; New York: Routledge.
Callon, Michel. 1984. 'Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay'. *The Sociological Review* 32(1_suppl):196–233.

Callon, Michel. 1998. 'Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics'. *The Sociological Review* 46(S1):1–57.
Callon, Michel. 2006. *What Does It Mean to Say That Economics Is Performative?* Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation (CSI), Mines ParisTech.
Carney, Mark. 2015. 'Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – Climate Change and Financial Stability'. Speech given by Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England Chairman of the Financial Stability Board.
Carsten, Janet and Stephen Hugh-Jones. 1995. 'Introduction'. Pp. 1–46 in *About the House: Lévi-Strauss and Beyond*, edited by J. Carsten and S. Hugh-Jones. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2009. 'The Climate of History: Four Theses'. *Critical Inquiry* 35(2):197–222.
Choy, Tim. 2011. 'Ecologies of Comparison'. Durham: Duke University Press.
Comaroff, Jean and John Comaroff. 2003. 'Ethnography on an Awkward Scale: Postcolonial Anthropology and the Violence of Abstraction'. *Ethnography* 4(2):147–79.
Comaroff, John L. and Jean Comaroff. 1992. *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination*. edited by J. Comaroff. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.
Connerton, Paul. 1989. *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Coronil, Fernando. 1997. *The Magical State : Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cross, Jamie. 2014. 'The Coming of the Corporate Gift'. *Theory, Culture & Society* 31(2–3):121–45.
Cruikshank, Julie. 2005. *Do Glaciers Listen? : Local Knowledge, Colonial Encounters, and Social Imagination*. Vancouver; Seattle: UBC Press ; University of Washington Press.
Daes, Erica-Irene. 2003. 'Globalization, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples'. *Indigenous Peoples: Resource Management and Global Rights* 67–73.
Dale, Brigt. 2011. 'Securing a Contingent Future : How Threats, Risks and Identity Matter in the Debate over Petroleum Development in Lofoten, Norway.' University of Tromsø.
Dale, Brigt. 2016. 'Governing Resources, Governing Mentalities. Petroleum and the Norwegian Integrated Ecosystem-Based Management Plan for the Barents and Lofoten Seas in 2011'. *The Extractive Industries and Society* 3(1):9–16.
Dale, Brigt and Gisle Andersen. 2018. 'Til Dovre Faller? Norsk olje og grønn omstilling'. Pp. 27–44 in *Grønn omstilling - norske veivalg*, edited by H. Haarstad and G. Rusten. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Dale, Ragnhild Freng. 2013. '"Tydelig Utydelighet: Prosess Og Kroppsteknikk i Fysisk Teater"'. *Betwixt and Between: Sosialantropologistudentenes Tidsskrift 23: 2013*.
Dale, Ragnhild Freng. 2015. 'Sámi Grassroots Fight for Indigenous Rights in Paris'. *New Internationalist Magazine*, December 13.
Dale, Ragnhild Freng. 2018a. 'Makten, æren og oljelandet'. *Scenekunst.No*, January 10.
Dale, Ragnhild Freng. 2018b. 'Petroleum in the Barents Region: Local Impacts and Dreams at Sea'. Pp. 37–52 in *Energy, Resource Extraction and Society: Impacts and Contested Futures*, edited by A. Szolucha. Oxon: Routledge.
Dankertsen, Astri. 2016. 'Fragments of the Future. Decolonization in Sami Everyday Life'. *Kult* 23–37.
Dannevig, Halvor and Brigt Dale. 2018. 'The Nussir Case and the Battle for Legitimacy: Scientific Assessments, Defining Power and Political Contestation'. Pp. 151–74 in *The Will to Drill - Mining in Arctic Communities*, edited by B. Dale, I. Bay-Larsen, and B. Skorstad. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Davidov, Veronica. 2016. 'Social Lives and Symbolic Capital: Indigenous "Oil Lawsuits" as Sites of Order and Disorder Making'. 60(3):57–75.
Democracy Now! 2015. "The People vs. Exxon: As Fossil Fuel Cover-Up Exposed, Activists Try Oil Giant for 'Climate Crimes'. *Democracy Now!*
Department of Finance. 2002. 'Letter to Efta Surveillance Authority, Additional Information, 30.04.2002.'
Dolan, Catherine and Dinah Rajak. 2011. 'The Anthropology of Corporate Social Responsibilty.' *Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology* 60:3–8.
Dryzek, John S., David Downes, Christian Hunold, David Schlosberg, and Hans-Kristian Hernes. 2003. *Green States and Social Movements : Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eco, Umberto. 1977. 'Semiotics of Theatrical Performance'. *The Drama Review: TDR* 21(1):107–17.
Edelman, Marc. 2001. 'Social Movements: Changing Paradigms and Forms of Politics'. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 30:285–317.
Eidheim, Harald. 1969. 'When Ethnic Identity Is a Social Stigma'. Pp. 39–57 in *Ethnic groups and boundaries : the social organization of culture difference*, edited by F. Barth. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Eidheim, Harald. 1971. *Aspects of the Lappish Minority Situation*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Eikeland, Sveinung. 2014. 'Building a High North Growth Pole: The Northern Norwegian City of Hammerfest in the Wake of Developing the "Snow White" Barents Sea Gas Field'. *Journal of Rural and Community Development* 9(1):57–71.

Eikeland, Sveinung, Stig Halgeir Karlstad, Christen Ness, Trygve Nilsen, and Inge Berg Nilssen. 2009. *Dette Er Snøhvit. Sluttrapport Fra Følgeforsknigen 2002-2008. Rapport 2009:3*. Alta: Norut.

Eilertsen, Kaia. 2015. 'Ungdom Mot Goliat'. *Altaposten*, April 23.

Elenius, Lars, Hallvard. Tjelmeland, Maria. Lähteenmäki, and Alexey. Golubev. 2015. *The Barents Region : A Transnational History of Subarctic Northern Europe*. Oslo: Pax Forlag AS.

Eni Norge. n.d. 'Welfare.' Retrieved 20 June 2018 (http://www.eninorge.com/en/Jobs/Opportunities-with-Eni1/).

Eythórsson, Einar. 2003. *Petroleumsvirksomhet i Lofoten – Barentshavet Og Samiske Forhold*.

Ferguson, James. 1999. *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt*. University of California Press.

Ferguson, James. 2005. 'Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa'. *American Anthropologist* 107(3):377–82.

Finnmark Dagblad. 2008. 'SMS Message. Unkown Sender'. August 27.

Fiskarlaget. 2017a. 'Krever Seismikkstans: Blåkveitefisket'. *Fiskarlaget.No*, May 19.

Fiskarlaget. 2017b. 'Sterk Olje Uro – 24. Konsesjonsrunde'. *Fiskarlaget.No*, May 3.

Foresight Finnmark. 2013. *Finnmark 2033. Fire Scenarier*.

Fortun, Kim. 2001. 'Advocacy after Bhopal Environmentalism, Disaster, New Global Orders'.

Fortun, Kim. 2014. 'From Latour to Late Industrialism'. *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory* 4(1):309–29.

Fouché, Gwladys. 2006. 'The Rampaging Reindeer of Hammerfest'. *The Guardian*, June 26.

Frynas, Jedrzej George. 2009. *Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frølich, Peter. 2017. 'Hold klimakampen unna domstolene'. *Bergens Tidende*, November 22.

Gatt, Caroline. 2018. *An Ethnography of Global Environmentalism: Becoming Friends of the Earth*. New York ;Oxon: Taylor & Francis.

Geertz, Clifford. 1972. 'Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight'. *Daedalus* 101(1):1–37.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures : Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books.

Gell, Alfred. 1988. 'Technology and Magic'. *Anthropology Today* 4(2):6–9.

Gilberthorpe, Emma and Dinah Rajak. 2017. 'The Anthropology of Extraction: Critical Perspectives on the Resource Curse'. *The Journal of Development Studies*

53(2):186–204.
Gledhill, John. 2000. *Power and Its Disguises : Anthropological Perspectives on Politics*. London: London: Pluto Press.
Gloppen, Siri and Asuncion Lera St. Clair. 2012. 'Climate Change Lawfare'. *Social Research* 79(4):899–930.
Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis : An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Graeber, David. 2004. *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*.
Graver, Hans Petter. 2011. *Hva Er Rett*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Graver, Hans Petter. 2017. 'Politisk Justis'. *Morgenbladet*, November 24.
Greaker, Mads and Knut Einar Rosendahl. 2017. *Petroleumsvirksomhet i Barentshavet Sørøst – Om Klima, økonomi og sysselsetting*. Oslo: Greenpeace.
Greenpeace. 2004. '"Greenpeace krever Goliatstopp fra Eni i Italia".' *Greenpeace.No*. Retrieved 11 August 2018 (http://www.greenpeace.org/norway/no/press/releases/greenpeace-krever-goliatstopp/).
Grendstad, Gunnar, Per Selle, Kristin Strømsnes, and Øystein Bortne. 2006. *Unique Environmentalism : A Comparative Perspective*. Boston: Boston, MA: Springer.
Gullestad, Marianne. 1996. *Hverdagsfilosofer : verdier, selvforståelse og samfunnssyn i det moderne Norge*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Gullestad, Marianne. 1989. *Kultur og hverdagsliv : på sporet av det moderne Norge*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Gullestad, Marianne. 1992. *The Art of Social Relations: Essays on Culture, Social Action and Everyday Life in Norway*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
Gaare, Kim. 2015. 'Politiet rykket ut til «snodig oppførsel» fra tre personer'. *Finnmark Dagblad*, April 17.
Hale, Charles. 2001. 'What Is Activist Research?' *Social Science Research Council. 2. 13-15.*
Hale, Charles R. 2006. 'Activist Research v. Cultural Critique: Indigenous Land Rights and the Contradictions of Politically Engaged Anthropology'. *Cultural Anthropology* 21(1):96–120.
Hammerfest kommune. 2001. *Snøhvitsamfunnet. Plan for Sosiale, Helse-/Trivselsmessige Og Kulturelle Forhold i Utbyggingsfasen 2002 – 2006.*
Hammerfest kommune. 2015. 'Særutskrift- Høring om Eiendomsbeskatning av arbeidsmaskiner mv. i verk og bruk. Letter from Hammerfest Municipality to the Department of Finance, 04.09.2015.'
Hammerfest kommune. 2016. *Økonomiplan 2016-2019*. Hammerfest.
Handelman, Don. 1974. 'A Note on Play'. *American Anthropologist* 76(1):66–68.

Handelman, Don. 1977. 'Play and Ritual: Complemetary Frames of Meta-Communication'. Pp. 185–92 in *It's a Funny Thing, Humour*, edited by A. J. Chapman and H. Foot. London: Pergamon.
Handelman, Don and Bruce Kapferer. 1972. 'Forms of Joking Activity: A Comparative Approach'. *American Anthropologist* 74(3):484–517.
Hanisch, Tore Jørgen. and Gunnar. Nerheim. 1992. *Norsk oljehistorie. Bind 1*. Oslo: Norsk Petroleumsforening.
Helander-Renvall, Elina. 2016. *Sámi Society Matters*. Rovaniemi: Lapland University Press.
Hellesvik, Jarl. 2016. *Samer og samepolitikk*. Oslo: Kolofon.
Henriksen, Georg. 1985. 'Anthropologists as Advocates - Promoters of Pluralism or Makers of Clients?' Pp. 119–29 in *Advocacy and Anthropology: first encounters*, edited by R. Paine. St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research.
Henriksen, Georg. 2003. 'Consultancy and Advocacy as Radical Anthropology'. *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice* 47(1):116–23.
Henriksen, Therese. 2010. 'Den som tier samtykker? : Samiske erfaringer fra Snøhvit'. University of Tromsø.
Henriksen, Therese and Hans-Kristian Hernes. 2011. 'Snøhvit - Eventyr i Sameland?' Pp. 189–201 in *Hvor går Nord-Norge? Tidsbilder fra en landsdel i forandring.* Stamsund.
Hersoug, Bjørn. 2010. 'Fisk Og/Eller Olje?' in *Oljevirksomhetens inntog i nord*, edited by P. Arbo and B. Hersoug. Oslo: Gyldendal akademisk.
Herzfeld, Michael. 1991. *A Place in History : Social and Monumental Time in a Cretan Town*. Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press.
Hoëm, Ingjerd. 2009. 'Ritualised Performances as Total Social Facts; the House of Multiple Spirits in Tokelau'. Pp. 203–22 in *Ritual Communication*, edited by G. Senft and E. B. Basso. Oxford: Berg.
Hogan, L. 1996. *Dwellings: A Spiritual History of the Living World*. Simon & Schuster.
Holm, Petter, Kathrine Tveiterås, Bjørn-Petter Finstad, and Edgar Henriksen. 2013. 'Lys i husan? Fisk og petroleum som modernitetsbærere i nord'. Pp. 361–72 in *Hvor går Nord-Norge? Bind 3. Politiske tidslinjer*. Stamsund: Orkana Forlag.
Holmberg, Aslak. 2018. 'Bivdit Luosa – To Ask for Salmon. Saami Traditional Knowledge on Salmon and the River Deatnu: In Research and Decision-Making'. Tromsø: UiT The Arctic University of Norway.
Holthaus, Eric. 2015. 'Kayaktivism'. *Slate.Com*, May 19.
Hommels, Anique. 2005. 'Studying Obduracy in the City: Toward a Productive Fusion between Technology Studies and Urban Studies'. *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 30(3):323–51.
Hornborg, Alf. 2017. 'Dithering While the Planet Burns: Anthropologists' Approaches

to the Anthropocene'. *Reviews in Anthropology* 1–17.
Hovland, Arild. 2000. *Moderne urfolk : samisk ungdom i bevegelse*. Oslo: UNGforsk/NOVA : Cappelen Akademisk Forlag.
Hungnes, H., D. Kolsrud, J. Nitter-Hauge, B. Prestmo, and B. Strøm. 2016. *Ringvirkninger Av Petroleumsnæringen i Norsk Økonomi.* Oslo: SSB.
Ibenholt, Karin, Ingeborg Rasmussen, and John Magne Skjelvik. 2016. *Gruvedrift Ved Repparfjorden – Gjennomgang Av Utredninger Om Samfunnsmessige Konsekvenser*. Oslo: Vista Analyse.
Igoe, J. 2010. 'The Spectacle of Nature in the Global Economy of Appearances: Anthropological Engagements with the Spectacular Mediations of Transnational Conservation'. *Critique of Anthropology* 30(4):375–97.
Ihlen, Øyvind. 2007. *Petroleumsparadiset : norsk oljeindustris strategiske kommunikasjon og omdømmebygging*. Oslo: Unipub.
Ihlen, Øyvind and Heidi von Weltzien Hoivik. 2015. 'Ye Olde CSR: The Historic Roots of Corporate Social Responsibility in Norway'. *Journal of Business Ethics* 127(1):109–20.
IMDi. 2018. 'Integreringen i Hammerfest Kommune [Integration in Hammerfest Municipality]'. *Statistics Norway*.
Ingold, Tim. 2000. *The Perception of the Environment : Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill*. London: Routledge.
International Energy Agency. 2016. *World Energy Outlook. Executive Summary*.
Irvine, Richard D. G. and Mina Gorji. 2013. 'John Clare in the Anthropocene'. *The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology* 31(1):119–32.
Jacobsen, Alf R. 1996. *Fra brent jord til Klondyke*. Universitetsforl.
Jacobsen, Alf R. 2010. *Snøhvit : Historien om olje og gass i Barentshavet*. edited by Statoil. Oslo: Statoil.
Jansen, Eystein. 2016. *Klimaendringer og klimarisiko. Kunnskapsstatus 2016 Klimafaglig Bakgrunnsnotat.* Bergen.
Jensen, Leif Christian. 2007. 'Petroleum Discourse in the European Arctic: The Norwegian Case'. *Polar Record* 43(03):247–54.
Jensen, Leif Christian. 2011. 'Norwegian Petroleum Extraction in Arctic Waters to Save the Environment: Introducing "Discourse Co-Optation" as a New Analytical Term'. *Critical Discourse Studies* 9(1):29–38.
Jensen, Leif Christian and Geir Hønneland. 2011. 'Framing the High North: Public Discourses in Norway after 2000'. *Acta Borealia* 28(1):37–54.
Jensen, Leif Christian and Berit Kristoffersen. 2013. 'Nord-Norge som ressursprovins: Storpolitikk, risiko og virkelighetskamp'. Pp. 67–80 in *Hvor går Nord-Norge? Politiske tidslinjer*, edited by S. Jentoft, K. A. Røvik, and J.-I. Nergård. Stamsund:

Orkana Forlag.
Jentoft, Svein. 2013. 'På sporet av Nord-Norge'. Pp. 431–44 in *Hvor går Nord-Norge? Bind 3. Politiske tidslinjer*. Stamsund: Orkana Forlag.
Joakimsen, Sverre. 2013. 'Endelig kunne de juble'. *Finnmarksposten*, February 14.
Johnsen, Kathrine Ivsett, Tor A. Benjaminsen, and Inger Marie Gaup Eira. 2015. 'Seeing like the State or like Pastoralists? Conflicting Narratives on the Governance of Sámi Reindeer Husbandry in Finnmark, Norway'. *Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - Norwegian Journal of Geography* 69(4):230–41.
Joks, Solveig and John Law. 2017. 'Sámi Salmon, State Salmon: TEK, Technoscience and Care'. *The Sociological Review* 65(2_suppl):150–71.
Junka-Aikio, Laura. 2018. 'Indigenous Culture Jamming: Suohpanterror and the Articulation of Sami Political Community'. *Journal of Aesthetics & Culture* 10(4):1379849.
Juris, Jeffrey S. 2015. 'Embodying Protest: Culture and Performance within Social Movements BT - Anthropology, Theatre, and Development: The Transformative Potential of Performance'. Pp. 82–104 in, edited by A. Flynn and J. Tinius. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Jørstad, Svein. 2015a. 'Flaggene går til topps for Goliat'. *Finnmark Dagblad*, April 17.
Jørstad, Svein. 2015b. 'Oljeframtid i Nord – Drøm Eller Realisme?' in *'Nye løft i nord'. Supplement to Finnmark Dagblad on the occasion of the Barents Sea Conference, 20.-22.04.2015.*, edited by S. Jørstad.
Jørstad, Svein. 2016a. '-Her har jeg kokt mye fiskesuppe'. *Finnmark Dagblad*, May 21.
Jørstad, Svein. 2016b. *Fortsatt Framtid i Nord. Supplement to Finnmark Dagblad on the Occasion of the Barents Sea Conference, 18.-20.04.2016*.
Jørstad, Svein. 2016c. 'Mot Strømmen i Nord.' in *'Fortsatt framtid i nord'. Supplement to Finnmark Dagblad on the occasion of the Barents Sea Conference, 18.-20.04.2016.*, edited by S. Jørstad.
Kapferer, B. 1988. *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia*. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Kershaw, Baz. 1992. *The Politics of Performance : Radical Theatre as Cultural Intervention*. London: Routledge.
Kielland, Ingrid Røise. 2017. *Natur Og Ungdom : Aksjonene som endret norsk miljøkamp*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm.
Kirsch, Stuart. 2002. 'Anthropology and Advocacy: A Case Study of the Campaign against the Ok Tedi Mine'. *Critique of Anthropology* 22(2):175–200.
Kirsch, Stuart. 2010. 'Sustainable Mining'. *Dialectical Anthropology* 34(1):87–93.
Klick, Matthew K. 2009. *The Political Economy of Corporate Social Responsibility and*

Community Development: A Case Study of Norway's Snøhvit Natural Gas Complex. Oslo.
Klo, Allan and Amund Trellevik. 2015. 'Stopper regjeringens skatteendring: Hammerfest kan juble for 218 millioner Kroner'. *NRK*, September 3.
Knol, Maaike and Peter Arbo. 2014. 'Oil Spill Response in the Arctic: Norwegian Experiences and Future Perspectives'. *Marine Policy* 50:171–77.
Knudsen, Ståle. 2014. 'Is Escobar's Territories of Difference Good Political Ecology? On Anthropological Engagements with Environmental Social Movements'. *Social Analysis* 58(2):78–107.
Kongsnes, Ellen and Elisabeth Seglem. 2015. 'Er det selve oljeeventyret som seiler inn?' *Stavanger Aftenblad*, April 18.
KonKraft. 2016a. *Nordover - Norsk Sokkel i endring. KonKraftRapport 2016 - 1*.
KonKraft. 2016b. *North and the Norwegian Continental Shelf -Introduction, Summary and Recommendations*.
Kramvig, Britt. 2005a. 'Fleksible kategorier, fleksible liv'. *Norsk Antropologisk Tidsskrift* (2–3):97–108.
Kramvig, Britt. 2005b. 'The Silent Language of Ethnicity'. *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 8(1):45–64.
Kristjánsson, Mimir. 2016. 'Leder: Søksmål'. *Klassekampen*, October 24.
Kristoffersen, Berit. 2014. '"Securing" Geography: Framings, Logics and Strategies in the Norwegian High North'. Pp. 131–48 in *Polar geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes*, edited by R. C. Powell and K. Dodds. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Kristoffersen, Berit. 2015. 'Opportunistic Adaptation'. Pp. 140–59 in *The Adaptive Challenge of Climate Change*, edited by E. Selboe and K. O'Brien. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kristoffersen, Berit and Brigt Dale. 2014. 'Post Petroleum Security in Lofoten: How Identity Matters'. *Arctic Review on Law and Politics* 5(2):201–6.
Kristoffersen, Berit and Oluf Langhelle. 2017. 'Sustainable Development as a Global-Arctic Matter: Imaginaries and Controversies. *Governing Arctic Change: Global Perspectives*. Pp. 21–41 in, edited by K. Keil and S. Knecht. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Lahn, Bård. 2017. *Redusert oljeutvinning som klimatiltak: faglige og politiske Perspektiver*. Oslo: CICERO.
Latour, Bruno and Steve Woolgar. 1979. *Laboratory Life : The Social Construction of Scientific Facts*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Lerkelund, Helga. 2018. *Skandalefeltet Goliat - Sviket mot Barentshavet*. Oslo: Naturvernforbundet.

Lien, Marianne. 2001. 'Likhet og verdighet, gavebytte og integrasjon i Båtsfjord.' in *Likhetens Paradokser, Antropologiske undersøkelser i det moderne Norge*, edited by M. Lien, H. Vidén, and H. Vike. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Lien, Marianne Elisabeth and John Law. 2011. '"Emergent Aliens": On Salmon, Nature, and Their Enactment'. *Ethnos* 76(1):65–87.

Liliequist, Marianne and Coppélie Cocq. 2014. 'Samisk kamp för kulturell överlevnad'. *Kulturella perspektiv - Svensk etnologisk tidskrift* 23(1):2–4.

Loe, Julia S. P. and Ilan Kelman. 2016. 'Arctic Petroleum's Community Impacts: Local Perceptions from Hammerfest, Norway'. *Energy Research & Social Science* 16:25–34.

Lorentzen, Marius and Kjetil Malkenes Hovland. 2017. 'Slik vil Eni sikre suksess for kjempefeltet i Barentshavet'. *E24*, April 25.

Lund, Svein. 2015. *Gull, Gråstein og Grums: Bind 1 - Omstridde Gruver*. Kárášjohka: Dávvi Girji.

Lund, Svein, Elfrid Boine, Siri Broch Johansen, and Siv Rasmussen. 2009. *Samisk Skolehistorie 4*. edited by S. Lund, E. Boine, S. B. Johansen, and S. Rasmussen. Kárášjohka: Dávvi Girji.

Lynch, Michael. 1999. 'Archives in Formation: Privileged Spaces, Popular Archives and Paper Trails'. *History of the Human Sciences* 12(2):65–87.

Løvås, Jostein. 2017. '«Vi Lager et Skattekart»'. *Dagens Næringsliv*, July 3.

MacEacheran, Mike. 2017. 'The Norwegian Town the World Tried to Erase'. *BBC*, December 4.

Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1922. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific : An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Martiniussen, Erik. 2016. 'Klimasøksmålet: Aftenposten, VG og Klassekampen bygger på misforståelser'. *Energi Og Klima*, November 2.

Mauss, Marcel. 1954. *The Gift : Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies / by Marcel Mauss. Translated by Ian Cunnison. With an Introduction to E. E. Evans-Pritchard*. London: Cohen & West.

McGlade, Christophe and Paul Ekins. 2015. 'The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused When Limiting Global Warming to 2 [Deg]C'. *Nature* 517(7533):187–90.

McNeish, John-Andrew and Owen Logan. 2012. *Flammable Societies: Studies on the Socio-Economics of Oil and Gas*. edited by J.-A. McNeish and O. Logan. London: Pluto Press.

Michaels, Axel. 2007. 'Perfection and Mishaps in Vedic Rituals'. in *When Rituals go Wrong: Mistakes, Failure, and the Dynamics of Ritual*, edited by U. Hüsken.

Leiden: Brill.
Michaelsen, Espen. 2007. 'Snøhvit: Et Subsidiert Distriktstiltak Eller Økonomisk Eventyr? – En Studie Av Tre Avisers Innramming Av Snøhvitdebatten'. *Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift* 23(04):371–93.
Midttun, Atle and Svein Kamfjord. 1999. 'Energy and Environmental Governance under Ecological Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Nordic Countries.' *Public Administration* 77:873–95.
Mikkelsen, Magnar. 1980. *Elva Skal Leve*. Oslo: Cappelen.
Miljødirektoratet. 2014. 'Forslag Til Utlysning i 23. Konsesjonsrunde. Miljødirektoratets Vurdering Av de Foreslåtte Blokkene'.
Minde, Henry. 2003a. 'Assimilation of the Sami – Implementation and Consequences'. *Acta Borealia* 20(2):121–46.
Minde, Henry. 2003b. 'The Challenge of Indigenism: The Struggle for Sami Land Rights and Self-Government in Norway 1960-1990'. Pp. 75–104 in *Indigenous Peoples: Resource Management and Global Rights*, edited by S. Jentoft, H. Minde, and R. Nilsen. Delft, The Netherlands: Eburon Delft.
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. 2016. 'Press Release: Tildeling av leteareal i 23. Konsesjonsrunde, 18.05.2016.' *Regjeringen.No*. Retrieved (https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/23.-konsesjonsrunde-tildeling/id2500924/).
Mitchell, Timothy. 1998. 'The Work of Economics: How a Discipline Makes Its World'. *European Journal of Sociology* 46(2):297–320.
Mitchell, Timothy. 2011. *Carbon Democracy : Political Power in the Age of Oil*. London; New York: Verso.
Morse, K. 2012. 'There Will Be Birds: Images of Oil Disasters in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries'. *Journal of American History* 99(1):124–34.
Moskwa, Wojciech. 2007. 'Arctic Boom Town Lit up by Gas Development'. *Reuters*, September 21.
Mouffe, Chantal. 2013. *Agonistics : Thinking the World Politically*. London: Verso.
Müftüoglu, Ingrid Birce et al. 2018. 'Rethinking Access. Key Methodological Challenges in Studying Energy Companies'. *Energy Research & Social Science* forthcomin.
Møller, Sunniva. 2016. 'Natur og Ungdom til Regjeringen: - Hva Faen Driver Dere Med?' *NRK*, May 20.
Nader, Laura. 1972. 'Up the Anthropologist: Perspectives Gained from Studying Up'. Pp. 284–311 in *Reinventing Anthropology*, edited by D. Hymes. New York: Pantheon Books.
Nader, Laura. 1981. 'Barriers to Thinking New about Energy'. *Physics Today* 24(2):9.
Nash, June C. 1993. *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us : Dependency and*

Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines. New York: Columbia university press.
NENT. 2014. *Regarding the Assessment of Research Ethics in Petroleum Research*.
Nergård, Jens-Ivar. 1994. *Det Skjulte Nord-Norge*. Oslo: Gyldendal.
Nergård, Jens-Ivar. 2006. *Den levende erfaring : en studie i samisk kunnskapstradisjon*. Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk forlag.
Nerheim, Gunnar. 1996. *Norsk oljehistorie. Bind 2*. Oslo: Norsk Petroleumsforening.
Neumann, Iver B. 2014. 'Imperializing Norden'. *Cooperation and Conflict* 49(1):119–29.
Nilsen, Trond. 2016. 'Samiske Interesser i En Nordnorsk Petroleumsregion'. Pp. 284–300 in *Nordområdene i Endring. Urfolkspolitikk og utvikling*, edited by E. Angell, S. Eikeland, and P. Selle. Oslo: Gyldendal akademisk.
Nilsen, Trond and Stig Halgeir Karlstad. 2016. *Regionale ringvirkninger av Goliatprosjektet og Eni Norges virksomhet i Nord-Norge. Leveranser og sysselsetting i Nord-Norge av Utbyggingsfase Goliat. (4/2016)*. Tromsø.
Nilsen, Trond and Stig Halgeir Karlstad. 2017. '«Når Tillit Brister»'. *Finnmark Dagblad*, June 28.
Nordström, Marika. 2017. 'Om Drömmar, Motstand Og Identitet. Samiske Musiker Berätter Om Sitt Musikkskapande'. Pp. 16–61 in *Samisk kamp. Kulturförmedling og rettviserørelse.*, edited by M. Lillequist and C. Cocq. Umeå: Bokförlaget h:strøm.
Norgaard, K. M. 2011. *Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and Everyday Life*. MIT Press.
Norman, Emma S. 2017. 'Standing Up for Inherent Rights: The Role of Indigenous-Led Activism in Protecting Sacred Waters and Ways of Life'. *Society & Natural Resources* 30(4):537–53.
Norsk Polarinstitutt. 2014. *Høringsuttalelse - Forslag Til Utlysning Av Blokker Til 23. Konsesjonsrunde*.
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014. *Norway's Arctic Policy*. Oslo.
NOU 1988: 17. *Frivillige Organisasjoner*. Oslo.
NPD, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. 2018. *Ressursrapport Leting 2018*. Oslo.
NPK, Norske petroleumskommuner. 2015. 'Høringsuttalelse Til Forslag Om å Fjerne Eiendomsskatt På Verk Og Bruk. [Statement for the Public Hearing on the Motion to Remove Property Tax on Mills and Factories]. Letter from NPK to the Department of Finance, Dated 31.08.2015.'
NRK Brennpunkt. 2009. 'Geir og Goliat [TV Documentary]'.
NTB, 2016. 'Fagforening anklager oljeselskap for bajaskultur.' *ABC Nyheter,* August 31.
Nuttall, Mark. 2010. *Pipeline Dreams : People, Environment, and the Arctic Energy Frontier*. Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs.
Nuttall, Mark. 2012. 'Imagining and Governing the Greenlandic Resource Frontier'. *The Polar Journal* 2(1):113–24.

Nuttall, Mark. 2013. 'Zero-Tolerance, Uranium and Greenland's Mining Future'. *The Polar Journal* 3(2):368–83.
Nygaard, Vigdis. 2016. 'The Extractive Industries and Society Do Indigenous Interests Have a Say in Planning of New Mining Projects ? Experiences from Finnmark , Norway'. *The Extractive Industries and Society* 3:17–24.
Oil change International. 2017. *The Sky's Limit: Why the Paris Climate Goals Require a Managed Decline of Fossil Fuel Production*. Washington, DC: OCI.
Olsen, Ingalill. 2018. 'Lei av å bli lurt – jeg konverterer'. *Nordnorsk Debatt*, March 21.
Ot.prp. nr. 43 (2008-2009). *Om lov om erverv og utvinning av mineralressurser (mineralloven).* Oslo: Nærings- og handelsdepartementet.
Ortner, Sherry B. 1978. *Sherpas Through Their Rituals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ortner, Sherry B. 1995. 'Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37(1):173–93.
Ortner, Sherry B. 2016. 'Dark Anthropology and Its Others: Theory since the Eighties'. *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory* 6(1):47–73.
Otte, Pia Piroschka, Katrina Rønningen, and Espen Moe. 2018. 'Contested Wind Energy: Discourses on Energy Impacts and Their Significance for Energy Justice in Fosen'. Pp. 140–58 in *Energy, Resource Extraction and Society: Impacts and Contested Futures*, edited by A. Szolucha. Oxon: Routledge.
Paine, Robert. 1957. *Coast Lapp Society.* Tromsø: Tromsø Museum.
Paine, Robert. 1965. *Coast Lapp Society. Vol. 2*. Tromsø: Tromsø Museum.
Paine, Robert. 1982. *Dam a River, Damn a People? IWGIA Document, 45*. Copenhagen.
Palmer, Marion. 2014. 'Nordområdesatsingas Utstillingsvindu'. *Nordnorsk Magasin* 3.
Pedersen, Paul and Asle M. Høgmo. 2012. *Sápmi slår tilbake : samiske revitaliserings- og moderniseringsprosesser i siste generasjon*. Kárásjohka: CálliidLágádus.
Pietikäinen, Sari. 2008. 'Broadcasting Indigenous Voices Sami Minority Media Production'. *European Journal of Communication* 23(2):173–91.
Plumwood, Val. 1993. *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.* New York/London: Routledge.
Powell, Richard C. 2008. 'Configuring an "Arctic Commons"?' *Political Geography* 27(8):827–32.
Prestmo, Joakim Blix, Birger Strøm, and Hilde Karoline Midsem. 2015. *Ringvirkninger av petroleumsnæringen i norsk økonomi*. Oslo: SSB.
PSA, Petroleum Safety Authorities. 2015a. *Revisjonsrapport: Rapport Etter Tilsyn Med Elektriske Anlegg På Goliat FPSO.* Report dated October 10.
PSA, Petroleum Safety Authorities 2015b. Rapport etter granskning av mann over bord hendelse på Scarabeo 8 den 20.2.2015. Report dated April 14.

PSA, Petroleum Safety Authorities 2016. Oppfølging av tilsyn innen logistikk, med tillegg av arbeidstakermedvirkning på Goliat. Report dated 18 February.
PSA, Petroleum Safety Authorities. 2017a. 'Pålegg til Eni Norge etter tilsyn med El-sikkerhet på Goliat.' October 6.
PSA, 2017b. Investigation report – Goliat FPSO – serious personal injury 250616. Report dated Januar 5.
PSA, 2017c. Årsrapport 2017-Petroleumstilsynet.
Radio Wolfgang. 2017. 'Unburnable: The People vs. Arctic Oil.'
Rajak, Dinah. 2011. 'Theatres of Virtue: Collaboration, Consensus, and the Social Life of Corporate Social Responsibility'. *Focaal* (60):9–20.
Ramsdal, Roald. 2013. 'Statoil: – Rystad får mene hva de vil'. *Teknisk Ukeblad*, November 15.
Ramsdal, Roald og Lars Taraldsen 2014. Derfor sprekker Goliat med minst 15 milliarder. *Tekniosk Ukeblad,* June 2.
Ramsdal, Roald 2015. Ny dødsulykke på Goliat-prosjektet. *Teknisk Ukeblad,* January 6.
Ravna, Øyvind. 2011. 'The Process of Identifying Land Rights in Parts of Northern Norway: Does the Finnmark Act Prescribe an Adequate Procedure within the National Law?' *Yearbook of Polar Law* 3:423–53.
Reed, Kristin. 2009. *Crude Existence*. 1st ed. University of California Press.
Rees, W. G., F. M. Stammler, F. S. Danks, and P. Vitebsky. 2007. 'Vulnerability of European Reindeer Husbandry to Global Change'. *Climatic Change* 87(1):199.
Reginiussen, Arne. 2018. 'Færre Søkere Truer Oljelinjer: - Det Er Svært Dramatisk'. *Finnmark Dagblad*, May 31.
Reinert, Hugo. 2018. 'Notes from a Projected Sacrifice Zone'. *ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies* 17(2 SE-Research).
Ringel, Felix. 2016. 'Beyond Temporality: Notes on the Anthropology of Time from a Shrinking Fieldsite'. *Anthropological Theory* 16(4):390–412.
Rogers, Douglas. 2015. 'Oil and Anthropology'. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 44(1).
Ryggvik, Helge. 2011. *Norske oljeerfaringer.* Oslo: Senter for teknologi, innovasjon og kultur (TIK).
Ryggvik, Helge. 2010. *The Norwegian Oil Experience: A Toolbox for Managing Resources?* Oslo: TIK.
Ryggvik, Helge and Berit Kristoffersen. 2015. 'Heating Up and Cooling Down the Petrostate: The Norwegian Experience'. Pp. 249–76 in *Ending the Fossil Fuel Era*, edited by T. Princen, J. P. Manno, and P. L. Martin. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Ryggvik, Helge and Marie Smith-Solbakken. 1997. *Norsk Oljehistorie. Bind 3*. Oslo: Norsk Petroleumsforening.
Sámediggi/Sámi Parliament. 2008. 'Sak R12/09 Utbygging Av Goliat - Høring Av

Konsekvensutredning. Letter from the Sami Parliament to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2008.'
Samuelsen, Kamilla. 2016. 'Oljemafiaens Ønskeliste'. *Miljømagasinet Putsj*, May 18.
Sandström, Moa. 2017. 'DeCo2onising Artivism'. Pp. 62–115 in *Samisk kamp. Kulturförmedling og rettviserørelse.*, edited by M. Liliequist and C. Cocq. Umeå: h:strøm.
Sara, Mikkel Nils. 2009. 'Siida and Traditional Sámi Reindeer Herding Knowledge'. *Northern Review; No 30: Spring 2009*.
Sawyer, Suzana. 2009. 'Human Energy'. *Dialectical Anthropology* 34(1):67–75.
Schechner, R. 2006. *Performance Studies: An Introduction*. Routledge.
Schechner, Richard. 1988. 'Performance Studies: The Broad Spectrum Approach'. *TDR (1988-)* 32(3):4–6.
Schechner, Richard and Willa Appel. 1990. *By Means of Performance: Intercultural Studies of Theatre and Ritual*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. 1992. *Death without Weeping : The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil*. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press.
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. 1995. 'The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant Anthropology'. *Current Anthropology* 36(3):409–40.
Schieffelin, Edward. 1996. 'On Failure and Performance: Throwing the Medium Out of the Seance'. Pp. 59–90 in *The Performance of Healing*, edited by C. Laderman and M. Roseman. New York: Routledge.
Scott, James C. 1989. 'Everyday Forms of Resistance'. *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 4(1):33.
Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing like a State : How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Searle, John R. 1969. *Speech Acts : An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Seglem, E., E. Skarsaune og Tor Gunnar Tollaksen, 2018. Goliat-skandalen i Stortinget: «Kast oljeselskapet Eni ut av norsk sokkel». *Stavanger Aftenblad* April 10.
Simpson, Audra. 2014. *Mohawk Interruptus : Political Life across the Borders of Settler States*. Durham [u.a.]: Duke Univ. Press.
Skarsaune, Erlend, Elisabeth Seglem, Tor Gunnar Tollaksen, and Hilde Øvrebekk. 2018. 'Goliat: Historien om alvorlige nestenulykker og et bakteppe av død og mulige forbrytelser'. *Stavanger Aftenblad*, April 7.
Skotnes, Vanja. 2016. '– Regjeringen viser fingeren til norske klimamål.' *Finnmark Dagblad*, May 20.
Solberg, Erna. 2014. 'Foreword'. in *Norway's Arctic Policy*. Oslo.
Species Databank of Norway. n.d. 'Rissa Tridactyla (Linnaeus, 1758) Krykkje'.

Artsdatabanken.No. Retrieved 4 November 2018 (https://artsdatabanken.no/Rodliste2015/rodliste2015/Norge/3705).
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1990. *The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*. Harasym, S. New York/London: Routledge.
Språkrådet. 2015. 'Årets Ord: Det Grønne Skiftet'. *Språkrådet.No*.
SSB. 2017a. 'Elektrisitet'. *SSB: Energi Og Industri*. Retrieved 4 November 2018 (http://www.ssb.no/energi-og-industri/statistikker/elektrisitet/aar).
SSB. 2017b. 'Utslipp Av Klimagasser'. Retrieved 6 November 2018 (https://www.ssb.no/klimagassn/).
St.meld. 7 (2006-2007). *Om Sametingets virksomhet*. Oslo: Arbeids- og inkluderingsdepartementet.
St.meld. nr. 27 (1996-97). *Om statens forhold til frivillige organisasjoner*. Oslo: Kulturdepartementet.
St.meld. nr. 8 (2005-2006). *Helhetlig Forvaltning Av Det Marine Miljø i Barentshavet Og Havområdene Utenfor Lofoten (Forvaltningsplan)*. Oslo: Miljøverndepartementet.
St.meld. nr 25 (1973-1974). *Petroleumsvirksomhetes plass i det norske samfunn*. Oslo: Olje- og energidepartementet.
St.prp. nr. 35 (2001-2002). *Utbygging, anlegg og drift av Snøhvit LNG.* Oslo: Olje- og energidepartementet.
St.prp. nr. 64 (2008–2009). *Utbygging og drift av Goliatfeltet*. Oslo: Olje- og energidepartementet.
Statista. 2018. 'Average Annual OPEC Crude Oil Price from 1960 to 2018 (in U.S. Dollars per Barrel)'. *The Statistics Portal*. Retrieved 12 September 2018 (https://www.statista.com/statistics/262858/change-in-opec-crude-oil-prices-since-1960/).
Statoil. 2001. *Snøhvit LNG. Konsekvensutredning*. Stavanger.
Statoil. 2015. 'Høringssvar fra Statoil om eiendomsbeskatning av arbeidsmaskiner Mv. i verk og bruk. [Statement for the Public Hearing on the Motion to Remove Property Tax on Mills and Factories].'
Steinberg, Philip E., Jeremy Tasch, Hannes Gerhardt, Adam Keul, and Elizabeth Nyman. 2015. *Contesting the Arctic : Politics and Imaginaries in the Circumpolar North*.
Steinberg, Philip and Berit Kristoffersen. 2017. '"The Ice Edge Is Lost … Nature Moved It": Mapping Ice as State Practice in the Canadian and Norwegian North'. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 42(4):625–41.
Stephansen, Maria Therese. 2017. 'A Hand-Drawn Map as a Decolonising Document: Keviselie (Hans Ragnar Mathisen) and the Artistic Empowerment of the Sami Movement'. *Afterall: A Journal of Art, Context and Enquiry* 44:112–21.

Storsveen, Arne. 2016. '– Kroken på døra for norsk miljøtroverdighet'. *Nu.No*.
Stortinget. 2009. 'Minutes from Agenda Item No.18., Thursday 18.06.2009.' Retrieved 8 September 2018 (https://www.stortinget.no/nn/Saker-og-publikasjonar/Publikasjoner/Referat/Stortinget/2008-2009/090618/18/).
Stortinget. 2010. 'Møte onsdag den 10. februar 2010 Kl. 10. [Oral Question Time]'. Retrieved 12 August 2018 (https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2009-2010/100210/muntligsporretime/#a5).
Stortinget. 2016. 'Åpen Høring i Stortingets Energi- Og Miljøkomité Onsdag 18. Mai 2016'. Retrieved 12 August 2018 (https://www.stortinget.no/no/Hva-skjer-pa-Stortinget/Horing/Horingsprogram/?dateid=10003946)
Stortinget, 2017. 'Skriftlig spørsmål fra Kari Elisabeth Kaski (SV) til olje- og energiministeren. Dokument nr. 15:177 (2017-2018)' Retrieved 5 May 2019. (https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Sporsmal/Skriftlige-sporsmal-og-svar/Skriftlig-sporsmal/?qid=70044).
Stortinget, 2018. 'Skriftlig spørsmål fra Lars Haltbrekken (SV) til olje- og energiministeren. Dokument nr. 15:1292 (2017-2018)'. Retrieved 5 May 2019. (https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Sporsmal/Skriftlige-sporsmal-og-svar/Skriftlig-sporsmal/?qid=71827)
Strathern, M. 2011. 'Binary License'. *Common Knowledge* 17(1):87–103.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1991. *Partial Connections*. Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1999. *Property, Substance and Effect : Anthropological Essays on Persons and Things*. London: Athlone.
Sunde, Jørn Øyrehagen. 2017. 'Klimasøksmål og demokrati'. *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 34(04):354–65.
Svensson, Tom G. 1976. *Ethnicity and Mobilization in Sami Politics*. Stockholm: [Dept. of social anthropology, Univ. of Stockholm].
Sverdrup, Liv Astrid. 1997. 'Norway's Institutional Response to Sustainable Development'. *Comparative Politics* 58–82.
Szolucha, Anna, ed. 2018. *Energy, Resource Extraction and Society: Impacts and Contested Futures*. Oxon: Routledge.
Sæther, Anne Karin. 2017. *De Beste Intensjoner: Oljelandet i Klimakampen*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm.
Taraldsen, Lars. 2016a. 'Folk flyttet og byen var i fullt forfall. Så kom oljeindustrien'. *Teknisk Ukeblad*, March 24.
Taraldsen, Lars. 2016b. 'Goliat-ansatte varslet myndighetene. 12 dager senere kom ulykken de hadde forutsett.' *Teknisk Ukeblad,* July 1.

Taraldsen, Lars 2016c. 'Fire ganger på et halvår slapp Goliat ut svarte kjemikalier' *Teknisk Ukeblad,* January 18.
Taraldsen, Lars. 2017a. 'Det går mot nye søksmål mot Goliat-operatøren: – Vi kan ikke vente lenger'. *Teknisk Ukeblad*, February 28.
Taraldsen, Lars. 2017b. 'Rot og feil i Goliat-tallene: Her er e-Postene som vekker internasjonal oppsikt.' *Teknisk Ukeblad*, November 8.
Taraldsen, Lars 2017c Statsadvokaten har henlagt Goliats gjentatte utslipp av svarte kjemikalier. *Teknisk Ukeblad.* April 21.
Taraldsen, Lars and Eirik Helland Urke. 2016. 'Da Lien åpnet Goliat-Feltet, var produksjonen stengt ned etter lekkasje. Fire timer senere gikk alarmen igjen.' *Teknisk Ukeblad*, April 22.
Taussig, Michael. 1980. *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America*. Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina Press.
Thengs, Gøran Østerman. 2017. 'En standardtilnærming til Grunnloven § 112'. *Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap* 130(01):28–67.
Thesen, Gunnar and Einar Leknes. 2010. 'Nord-Norge i norsk petroleumspolitikk – Narrativer Og Politisk Endring'. Pp. 45–76 in *Oljevirksomhetens inntog i nord*, edited by P. Arbo and B. Hersoug. Oslo: Gyldendal akademisk.
Trellevik, Amund. 2016. 'Oljebransjen nekter å delta i sin egen «oljerettssak»'. *NRK*, December 28.
Tsing, Anna. 2000. 'Inside the Economy of Appearances'. *Public Culture* 12(1):115.
Tsing, Anna. 2005. *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Encounter*.
Tsoukas, Haridimos. 1999. 'David and Goliath in the Risk Society: Making Sense of the Conflict between Shell and Greenpeace in the North Sea'. *Organization* 6(3):499–528.
Turner, Victor. 1974. *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors : Symbolic Action in Human Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Turner, Victor. 1982. *From Ritual to Theatre : The Human Seriousness of Play*. New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications.
Turner, Victor. 1990. 'Are There Universals of Performance in Myth, Ritual and Drama?' Pp. 8–18 in *By means of performance. Intercultural studies of theatre and ritual*, edited by R. Schechner and W. Appel. Cambridge [England] ;New York: Cambridge University Press.
Turner, Victor Witter. 1957. *Schism and Continuity in an African Society; a Study of Ndembu Village Life*. [Manchester, Eng.: Published on behalf of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia, by Manchester University Press.
Tveiterås, Kathrine. 2010. 'Snøhvit – et megaprosjekt tar Ffrm'. in *Oljevirksomhetens inntog i nord*, edited by P. Arbo and B. Hersoug. Oslo: Gyldendal akademisk.
Uhre, Kjerstin. 2015. 'Sápmi and the Fennoscandian Shield: On and Off the Map'.

Moving Worlds 15(2):81–92.
United Nations. 1987. *Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future*.
Vallejo, Catalina and Siri Gloppen. 2013. 'Red-Green Lawfare? Climate Change Narratives in Courtrooms'. in *Climate Talk*, edited by J. Dugard, A. L. St.Clair, and S. Gloppen. Juta Law.
Vatne, Marianne. 2011. 'Petroleumsjournalistikk på Helgeland : Om Skarv-eventyret og lokalpressen i oljebyen Sandnessjøen'. Høgskolen i Bodø.
Verdery, Katherine. 2002. 'Seeing Like a Mayor'. *Ethnography* 3:5–33.
VG. 2016. 'Leder: Ingen sak for rettsvesenet'. *VG*, October 25.
Vik, Synnøve Marie. 2017. 'Petro-Images of the Arctic and Statoil's Visual Imaginary'. Pp. 43–58 in *Arctic Environmental Modernities: From the Age of Polar Exploration to the Era of the Anthropocene*.
Vike, Halvard. 2018. 'Politics and Bureaucracy in the Norwegian Welfare State : An Anthropological Approach'.
Vistnes, Ingunn Ims et al. 2009. *Reindeer Husbandry and Barents 2030: Impacts of Future Petroleum Development on Reindeer Husbandry in the Barents Region*. Alta.
Visweswaran, Kamala. 2011. 'Conclusion: Fragile Facts On Scholarship and Activism'. *Cultural Dynamics* 23(1):73–79.
Vitebsky, Piers and Anatoly Alekseyev. 2015. 'What Is a Reindeer? Indigenous Perspectives from Northeast Siberia'. *Polar Record* 51(4):413–21.
Vågenes, Tina Andersen. 2018. 'Vil du være med å aksjonere for Repparfjord og Førdefjorden?' *Nu.No*.
Wagner, Roy. 1981. *The Invention of Culture. Revised and Expanded Edition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wanvik, Tarje Iversen and Ken Caine. 2017. 'Understanding Indigenous Strategic Pragmatism: Métis Engagement with Extractive Industry Developments in the Canadian North'. *The Extractive Industries and Society* 4(3):595–605.
Watts, Michael. 2001. 'Petro-Violence: Community, Extraction, and Political Ecology of a Mythic Commodity'. Pp. 189–212 in *Violent environments*, edited by N. L. Peluso and M. Watts. New York: Cornell University Press.
Watts, Michael. 2004. 'Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria'. *Geopolitics* 9(1):50–80.
Ween, Gro B. and Marianne Lien. 2012. 'Decolonialization in the Arctic? Nature Practices and Land Rights in the Norwegian High North.' *Journal of Rural and Community Development* 7(1):93–109.
Welker, Marina. 2014. *Enacting the Corporation : An American Mining Firm in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia.* University of California Press.

West, Sandra Márjá. 2016. 'Sjøsamisk betyr ikke gruvesamisk'. *Altaposten*, March 9.
Weszkalnys, Gisa. 2008. 'Hope & Oil: Expectations in SãO Tomé E Príncipe'. *Review of African Political Economy* 35(117):473–82.
Weszkalnys, Gisa. 2011. 'Cursed Resources, or Articulations of Economic Theory in the Gulf of Guinea'. *Economy and Society* 40(3):345–72.
Weszkalnys, Gisa. 2014. 'Anticipating Oil: The Temporal Politics of a Disaster Yet to Come'. *The Sociological Review* 62(1_suppl):211–35.
White, Leslie A. 1943. 'Energy and the Evolution of Culture'. *American Anthropologist* 45(3):335–56.
Ytreberg, Rune. 2012. '- Gi fra deg fiskekvotene, Røkke!' *NRK*, December 6.
Ytreberg, Rune. 2013. 'PR, Presse, Penger Og Plagiat'. Pp. 45–66 in *Hvor går Nord-Norge? Politiske tidslinjer*, edited by S. Jentoft, K. A. Røvik, and J.-I. Nergård. Stamsund: Orkana Forlag.
Ytreberg, Rune. 2016. 'Sendt til Norge for å rydde opp'. *Dagens Næringsliv*, September 25.
Zaloom, Caitlin. 2004. 'The Productive Life of Risk'. *Cultural Anthropology* 19(3):365–91.
Zorgdrager, Nellejet. 1997. *De rettferdiges strid: Kautokeino 1852 : Samisk motstand mot norsk kolonialisme*. Vett & Viten i samarbeid med Norsk folkmuseum.
Østvik, Helle. 2016. 'Erna om Kystopprøret: Det var uansett for mange steder å levere fisk'. *Finnmark Dagblad*, July 7.
Østvik, Helle. 2017. 'Her mangler ingenting'. *Finnmark Dagblad*, April 20.
Åhren, Christina. 2008. 'Är jag en riktig same? : En etnologisk studie av unga samers identitetsarbete.' Umeå: University of Umeå.

Appendix A: A brief history of early petroleum management

1959: ExxonMobil and Shell found gas near the Netherlands in 1959, and subsequently thinks there might also be oil in the North Sea, which has a similar geology.

1962: The American petroleum company Philips contacts the Norwegian government to carry out seismic surveys offshore in Norway.

1963: Norway declares the resources below the seabed to belong under Norwegian jurisdiction and starts creating legislation to secure the resources will remain under Norwegian control. An agreement of a division line at the halfway point between Norway and the UK, Midtlinjeprinsippet, comes into place.

1965: The Concession Law is made and the first concessions awarded.

1966: The first test drilling takes place on the NCS. They are dry, but companies find petroleum resources subsequent years.

1969: The Ekofisk Field is discovered in the North Sea, one of the biggest offshore fields ever found in the world.

1971: Ekofisk starts production. The Standing Committee on industry in the Storting produces what has since been known as the '10 oil commandments'. These included the goal of national supervision and control for all operations on the NCS, the creation of a Norwegian petroleum company, that Norwegian industry should be competent to serve the new industry, and that operations should be environmentally responsible.

1972: Statoil, directly controlled by the Norwegian state, is created, as a tool for state participation in the petroleum production on the NCS. The Petroleum Directorate is created to regulate security offshore and to have an oversight over the geology.

1974: The Report to the Norwegian Storting on 'The role of petroleum activities in Norwegian society' (St.meld. nr 25 (1973-1974)) is delivered. It states that the wealth created from oil should be used to develop a 'qualitatively better society'; that Norway should take a 'moderate pace' in the extraction of petroleum resources, and that there should be a cap on production of maximum 90 million tons of oil equivalents per year.

Sources: (Hanisch and Nerheim 1992; McNeish and Logan 2012; Nerheim 1996; Ryggvik 2011; Ryggvik 2010; Ryggvik and Kristoffersen 2015; Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken 1997)

Appendix B. The Norwegian Licencing System and the Petroleum Act

Numbered licencing rounds on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) is the primary procedure for how the Norwegian government grant permission for companies to start exploration in defined areas, and have taken place roughly every other year since 1965. Each licencing round is preceded by a nomination process where oil companies operating on the NCS say which blocks they want included in that round, before the Petroleum Directorate reviews nominations and recommends to the Ministry which blocks should be included. Licences in areas where there already is activity, so-called mature areas, can also happen in a less lengthy procedure, the Awards in Predefined Areas (APA). The APA procedure was introduced in 2003 to aid extraction of resources nearby already existing infrastructure.

For the first 43 years, the licencing rounds were made without public hearings after the nominations were recommended by the Petroleum Directorate, but since the 20th licencing round in 2008, public hearings have been part of the licencing procedure.[49] After this public consultation, the Government makes the final decision about which blocks companies can bid for, and whether there are any special requirements or restrictions for environmental or fisheries-related activities to ensure that the petroleum production takes extra precautions in particularly sensitive areas. After the companies have submitted their applications, the Government makes their final considerations (which might include negotiations with companies), and decide which companies will get which licences. This is then formally granted by the King-in-Council, the weekly meetings at the Royal Castle in Oslo, where the decisions of the Government, the so-called Council of State, are formally enacted.[50]

[49] A public hearing in Norwegian politics allows organisations, members of the public and business interests to state their opinion on the areas recommended for opening by the Petroleum Directorate.
[50] The most important political discussions on a political level in Norway are held in Government conference before the formal meeting of the King-in-Council. The King does not make but only

The process of awarding new areas for petroleum exploration on the NCS is regulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Act of 1996[51], and there are three steps towards petroleum production which are regulated by different parts of this act, regulating them into an order where specific concerns are addressed at each respective stage. Opening of new areas is regulated by statute 3.1 of the Act, and requires an assessment '*of the impact of the petroleum activities on trade, industry and the environment, and of possible risks of pollution, as well as the economic and social effects that may be a result of the petroleum activities.'* It is the Government Department (Ministry) that decides on the exact administrative procedure for each case.

The Act prescribes the minimal requirements for a licencing application, in particular which assessments and surveys are to be undertaken before the block is opened up. The Act also defines the interested parties that are the official parties be heard on the matter. Hearings in Norway are open and public, and while local public authorities and trade and industry associations typically are invited parties to a hearing, all other potentially interested parties, including the Sámediggi,[52] can make their input heard by responding within the time frame where all interested parties may submit their views which thus become part of the administrative evaluation of the licencing application.

---

sanctions decisions in Norwegian politics, nevertheless the institution of the King-in-Council is a formality that remains part of the political system. All legislation and other decisions made in the Council of the State are signed by the King and then countersigned by the Prime Minister, and only enters into effect after this formal sanction has been given. The effect of the procedure is to ensure collective cabinet responsibility whereby the whole of the government, rather than only the minister of the relevant department, formally accepts the law or decision made. (Andenæs and Fliflet 2004)

[51] Act 29 November 1996 No. 72 relating to petroleum activities. English-language version read on the web page of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 06.11.18. http://www.npd.no/en/Regulations/Acts/Petroleum-activities-act/#Section%203-3. Norwegian version of the law in https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1996-11-29-72?q=petroleumsloven

[52] The Act, with an opening paragraph which declares the petroleum resources the property of the Norwegian state, for the good of the Norwegian society, thus excludes other possible claims, including any that might come from the indigenous Sami.

An eventual production licence is granted by the King-in-Council. This licence may cover one or more blocks or parts of them, and statute 3-3 of the Act 'entails an exclusive right to survey, exploration drilling and production of petroleum deposits in areas covered by the licence.' Before this is granted, the Government Department has to announce publicly which blocks companies can bid for licences in, and allow for a time period where this will happen. Then, typically, the Government Department appoints the operator of the licence which will be awarded – the event which took place in Hammerfest on 18 May. Finally, the King-in-Council formally establishes the production licence. The steps necessary before the Norwegian state allows actual petroleum production are much longer: if the companies find resources they consider to be commercially viable, they may apply for permission to install and operate production facilities, starting their application with a specific impact assessment for the field they have a licence to operate in.